On July 25, 2005 the petitioner obtained a decision and order on default vacating an arbitrator's award and granting it judgment for $1,153.90.

Respondent's motion to vacate the decision and order is granted to the extent the petitioner may not execute and the Court vacates the clerk's judgment dated April 16, 2013. The Court also corrects this CPLR Article 7511 proceeding's caption to refer to Castle Hill as petitioner and MVAIC as respondent.

The petition to vacate an arbitrator's decision was based on the attorney's information and belief. The copy submitted in opposition to this motion contained no other affidavits or documentary support.

When the respondent defaulted and failed to appear on June 25, 2005 - despite the fact respondent submitted opposition papers - the Court granted respondent's motion on default. The [*2]decision and order was undoubtedly prepared by petitioner's counsel and submitted to the Court for signature. The Court cannot vacate the decision and order. But it can prevent petitioner from executing the money judgment because it failed to properly proceed after June 25, 2005.

Petitioner was not entitled to the money judgment. - even on default. The request for a money judgment was only in the Notice of Petition and the petition's "WHEREFORE" clause. The Court may grant general requests for relief if they are not dramatically different from the actual relief sought, there is proof supporting the request and the relief will not prejudice a party. (Carter v Johnson, 110 AD3d 656 [2nd Dept 2013], Geffner v Mercy Medical Center, 83 AD3d 998 [2nd Dept 2011], Arriga v Michael Laub, Co, 223 AD2d 224 [1st Dept 1996], citing HCE Assoc. v 3000 Water Mill Lane Realty Corp., 173 AD3d 774 [2nd Dept 1991]).

Here, the petitioner sought a money judgment, affirmative relief different than vacatur, without proof. The money judgment definitely prejudiced the respondent since the petitioner has now submitted a judgment to the clerk for $1153.90, plus costs, and interest totaling $22,996.72.Despite the decision and order, the petitioner may not execute the money judgment.

When it appears that a party has counsel, the opposing party may only contact that party, and serve papers, through counsel. Siegel, NY Pract., §202, p. 344 (5th Ed.), CPLR 2103(b).

Orders become effective only when served on the opposing party. (Raes Pharmacy, Inc v Perales, 181 AD2d 58, 64 [1st Dept, 1992], Siegel, NY Pract. (5th Ed.), §250, p. 444). Exceptions exist, such as where an opponent served counsel, but counsel moved without providing a forwarding address; this case would not fall into any exception. (Deygoo v Eastern Abstract Co., 204 Ad2d 596 [2nd Dept, 1994]).

Here, the petitioner served the Notice of Entry and the June 25, 2005 order on MVAIC - the party. Petitioner served the party even though it knew the attorney who represented MVAIC and opposed the petition. Petitioner's assertion that counsel left a copy of the order a basket in the courtroom for pick-up by the respondent, does not abrogate the service requirement.

And since, absent proper service, the June 25th order has no effect, the civil judgment filed with the clerk on April 16, 2013 - eight years after the original decision and order was signed - is vacated.

Petitioner may still serve a copy of the June 25, 2005 decision and order with notice of entry and only then enter the civil judgment. If it does, because of petitioner's "inordinate delay in entering the civil judgment" interest will commence running from the date petitioner files the civil judgment with the clerk. (Peerless Ins. Co. v Casey, 194 AD2d 411 [1st Dept, 1993], 11 NYCRR 65-3.9(d))

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Brooklyn, NY