Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Jeffrey D. Lebowitz, J.), rendered May 29, 2012. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of trespass.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is reversed, on the law, and the accusatory instrument is dismissed.

Defendant was convicted, after a nonjury trial, of trespass (Penal Law § 140.05). To establish defendant's guilt of trespass, the People had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant, an employee of the Sheriff's Office, knowingly entered or remained unlawfully in the Sheriff's Office. "A person enters or remains unlawfully' in or upon premises when he is not licensed or privileged to do so" (Penal Law § 140.00 [5]). A person who enters or remains upon premises who honestly believes that he is licensed or privileged to so enter or remain, is not guilty of any degree of criminal trespass (see People v Basch, 36 NY2d 154, 159 [1975]). Assuming, without deciding, that defendant's right to remain on the premises had been properly revoked, it was nonetheless reasonable, under the facts and circumstances established, for defendant to conclude that he had a license or privilege to remain on the premises. Thus, such a belief, even if mistaken, negated the element of knowingly remaining unlawfully on the premises necessary to convict defendant of trespass (see People v Harrell, 133 AD2d 706 [1987] People v Insogna, 86 AD2d 979 [1982]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the accusatory instrument is dismissed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 07, 2014