| Khan v Rahman |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 50763(U) [43 Misc 3d 1224(A)] |
| Decided on May 7, 2014 |
| Supreme Court, Queens County |
| McDonald, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Javid Khan,
Plaintiff,
against Muhamad A. Rahman, Defendant. MUHAMAD RAHMAN and HASIFA RAHMAN, Plaintiffs, against JAVID KHAN, Defendant. ANTONIA KAHN, Plaintiff, against MUHAMAD A. RAHMAN and JAVID KHAN, Defendants. |
The following papers numbered 1 to 14 were read on this motion by defendant in Action No. 1, MUHAMAD A. RAHMAN, for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212(b) granting defendant summary judgment on the issue of liability against Plaintiff in Action NO. 1, JAVID KAHN:
Papers Numbered
Notice of Motion-Affidavits-Exhibits.................1 - 6
Affirmation in Opposition-Memo of Law................7 - 12
Reply Affirmation...................................13 - 14
In this negligence action, plaintiff in Action No. 1, Javid Khan, seeks to
recover damages for personal injuries he sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident
that occurred at approximately 7:30 p.m. on June 16, 2009, between the vehicle operated
by plaintiff and the vehicle owned and operated by defendant in Action No. 1, Muhamad
A. Rahman. The accident took place at the intersection of 45th Street and 21st Avenue,
Queens County, New York. Plaintiff was allegedly injured when his vehicle collided
with the defendant's vehicle in the intersection. The intersection is controlled by a stop
sign which was facing the direction of the plaintiff's vehicle on 45th Street. Plaintiff
contends that he stopped at the stop sign, then proceeded partially into the intersection
and stopped again (due to an obstructed view of 21st Avenue), and was struck by the
defendant's vehicle which was proceeding with the right of way on 21st Avenue. Plaintiff
contends that as a result of the accident he sustained serious physical injuries.
The plaintiff commenced this action by filing a summons and complaint on
June 7, 2012. Issue was joined by service of defendant's verified answer dated July 17,
2012. By decision and [*2]order dated February 28,
2013, this matter was consolidated for joint trial with Action No. 2 under Index No.
10454/2012 and Action No. 3 under Index No. 15361/2011 as set forth above. Following
the completion of discovery, the plaintiff in Action No. 1 filed a Note of Issue on July
26, 2013. The Court records indicate that on January 28, 2014, Action No. 3 was settled
before trial. Action Nos. 1 and 2 are on the calendar of the Trial Scheduling Part for
September 15, 2014.
In support of the motion for summary judgment, the defendant submits an
affirmation from counsel, Scott R. Dinstell, Esq; a copy of the pleadings; copies of the
transcripts of the examinations before trial of the plaintiff and the defendant; and a
photograph of the intersection taken from the Google website.
In his examination before trial, taken on June 14, 2013, plaintiff, Javid Khan,
a self employed taxi driver, age 61, stated that on the date of the accident, June 16, 2009,
he was coming from his home and proceeding on 45th Street. His wife was seated in the
front passenger seat. When he approached the intersection with 21st Avenue he was
faced with a stop sign in his direction. He stated that he made a full stop behind the stop
line prior to entering the intersection. He stated that he could not fully see into the
intersection because a blue van parked to his left on the corner of 21st Street had
obstructed his view. He slowly moved up seven or eight feet past the cross-walk and
drove partially into the intersection to get a better view of traffic on 21st Avenue. He
then came to a full stop again and looked to his left and to his right. When he looked to
his right he saw a car on 21st Avenue coming towards the intersection at a high rate of
speed. Approximately one second later he was still stopped in the intersection when his
vehicle was struck by the defendant's vehicle. The plaintiff was transported from the
scene in an ambulance and taken to the emergency room at Elmhurst Hospital where he
was treated and released in the morning.
Defendant, Muhamad A. Rahman, a station supervisor with the New York
City Transit Authority, age 50, testified on June 14, 2013. On the day of the accident he
was operating a 1995 Nissan Altima with his wife, his son and daughter in the vehicle.
He was coming from his home and proceeding westbound on 21st Avenue going to pick
up another child at school. He stated that there is no stop sign or traffic light at the
intersection of 45th Street for cars proceeding on 21st Avenue. He states he was traveling
at a rate of 25 miles per hour. He stated that as he was proceeding through the
intersection at 45th Street his vehicle was struck on the right side, passenger rear door, by
the front of the vehicle being operated by the plaintiff. He first saw the plaintiff's [*3]vehicle when he, defendant, was 30 feet from the
intersection. When he first saw the plaintiff's vehicle it was moving on 45th Street and
was 25 feet behind the stop sign. He proceeded into the intersection looking straight
ahead and was struck by the plaintiff's vehicle causing his vehicle to spin out. When the
police came to the scene he told them that he was driving through the intersection on 21st
Avenue and the plaintiff did not stop at the stop sign and struck his vehicle. He left the
scene of the accident in an ambulance and was taken to Elmhurst Hospital where he was
treated and released.
Defendant seeks summary judgment on the ground that the evidence
establishes that the plaintiff violated VTL § 1142(a), was negligent as a matter of
law and was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Defendant's counsel contends that
the accident was caused solely by the negligence of the plaintiff who had a stop sign
facing his direction of traffic and failed to yield the right of way to the defendant in
violation of VTL § 1142. Counsel submits that although the plaintiff states that he
stopped at the stop sign he then proceeded into the intersection without having a clear
view, failed to see the vehicle operated by Rahman until he was already through the stop
sign and failed to yield the right of way to the defendant's vehicle which was proceeding
with the right of way on 21st Avenue. Counsel contends that the defendant was
proceeding within the speed limit and that his vehicle was already in the intersection
when the plaintiff came out into the intersection and struck his vehicle leaving the
defendant no opportunity to try to avoid the accident. Counsel asserts that Rahman was
entitled to assume that the driver of the vehicle controlled by the stop signal would yield.
Thus, counsel contends that the plaintiff was solely responsible for causing the accident
while the defendant, driving with the right of way, was free from culpable conduct
(citing Hutton v Whelan,
104 AD3d 914 [2d Dept. 2013] Amalfitano v Rocco, 100 AD3d 939 [2d Dept. 2012] Rankel v Saccardo, 100 AD3d
613 [2d Dept. 2012].
In opposition, Salvatore A. Asaro, Esq., counsel for plaintiff, Javid Kahn,
submits that summary judgment is not appropriate as there are triable issues of fact with
respect to defendant's negligence in the happening of the accident. Counsel asserts that
the version of the accident submitted by the defendant is inconsistent with the plaintiff's
version of the accident and as such there are triable issues of fact requiring a
determination by a jury. Plaintiff asserts that the courts have held that notwithstanding
the presence of a stop sign at an intersection the driver traveling on the uncontrolled
through highway may not have the right of way with respect to a vehicle that has already
entered the intersection (citing Nevarez v [*4]S.R.M.
Management Company, 58 AD3d 295 [1st Dept. 2008] Rivera v Berrios Trans Service
Inc., 64 AD3d 416 [1s Dept. 2009]. Counsel asserts that even if the defendant
did have the right of way there are questions of his comparative negligence in view of the
fact that the plaintiff stated that he had already proceeded into the intersection before the
defendant's vehicle, which was allegedly proceeding at a fast rate of speed, in violation
of VTL § 1180, struck his vehicle. Counsel asserts in addition, that the defendant
stated that he observed the plaintiff's vehicle behind the stop sign 10 - 15 seconds before
the accident but failed to keep the plaintiff's vehicle under observation, thus failing to see
what should have been seen. Counsel claims that the plaintiff stopped appropriately at
the stop sign and proceeded slowly into the intersection, but due to the defendant's failure
to keep a proper lookout and reduce his speed there is a question of whether the
defendant was negligent and whether defendants's actions were a proximate cause of the
accident.
Thus, plaintiff argues that the motion for summary judgment must be denied
as there are contrary versions of how the accident occurred and questions of fact as to
defendant's speed, which vehicle entered the intersection first and whether defendant
used reasonable care when he approached the intersection to avoid the accident.
The proponent of a summary judgment motion must tender evidentiary proof
in admissible form eliminating any material issues of fact from the case. If the proponent
succeeds, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion, who then must show the
existence of material issues of fact by producing evidentiary proof in admissible form in
support of his position (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d
557[1980]).
Pursuant to VTL § 1142(a):
"every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop as required by
section eleven hundred seventy-two and after having stopped shall yield the right of way
to any vehicle which has entered the intersection from another highway or which is
approaching so closely on said highway as to constitute an immediate hazard during the
time when such driver is moving across or within the intersection."
Upon review of the defendant's motion, the affirmation in opposition, and
the reply thereto, the motion by defendant Rahman for summary judgment on the issue of
liability dismissing the plaintiff's complaint in Action No. 1 is denied.
[*5]
This Court finds, that the defendant
presented evidence that the plaintiff, who was faced with a stop sign at the intersection of
21st Avenue and 45th Street, was negligent having driven his vehicle into the
intersection without having a clear view of the traffic on the through street and without
yielding the right-of-way to the defendant's vehicle (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §
1142[a] Zuleta v Quijada,
94 AD3d 876 [2d Dept. 2012] Kotzias v Panagiotis, 91 AD3d 607 [2d Dept. 2012] Duran v Simon, 83 AD3d
654 [2d Dept. 2011). It is immaterial that the plaintiff stopped at the stop sign before
proceeding into the intersection, because he did not have the right of way when he
proceeded into the intersection (see Amalfitano v Rocco, 100 AD3d 939 [2d Dept.2012] Martin v Ali, 78 AD3d
1135 [2010]).
Here, plaintiff testified that he proceeded into the intersection and stopped
again because his view of 21st Street was partially obstructed. In this regard, the courts
have held that where the proof establishes that a vehicle enters an intersection without a
clear view of traffic and fails to yield the right-of-way to cross-traffic after stopping at a
stop sign, the evidence is sufficient to establish the driver is negligent based upon a
violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a)(see Galvis v Ravilla, 111 AD3d
600 [2d Dept. 2013] Timm
v Barilli, 109 AD3d 655 [2d Dept. 2013] Figueroa v Diaz, 107 AD3d 754 [2d Dept. 2013] Hutton v Whelan, 104 AD3d
914 [2d Dept. 2013] Williams v Hayes, 103 AD3d 713 [2d Dept. 2013] Francavilla v Doyno, 96 AD3d
714 [2d Dept. 2012] Martin v Ali, 78 AD3d 1135 [2d Dept. 2010] Cartica v Kieltyka, 55 AD3d
523 [2d Dept. 2008]).
However, the testimony of the plaintiff is sufficient to raise triable issues of
fact as to whether the defendant was also negligent. The plaintiff testified that he was
already in the intersection when the defendant who was traveling at an unreasonable rate
of speed struck his vehicle in the intersection. However, defendant stated he observed the
plaintiff's vehicle behind the stop sign, continued looking straight ahead and proceeded
into the intersection when his vehicle was struck by the plaintiff's vehicle. In this regard
the courts have held that a driver who has the right-of-way has a duty to exercise
reasonable care to avoid a collision with another vehicle already in the intersection (see
Sirot v Troiano, 66 AD3d
763 [2d Dept. 2009] Thus, "under the doctrine of comparative negligence, a driver
who lawfully enters an intersection . . . may still be found partially at fault for an accident
if he or she fails to use reasonable care to avoid a collision with another vehicle in the
intersection" (see Regans v
Baratta, 106 AD3d 893 [2d Dept. 2013] Romano v 202 Corp., 305
[*6]AD2d 576 [2d Dept. 2003][that the plaintiff allegedly
"ran" the stop sign would not preclude a finding, as a matter of law, that negligent
conduct by defendant contributed to the accident]).
Thus, as the parties testified to conflicting versions of the cause of the
accident they raised triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff stopped at the stop
sign before proceeding into the intersection; which vehicle entered the intersection first;
whether the defendant was also negligent, whether his negligence was a proximate cause
of the accident, and whether defendant failed to see the plaintiff's vehicle in the
intersection through the proper use of his senses and contributed to the happening of the
accident (see Fogel v Rizzo,
91 AD3d 706 [2d Dept. 2012] Todd v Godek, 71 AD3d 872 [2d Dept. 2010]). "A driver
who has the right-of-way has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid a collision with
another vehicle already in the intersection" (Gause v Martinez, 91 AD3d 595 [2d Dept. 2012]). The
courts have held in this regard that there can be more than one proximate cause of an
accident. The issue of comparative negligence is generally a question for the jury to
decide (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980] Myles v Blain, 81 AD3d
798 [2d Dept. 2011] Goldenberg v Palewicz, 65 AD3d 518 [2d Dept. 2008] Sokolovsky v Mucip, Inc., 32
AD3d 1011 [2d Dept. 2006] Cox v Nunez, 23 AD3d 427 [2d Dept. 2005]).
Accordingly for all of the above stated reasons the motion by defendant
Muhamad A. Rahman for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint in
Action No 1 is denied.
Dated: May 7, 2014
Long Island City, NY
______________________________
ROBERT J. MCDONALD
J.S.C.