| People v Ndiaye (Khadime) |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 51208(U) [44 Misc 3d 135(A)] |
| Decided on August 11, 2014 |
| Appellate Term, First Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
In consolidated criminal actions, defendant, as limited by his brief, appeals from two judgments of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (ShawnDya L. Simpson, J.), each rendered May 31, 2011, convicting him, upon his pleas of guilty, of attempted trademark counterfeiting in the third degree and unlicensed general vending, and imposing sentence.
Per Curiam.
Judgments of conviction (ShawnDya L. Simpson, J.), rendered May 31, 2011, affirmed.
The accusatory instruments underlying these consolidated criminal prosecutions were not jurisdictionally defective. The informations — comprising the misdemeanor complaints and supporting depositions of the arresting police officers and a representative of the trademark owner — each alleged, in sum and substance, that at a specified time and location, defendant, without the requisite license, displayed and offered for sale approximately 10 handbags, bearing Louis Vuitton trademarks, with defendant "showing the merchandise to numerous people" or with "numerous passersby paus[ing] to observe the merchandise"; that the handbags were determined to be counterfeit based on several features distinguishing them from genuine Louis Vuitton handbags; and that the allegedly counterfeit trademarks appearing on the bags were registered and in use. These factual allegations, "given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]), were sufficient to establish reasonable cause to believe and a prima facie case that defendant was guilty of attempted third-degree trademark counterfeiting (see Penal Law §§ 110.00/165.71) and unlicensed general vending (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 20-453). For purposes of our threshold, pleading-stage inquiry, the accusatory instruments sufficiently described the trademark that was allegedly infringed (see People v Thiam, 189 Misc 2d 810, 812-813 [2001]) and "were sufficiently evidentiary in character" (People v Allen, 92 NY2d 378, 385 [1998]) to support the sale or offer for sale element of unlicensed general vending (see People v Kasse, 22 NY3d 1142 [2014]; People v Abdurraheem, 94 AD3d 569 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 970 [2012]).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.