Defendant pro se moves pursuant to CPL 440.10, to vacate his conviction on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's alleged failure to advise him that his guilty plea would have several collateral consequences. The People oppose Defendant's motion.

On July 17, 1990, Defendant pled guilty in Bronx Supreme Court (Burton Hecht, J.) to Grand Larceny in the Third Degree (PL §155.35[1]) in exchange for a promised indeterminate [*2]sentence of from 1 to 3 years imprisonment. On August 8, 1990, the Court sentenced Defendant to the promised sentence. Defendant did not file a notice of appeal and otherwise has fulfilled the terms of that sentence. However, Defendant is currently serving a 30 year sentence, imposed in 2006, for his conviction of "conspiracy to commit murder for hire and distribution and possession of cocaine" in the Southern District of New York.

Relying on Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 US 356 (2010)^[FN1] but not claiming any immigration consequences related to the plea or that he is not a United States citizen, Defendant moves to

vacate the New York grand larceny conviction. He alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to advise him that his guilty plea would have several collateral consequences, including ineligibility for a firearm permit, exclusion from certain aspects of employment, loss of housing, preclusion from voting while on parole/probation and potential future sentence enhancements on newly committed crimes.

Preliminarily, the People submit that Defendant has failed to sufficiently corroborate his claim in that he has failed to provide an affirmation from his attorney, Raymond Loving. Thus, pursuant to CPL §440.30(4)(d), the Court may deny Defendant's motion if an "allegation of fact essential to support the motion" is "made solely by the defendant." Furthermore, the People maintain that a defendant need not be advised of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea.

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test for establishing when an attorney renders ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) the representation must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there must be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In People v. Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 (1981), the New York Court of Appeals held that "[s]o long as the evidence, the law and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation, the constitutional requirement will have been met."

Pursuant to CPL §440.30(4)(a), upon considering the merits of the instant prayer, a court may deny a motion to vacate a conviction, without conducting a hearing, if the moving papers do not allege any ground constituting legal basis for the motion. In other words, even if the herein allegations are true, they do not establish any of the grounds for relief set forth in CPL §440.10(1).

In this case, Defendant has failed to allege facts that would amount to denial of effective assistance of counsel. Contrary to Defendant's claim, it is well established that the failure to advise a defendant of potential future sentence enhancements does not render a guilty plea invalid (see People v. Pierre, 80 AD3d 441 [1st Dept 2011] People v. Watkins, 244 AD2d 269, 270 [1st Dept 1997]. Moreover, a defendant need not be advised of the collateral consequences of his guilty plea such as, "loss of the right to vote or travel abroad, loss of civil service employment, loss of a driver's license, [and] loss of the right to possess firearms" (see People v. Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 403 (1995), overruled on other grounds by People v. Peque, 22 NY3d 168 [*3](2013). ^[FN2] Thus, even if true, Defendant's allegations would not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Defendant's motion to vacate his conviction is denied without a hearing.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

March 21, 2014______________________________Dominic R. Massaro, JSC

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