Capelo v Tinoco (2014 NY Slip Op 50367(U))

Capelo v Tinoco

2014 NY Slip Op 50367(U) [42 Misc 3d 147(A)]

Decided on February 28, 2014

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

Jacinta N. Capelo, Appellant,

against

Diego Tinoco, Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Joseph E. Capella, J.), entered October 15, 2012. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the action.

Plaintiff commenced this small claims action to recover the principal sum of $5,000, alleging that defendant had failed to pay for services rendered. After a nonjury trial, the Civil Court dismissed the action, stating that there was no proof of an oral or written contract. Upon a review of the record, we find that the judgment provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see CCA 1804, 1807; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000] Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]).

The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992] Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126).

In this case, it is undisputed that there was no proof of any oral or written contract.
Moreover, neither the elements of an implied-in-fact contract nor an implied-in-law contract were established (see Kapral's Tire Svc. Inc. v Aztek Tread Corp., 124 AD2d 1011 [1986] see also Joan Hansen & Co. v Everlast World's Boxing Headquarters Corp., 296 AD2d 103 [2002]). Accordingly, the action was properly dismissed and the judgment is affirmed.