Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Dawn Jimenez Salta, J.), entered November 14, 2012. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the action.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

In this small claims action, plaintiff seeks to recover the principal sum of $5,000, based on claims for "defective services rendered and reimbursement for tuition money." At a nonjury trial, plaintiff indicated that he had written checks to defendant, and that, after he had delivered the checks, the name of the payee on at least one check had been changed. He claimed that defendant's witness or the witness's girlfriend had made the change, without authority. Plaintiff also sought a tuition reimbursement from defendant. Pierre Damis, who identified himself as defendant's former vice-president and acting president, testified on behalf of defendant. Mr. Damis stated that defendant acknowledged receipt of plaintiff's tuition money, that defendant had awarded plaintiff certificates, and that he did not know why plaintiff was suing defendant. Following the trial, the Civil Court dismissed the action upon a finding that plaintiff had failed to prove a prima facie case.

Our review is limited to determining whether "substantial justice has not been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (CCA 1807). The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that its conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). The determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992] Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510 [1991]). The deference accorded to a trial court's credibility determinations applies with even greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court, given the limited standard of review (see CCA 1807; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]). As the record supports the Civil Court's determination, we find no reason to disturb the judgment. Consequently, we conclude that the judgment rendered substantial justice between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see CCA 1804, 1807).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: April 07, 2014