[*1]
Mondshein's Clothing Ctr., Inc. v City of New York
2014 NY Slip Op 50920(U) [43 Misc 3d 1234(A)]
Decided on May 30, 2014
Civil Court Of The City Of New York, Kings County
Levine, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on May 30, 2014
Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County


Mondshein's Clothing Center, Inc., Petitioner/Landlord,

against

City of New York, et al, Respondent/Tenant




081404/13



ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER:



CORNICELLO, TENDLER & BAUMEL-CORNICELLO, LLP



TWO WALL STREET



20TH FLOOR



NEW YORK, N.Y. 10005-2072



ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT:



MICHAEL A. CARDOZO



Corporation Counsel of the City of New York



100 CHURCH STREET



NEW YORK, N.Y. 10007


Katherine A. Levine, J.

In this summary holdover proceeding, petitioner/landlord Mondshein's Clothing Center, Inc. ("landlord," "petitioner" or "Mondshein") seeks to recover the commercial premises located at 152 Manhattan Avenue, Brooklyn, from the respondent/tenant City of New York ( "tenant," "respondent" or "City") on the grounds that the term for which said premises was rented expired on July 14, 2013.



The City moves to dismiss the petition on the ground that there is a written lease in effect. The landlord cross-moves for summary judgment and argues that it revoked its offer to renew the [*2]lease, before the City's attempted acceptance.[FN1] Alternatively, the landlord argues that the City rejected the offer with a counter offer, which expired due to the passage of seven (7) months.



When the 10-year lease between the parties expired on May 15, 2011, the City negotiated a new lease for an additional six-year term. Upon the completion of negotiations, the City prepared the new renewal lease ("lease renewal") and sent an un executed copy to the landlord to sign and return. The landlord signed the lease renewal and returned it to the City on or about July 5, 2012 for signature. Paragraph 5 of the lease renewal states: "this Lease Renewal is subject to public hearing and Mayoral approval...to be scheduled subsequent to the execution of this Lease Renewal by Landlord." Paragraph 6 provides: "[t]his Lease Renewal may be executed by the Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Citywide Administrative Services ("DCAS") after public hearing and Mayoral approval" (emphasis added).



Upon receiving the lease renewal signed by the landlord, the City's Associate General Counsel, by letter dated July 6, 2012, asked the landlord for Exhibit A, the affirmation and the W-9 form. The letter also stated: "[n]either this Lease Renewal, nor any prior or subsequent draft of Lease Renewal, is binding upon the City of New York until executed by a duly authorized representative of the City in accordance with all then prevailing City policies and procedures." The landlord subsequently sent its affirmation and the W-9 tax form on or about July 10, 2012 to the City and also consented to attach the original lease as Exhibit A.

Having received the landlord's consent, and pursuant to Paragraph 5 of the lease, the City initiated its internal approval process, which culminates in a sign off by DCAS. The public hearing schedule was delayed due to the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy until December 5, 2012. Following the public hearing, the Mayor's Office of Contract Services ("MOCS") authorized DCAS to execute the lease renewal on December 11, 2012.



By e-mail dated December 13, 2012, the City notified the landlord that it had obtained the interagency sign-offs as well as the Mayoral Approval, "permitting the City to now execute the Lease Renewal." However, since the City had improperly listed and typed in the name of the former Deputy Commissioner of DCAS below the signature line on the lease renewal, the e mail requested the landlord to re-execute, re-notarize and return to the City seven new copies of the lease renewal which listed the name of the current Deputy Commissioner on the signature line. Curiously, the City did not actually send the landlord the new signature pages. As the landlord did not reply to this e mail, the City sent another e-mail, dated December 21, 2012, apologizing for "the procedural complication" and requesting that Mr. Mondshein "finalize this matter." The email further inquired whether the landlord wanted the City to forward "just the signature pages [*3]for re-execution or all original Lease Renewal Agreements with new signature/notarization pages." Again, the landlord did not respond.



On January 9, 2012, the City finally mailed the landlord a cover letter and a package containing the updated signature pages and instructed the landlord to "return [them]...for further processing" due to the need to have the newly appointed Deputy Commissioner sign off on the lease renewal on behalf of the City This letter contained the same afore stated paragraph that "[n]either this Lease Renewal, nor any prior or subsequent draft of Lease Renewal, is binding upon the City of New York until executed by a duly authorized representative of the City in accordance with all then prevailing City policies and procedures." Curiously, the new Deputy Commissioner did not sign the signature page prior to sending the new copies of the renewal to the landlord.



The package was returned since the City inadvertently sent the package to 577 Grand Avenue as opposed to 577 Grand Street, the landlord's actual address. The City therefore resent the package to the landlord on January 30, 2013 with a new cover letter requesting the landlord to re-execute, and "cause to be notarized" the lease renewal pages if "the Lease Renewal is acceptable to you" (emphasis added). The letter reiterated that the lease renewal was not binding upon the City until its was executed by an authorized representative. For some unknown reason, the revised signature pages sent to the landlord id not contain the actual signature of the new Deputy Commissioner.



On February 14, 2013, the City finally received a letter from the landlord indicating that he was no longer interested in renewing the lease with the City and inquiring when the City could vacate the premises. In response to this letter, the new Deputy Commissioner signed the original lease renewal that had previously been signed by the landlord, hand wrote her name below the signature line, and crossed out the name of the former Deputy Commissioner. The City then mailed the fully signed original lease to the landlord with a cover letter which stated "I am sending a second fully executed original-signature Lease Renewal Agreement...in light of [your] letter of February 13, 2013, which [the City] received today." This letter confirms that the City had received the landlord's rejection before its new Deputy Commissioner executed and mailed back to the landlord the lease renewal. The affidavit of Scott Bernstein, the City's Senior Lease Negotiator, also confirms that the City received the landlord "rejection" of the lease prior to the City's new Deputy Commissioner signing the lease.



Summary judgment may not be granted unless the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Marks v. New York University, 61 F. Supp.2d 81, 87 (S.D. NY, 1999). On a summary judgment motion, the moving party must set forth evidence that there is no factual issue and that it is entitled to summary judgment. Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 315 (2004) citing Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 (1980). If the moving party establishes a basis for a grant of summary judgment, the opposing party must present evidence [*4]that there is a triable issue of fact. Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, supra, 49 NY2d at 315. The facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.



A lease is a hybrid document involving both a conveyance of an interest in land for a fixed period of time and a contract requiring the parties to fulfill certain obligations. Dlugosz v. O'Brien, 36 AD3d 1035 (3rd Dept. 2007) citing 219 Broadway Corp v. Alexander's Inc., 46 NY2d 506, 509 (1979). Therefore, a lease does not become effective unless it is signed, delivered and accepted, satisfying both contract and property law parameters. Penny Lane Owners Corp v. Conthur Development Co., Ltd, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1503 (S.D.NY 2000). If parties to an agreement do not intend it to be binding until it is reduced to writing and signed by both of them, they are not bound and may not be held liable "until it has been written out and signed." Scheck v. Francis, 26 NY2d 466 (1970); ADCO Electrical Corp. V. HRH Construction, LLC, 61 AD3d 653, 654 ( 2d Dept. 2009); Lone Creek Associates, LLC v Marine Midland Bank, 293 AD3d 719 ( 2d Dept. 2002). The parties intent to be bound by a contractual agreement can be determined by either the words of the written agreements, or, if the agreement is unclear, by inferences outside the written words of the instrument." ADCO Electrical Corp., supra, 61 AD3d at 654. See Mallad Constru. Corp. v. County Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. 32 NY2d 285, 291 (1973).

As with any other bilateral contract, a lease which provides for the signature of both parties is "executed" only when it is signed by both parties and delivered. East 56th Plaza, Inc v. NY City Conciliation and Appeals Bd., 80 AD2d 389, 393 (1st Dept. 1981)(rev'd on other grounds). Furthermore, the transaction is not complete and it is not binding when the evidence surrounding the parties' negotiations shows that they agreed to it being non-binding until it is so reduced to writing and formally executed. Municipal Consultants v. Ramapo, 47 NY2d 144, 148 (1979).

On its face, the lease renewal required the signatures of both parties as the last page had two signature lines. The lease renewal provided that even after the landlord signed the lease renewal drafted by the City, the renewal would not be effective until it underwent a public hearing and mayoral hearing. While the lease stated that it may be executed by the Deputy Commissioner of DCAS, any ambiguity as to the necessity that both parties sign the renewal was resolved by the City's subsequent e-mails and letters to the landlord which repeatedly stated that the lease renewal would not be binding upon the City "until executed by a duly authorized representative of the City." Having repeatedly set forth the conditions upon which the lease renewal would be binding — i.e. the signature of the current Deputy Commissioner of DCAS — the City cannot now argue that its signing of the lease renewal was a mere formality and that the lease renewal became binding after the Mayoral Approval.What is even more confounding is the City's repeated failure to have the current DCAS Deputy Commissioner actually sign the revised signature pages prior to sending the same to the landlord. Akin to the nonsensical tea party in Alice In Wonderland, the City wasted approximately one and a half months by repeatedly apprising the landlord that it had made a [*5]mistake by sending the original signature page with the typed in name of the former Deputy Commissioner, without ever sending the revised signature page with the actual signature of the current Deputy Commissioner! It was only after the landlord rejected the lease renewal on February 13, 2012, that the City had an epiphany that both parties were bound by the original lease renewal and that the new Commissioner need only cross out the name of the former Commissioner and sign her name to make the binding nature of the renewal official.

The City's contention, via the Bernstein affidavit, that the update to the signature page was "not essential or substantive" to the lease renewal and that the City "did not insist upon the change" is contradicted by the multitude of e mails and letters that the City annexes to its Motion to Dismiss. Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, " a party is precluded from inequitably adopting a position directly contrary to or inconsistent with an earlier assumed position in the same proceeding." Nestor v. Britt, 270 AD2d 192,193 (1st Dept. 2009); See Neumann v Metropolitan Medical Group. 153 AD2d 888, 889 (2d Dept. 1989) (a party who assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding may not hereafter assume a contrary position simply because his interests have changed).If the City believed that the lease renewal was binding after Mayoral Approval, it should have so informed the landlord immediately and/or written to the landlord that any subsequent sign off on the lease renewal was superfluous to the binding nature of the agreement. Having failed to do so, the City is now estopped from claiming that its repeated e-mails and letters concerning the need for the landlord to reexecute the new signature pages were mistaken or an oversight, and that the Deputy Commissioner's signature was merely ministerial.



Accordingly, this Court rules that the parties did not renew the lease and that City must leave the premises. The City's motion to dismiss is denied and the landlord's cross motion for summary judgement is granted.The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.



Dated: May 30, 2014______________________________KATHERINE A. LEVINEActing Justice Supreme Court

Footnotes


Footnote 1:In light of the different paradigm that comes into play when the City acts as tenant but drafts the initial lease the court need not and will not rule in the instant matter whether its was the City or Landlord who offered the lease.