| Busari v Rahman |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 50365(U) [42 Misc 3d 147(A)] |
| Decided on February 28, 2014 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Appeal from a judgment of Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County
(Anna Culley, J.), entered August 9, 2012. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded
plaintiff the principal sum of $520.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff commenced this small claims action against her former landlord to recover her security deposit in the amount of $520. After a nonjury trial, the Civil Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $520. On appeal, defendant argues that she should have been able to retain the security deposit as a setoff against unpaid rent.
The standard of review of an appeal of a small claims judgment is whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (CCA 1807). Resolution of issues of credibility is for the trier of fact, as it had the opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses (see McGuirk v Mugs Pub, 250 AD2d 824 [1998] Richard's Home Ctr. & Lbr. v Kraft, 199 AD2d 254 [1993]), and the decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's determination could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). The deference normally accorded to the credibility determination of a trial court "applies with greater force" to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court, given the limited scope of review (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]).
It is undisputed that plaintiff gave defendant a security deposit in the sum of $520 and that it was not returned to plaintiff after plaintiff vacated the premises. A tenant's security deposit is the property of the person making the deposit (General Obligations Law § 7-103). While, upon a default by a tenant, a security deposit may be used by the landlord as a setoff against amounts owed to the landlord (see Rivertower Assoc. v Chalfen, 153 AD2d 196, 199 [1990]), here, the trier of fact found that defendant had failed to establish at trial that plaintiff had defaulted in payment of one month's rent in the amount of $520. As we find no basis to disturb the credibility determination of the trial court, we conclude that the judgment rendered substantial justice between the parties (see CCA 1804, 1807).
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 28, 2014