| Arias v Arbelaez |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 50428(U) [42 Misc 3d 1238(A)] |
| Decided on March 17, 2014 |
| Supreme Court, Queens County |
| McDonald, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Amparo Arias,
Plaintiff,
against Jorge E. Arbelaez, THREE A'S 250-02 LLC, WELLS FARGO BANK N.A., HECTOR ATILIO MARICHAL, P.C., HECTOR ATILIO MARICHAL, JAIME RAMIREZ, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE (said names being fictitious, it being the intention of the plaintiff to designate all parties or entities if any, having or claiming an interest or lien upon the mortgaged premises, Defendants. |
The following papers numbered 1 to 19 were read on this motion by defendant HECTOR ATILIO MARICHAL, P.C. also sued as HECTOR ATILIO MARICHAL, for an order pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) dismissing the plaintiff's amended complaint against said defendant for failure to state a cause of action:
Papers Numbered
Notice of Motion-Affidavits-Exhibits-Memo of Law.....1 - 8
Affirmation in Opposition-Affidavits-Exhibits........9 - 15
Reply affirmation...................................16 - 19
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In this action for breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, fraud in the
factum, fraud in the inducement, breach of contract, imposition of a constructive trust,
unjust enrichment, and action to quiet title pursuant to RPAPL Article [*2]15, defendant HECTOR ATILIO MARICHAL, P.C., also
sued as HECTOR ATILIO MARICHAL moves, prior to filing an answer, for an order
pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7); dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action against him upon which relief may be granted.
According to the supplemental summons and amended verified complaint,
filed on October 3, 2013, the plaintiff, Amparo Arias, was approached by defendant,
Jorge E. Arbelaez, with respect to purchasing the subject premises, a residential property
located at 250-02, 87th Avenue, Bellerose, New York. Plaintiff alleges that on December
17, 2011, she entered into a written "Acquisition Agreement" with Arbelaez whereby
plaintiff would provide the necessary funds to acquire the property, and Arbelaez would
handle the administrative process. The agreement stated that each party would be a 50%
owner of a corporation known as "THREE A'S 250-02 LLC" formed to hold title of the
premises and the corporation would hold the title in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff
with title to ultimately pass to the plaintiff as the equitable owner on a future date. In
order to acquire the premises, the buyer, THREE A'S 250-02 LLC, was to assume four
separate mortgages totaling $550,000 and plaintiff would put up $50,000 for the
acquisition of the property. The complaint states that defendant Hector Marichal
represented the plaintiff, defendant Arbelaez, and the corporation in the acquisition of
the premises.
Plaintiff alleges that she paid $50,000, a portion of which went to Arbelaez
and a portion to Hector Marichal, as attorney, to cover the costs of acquiring the
premises. On March 2, 2012 the corporation was taking title to the property subject to the
four mortgages. Plaintiff claims that subsequent to the purchase she expended an
additional $60,000 to settle and satisfy three existing mortgages on the property. Plaintiff
claims that in March 2013 defendants Arbelaez and Marichal did not remit any of the
monies she paid towards the first mortgage and as a result the property is in foreclosure.
In addition, plaintiff contends that she did not receive marketable title in her name nor
has she received any of the corporate documents for Three A's 25-02 LLC after repeated
requests.
Plaintiff asserts causes of action for a constructive trust asserting that the
plaintiff is the equitable owner of the property and that nominal title was taken in the
name of the corporation on behalf of the plaintiff and that despite her investment of
$110,000 defendants have refused to reconvey title to the plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that
as a result, the defendants will be unjustly enriched if the premises are [*3]permitted to remain as presently titled.
With respect to defendant Hector Marichal, the complaint alleges that he was
part of a conspiracy with the other defendants in which they had a preconceived intention
not to honor their obligations to plaintiff but rather to secure their business interests for
their own benefit. Therefore, plaintiff asserts causes of action against Hector Marichal
for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and legal malpractice. Plaintiff
asserts in this regard that Marichal had no intention of fully representing plaintiff in the
transaction and induced the plaintiff to transfer at least $110,000 to defendant as legal
fees and acquisition costs. Counsel alleges that Marichal breached his legal and
contractual duties to the plaintiff by engaging in fraudulent and deceitful conduct, failing
to deliver marketable title, failing to inform plaintiff that the premises was in foreclosure
prior to the purchase, and failing to disclose his conflict of interest with the seller,
Ramirez.
Mr. Marichal submits an affirmation in support of the motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's complaint against him. He states that in early 2013, defendant Jaime Ramirez,
the seller of the property, and defendant Arbelaez, came to his office to retain him for the
sale of Ramirez's property to Three A's. He states he was not made aware of the
Acquisition Agreement with the plaintiff. His claims that his retainer, which was not
produced, states that he was only representing the interests of the LLC and that Ramirez
was advised to retain his own attorney. On March 1, 2012, the deed was transferred and
the LLC assumed the various mortgages. Subsequent to the transfer of the deed,
Marichal paid Ramirez $22,500 from his escrow account which monies had been given
to him by plaintiff Arias. Marichal states that the complaint fails to state a cause of action
against him because it was his client, defendant Arbelaez, who breached the agreement
with the plaintiff. Marichal contends that the plaintiff has presented no evidence that he
was part of a conspiracy to defraud her. In addition, he claims that any damages sustained
by the plaintiff were the result of Arbelaez's breach of contract rather than fraud or
malpractice that was committed by him.
Marichal's attorney, Charles Zolot, Esq., submits an affirmation stating that
other than preparing the transfer documents from Ramirez to Three A's and remitting
plaintiff's funds to Mr. Ramirez, Marichal had nothing to do with any agreement between
the plaintiff and defendant Arbelaez. Mr. Zolot contends that the causes of action for
fraud must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of [*4]action because they were not pled with particularity.
Counsel states there is no statement in the pleading that alleges that Marichal
misrepresented a material fact which was known to be false by the defendant and which
induced the plaintiff to unjustifiably rely on such misrepresentation to her detriment.
Counsel claims that the complaint only states conclusory allegations of fraud and
contains no facts as to how Marichal induced plaintiff to enter into an agreement or in
what respect he participated in an elaborate scheme to defraud her of her investment. In
addition, counsel asserts that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against
Marichal for legal malpractice and breach of contract. Counsel asserts that any damages
sustained by the plaintiff were the result of Arbelaez's failure to honor his agreement to
deliver marketable title to the plaintiff and not the result of any misconduct by Marichal.
In opposition, Carolyn S. Clyne, Esq., counsel for plaintiff states that
because Mr. Arbelaez had not remitted any of the over $50,000 paid by the plaintiff to
satisfy the first mortgage with Wells Fargo that the property is now in foreclosure.
Plaintiff asserts that the with the respect to the second and third causes of
action alleging fraud against the defendants that the pleadings sufficiently set forth
factual allegations that all of the defendants, including Hector Marichal, engaged in a
fraudulent scheme at the behest of Arbelaez to defraud the plaintiff. Plaintiff contends
that both Arbelaez and Marichal, who represented the plaintiff's LLC, accepted monies
from the plaintiff as part of the scheme but failed to appropriately represent or advise the
plaintiff regarding the transaction vis a vis the assumption of the mortgages and the
Wells Fargo mortgage that was in foreclosure.
With respect to the fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action for breach of
contract, legal malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty, counsel alleges that Marichal's
conduct in the real estate transaction fell below the standard of care and diligence
commonly possessed by other members of the bar. Counsel claims that the evidence
submitted demonstrates that Ms. Arias brought checks to Marichal's office which were
remitted to him as her attorney and deposited in his attorney escrow account. Plaintiff
claims that Marichal failed to retain the services of a title company, failed to notify Wells
Fargo, who holds a mortgage and, as to the transaction, represented all parties including
the seller and buyer. Further, the plaintiff claims that Marichal failed to advise her that
the property was already in foreclosure when the deed was transferred to her corporation
Plaintiff claims that fraud and malpractice was perpetrated by Marichal in [*5]that plaintiff was deprived of the funds which she
contributed to the purchase of the subject premises and Marichal and the other
defendants misappropriated the funds provided by the plaintiff and failed to convey
marketable title to the premises to her as promised.
On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure
to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true,
accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether
the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Nonnon v City of New York, 9
NY3d 825[2007] Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]).
Here, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, according the
plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determining only whether the
allegations fit within any cognizable legal theory (see DeSandolo v United Airlines Inc., 71 AD3d 1073 [2d
Dept.2010] AG Capital
Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co., 5 NY3d 58 [2005]), this
Court finds that the plaintiff has sufficiently stated a cause of action for fraud, legal
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty against Marichal. In the early stages of litigation
such as the pre-discovery stage, "plaintiffs are entitled to the most favorable inferences,
including inferences arising from the positions and responsibilities of defendants," and
"plaintiffs need only set forth sufficient information to apprise defendants of the alleged
wrongs" (DDJ Mgt., LLC v
Rhone Group L.L.C., 78 AD3d 442 [1st Dept. 2010] also see Selechnik v Law Off. of Howard
R. Birnbach, 82 AD3d 1077 [2d Dept. 2011).
The complaint sufficiently alleges that the moving defendant was involved
as an attorney in what is alleged to be a scheme in which Arbelaez formed a corporation
with the plaintiff to purchase the subject property under then name of Three A's 25-02
LLC the terms of which required the plaintiff to provide all the financing whereas
Arbelaez provided the administrative work. The complaint asserts that Marichal
represented the plaintiff's corporation and had an attorney-client and fiduciary
relationship with Arias as he accepted funds from the plaintiff and transferred a deed on
behalf of her corporation but failed to properly advise the plaintiff that the premises were
already in foreclosure and as such the complaint sufficiently alleges that he failed to
properly represent the plaintiff's interests. Such failure to disclose, it is alleged, was
designed to deceive plaintiff and to misappropriate her funds. As such, the allegations of
failure to disclose material facts regarding the sale as set forth in the complaint are
pleaded with sufficient [*6]detail as to clearly inform
defendant Marichal with respect to the allegedly fraudulent real estate transactions
complained of and the role of the moving defendant therein (see Lanzi v Brooks,
43 NY2d 778 [1977] RBE N.
Funding, Inc. v Stone Mtn. Holdings, LLC, 78 AD3d 807 [2d Dept. 2010]).
In a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly
possessed by a member of the legal profession and that the attorney's breach of this
professional duty caused the plaintiff's actual damages (see Stuart v Robert L. Folks & Assoc.,
LLP, 106 AD3d 808 [2d Dept. 2013]). To establish a breach of fiduciary duty, a
party must prove the existence of a fiduciary relationship, misconduct by the defendant,
and damages that were directly caused by the misconduct(see Kurtzman v Bergstol, 40
AD3d 588 [2d Dept 2007]).
Here, construing the amended complaint liberally, accepting the facts alleged
in the amended complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every
possible inference, the complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action for legal
malpractice in that Marichal's conduct in the real estate transaction with respect to Ms.
Arias fell below the appropriate standard of care, in that he breached his legal and
fiduciary duty, accepted funds from the plaintiff for the real estate transaction, and failed
to apprise the plaintiff of the ramifications of the sale to her corporation allegedly
resulting in her losing her investment of $110,000. In addition, the defendant failed to
present documentary evidence conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law (see
Almieri v Biggiani, 108 AD3d 604 [2d Dept. 2013]). However, the cause of
action alleging breach of contract is dismissed as duplicative of the cause of action
alleging legal malpractice as it arose from the same facts as the legal malpractice cause of
action (see Gaskin v Harris,
98 AD3d 941 [2d Dept. 2012).]
Accordingly, for all of the above stated reasons, it is hereby,
ORDERED, that the motion of Hector Atilio Marichal to dismiss the
complaint against him is denied, and it is further,
ORDERED that defendant shall serve an answer if he has not already done
so within 20 days of service of a copy of this order with notice of entry thereof.
[*7]
Dated: Long Island City, NY
March 17, 2014
______________________________
ROBERT J. MCDONALD
J.S.C.