Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Mary Kim Dollard, J.), entered September 13, 2012. The judgment, entered pursuant to a January 26, 2012 decision of the same court, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the complaint.

ORDERED that, on the court's own motion, the notice of appeal from the decision dated January 26, 2012 is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment entered September 13, 2012 (see CPLR 5520 [c]); and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

On this appeal, plaintiff contends that the Civil Court, after a nonjury trial, erroneously dismissed the complaint, which asserted causes of action to recover damages based on an allegedly illegal search of plaintiff, and for plaintiff's "wrongful ejection" by police from a Staten Island office building.

In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, an appellate court's power is as broad as that of the trial court, and the appellate court may render a judgment it finds warranted by the facts, bearing in mind that in a close case, the trial court had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses (see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983] Tyree v Henn, 109 AD3d 906, 907 [2013] Irobunda v Western Union Financial Services, Inc., 36 Misc 3d 144[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51551[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2012]). Resolution of issues of credibility is for the trier of fact, which had the opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses (see Rodriguez v Herrera, 34 Misc 3d 147[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50175[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]).

Here, the record amply supports the Civil Court's determination. The evidence indicates that two police officers responded to a 911 call that a person was trespassing in an office building. Upon arrival, the officers encountered plaintiff. One of the officers testified that plaintiff was very agitated, was moving around a lot, was carrying many items, and was wearing "large clothing." The officer further testified that he believed that plaintiff might have had a weapon, and searched him out of concern for his safety. The officers then directed plaintiff to leave the building and not return. Plaintiff was not arrested.

Plaintiff's cause of action to recover damages based on an allegedly illegal search was properly dismissed, as the officers had lawfully searched plaintiff's coat pockets based on their reasonable suspicion that plaintiff was armed or posed a threat to their safety (see People v Batista, 88 NY2d 650, 654 [1996] People v Torres, 74 NY2d 224, 226 [1989] People v Jimenez, 98 AD3d 886 [2012], lv granted 20 NY3d 987 [2012] Evans v Solomon, 681 F Supp [*2]2d 233, 255 [ED NY 2010] cf. People v Evans, 45 NY2d 160 [1977]). Moreover, plaintiff did not establish that he "experienced a significant intrusion of his . . . freedom of movement so as to amount to an actionable seizure" (Brown v State of New York, 45 AD3d 15, 24-25 [2007]). Thus, he did not establish grounds entitling him to a damages remedy (see Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 83 [2001]). Furthermore, to the extent plaintiff's claim is predicated on 42 USC § 1983, defendant cannot be liable for the acts of individual employees under the doctrine of respondent superior unless the acts were based on an official municipal policy or custom (see City of Canton, Ohio v Harris, 489 US 378 [1989] Monell v Department of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 US 658, 694 [1978] Leftenant v City of New York, 70 AD3d 596, 895 [2003] Davis v City of New York, 228 F Supp 2d 327, 336-337 [2002]). There is no evidence that the officers acted pursuant to defendant's policy or custom.

Plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 28, 2014