[*1]
125 Ct. St., LLC v Nicholson
2014 NY Slip Op 50973(U) [44 Misc 3d 128(A)]
Decided on June 13, 2014
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on June 13, 2014
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., SOLOMON and ELLIOT, JJ.
2012-1856 K C

125 Court Street, LLC, Respondent,

against

Yolande Nicholson, Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Anthony J. Fiorella, Jr., J.), entered May 20, 2011. The order denied tenant's motion to vacate two stipulations of settlement in a holdover summary proceeding.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this holdover summary proceeding based upon tenant's alleged failure to sign a renewal lease for her rent-stabilized apartment (Rent Stabilization Code [9 NYCRR]


§ 2524.3 [f]), tenant, while represented by counsel, entered into a so-ordered stipulation on June 10, 2010 pursuant to which she agreed, among other things, to waive her affirmative defenses, and that she owed $22,423.21 in arrears through June 30, 2010. Landlord agreed, among other things, to accept $12,891.03 in satisfaction of the amount owed, provided that tenant vacated the apartment by September 30, 2010 and otherwise complied with the terms of the stipulation. Nearly one month after entering into the stipulation, tenant moved to vacate the stipulation, contending that the "of counsel" attorney who had appeared for her and had entered into the stipulation had agreed to terms that she had not authorized. However, tenant ultimately withdrew that motion and entered into a second so-ordered stipulation, which modified the first stipulation by, among other things, reducing to $12,000 the sum landlord would accept in satisfaction of the arrears. At the beginning of September, tenant moved to vacate both stipulations. The Civil Court denied her motion, and tenant appeals.

It is well settled that stipulations of settlement are judicially favored and will not easily be set aside (see Hallock v State of New York, 64 NY2d 224 [1984]; Matter of Frutiger, 29 NY2d 143 [1971]). While stipulations of settlements may be vacated on grounds sufficient to set aside a contract, such as fraud, mistake, collusion or accident (see Nash v Yablon-Nash, 61 AD3d 832 [2009]), a party should not be relieved from the consequences of a stipulation, particularly one that has been so-ordered by the court, absent a sufficient or compelling showing of one of these grounds (see Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC v Williams, 38 Misc 3d 138[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50184[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]). Tenant's allegation that she was unaware of her right to a post-judgment cure period, which was the basis of her motion, is insufficient to vacate the stipulations, particularly since she, an attorney herself, was represented by two different attorneys when she entered into the stipulations.

We note that we do not consider those factual assertions contained in, or the exhibits attached to, tenant's briefs which, not having been presented to the Civil Court, are dehors the record (see Chimarios v Duhl, 152 AD2d 508 [1989]; Blum v Yuabov, 12 Misc 3d 139[A], 2006 [*2]NY Slip Op 51333[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Solomon and Elliot, JJ., concur.


Decision Date: June 13, 2014