[*1]
Coleman v Onsite Prop. Mgt., Inc.
2014 NY Slip Op 51217(U) [44 Misc 3d 1221(A)]
Decided on July 11, 2014
Civil Court Of The City Of New York, Bronx County
Rodriguez, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on July 11, 2014
Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County


Reginald Coleman, Petitioner

against

Onsite Property Management, Inc., Tony Rivera and John Doe, Respondents, Mario Herrera Third Party Respondent.




805127/14



for Petitioner Coleman: Megan K. O'Byrne, New York Legal Assistance Group



for Respondent Onsite Property Management, Inc.: Kathleen R. Bradshaw


Jose Rodriguez, J.

Petitioner commenced this proceeding by Order to Show Cause in Lieu of Petition seeking to be restored to possession of premises located at 2412 Westchester Avenue, Apartment 3R, Bronx, New York. Respondent argues that the petitioner abandoned and/or surrendered the apartment. Petitioner and respondent, Onsite Management, Inc., are represented by counsel. Third Party respondent, Mario Herrera, failed to appear.

After trial it is the conclusion of this Court that petitioner has been improperly locked out of the subject apartment and is entitled to be restored to possession. Petitioner is the tenant of record of the subject rent stabilized apartment. Petitioner has resided in the subject apartment since August 2010 pursuant to a written lease agreement and is the recipient of a New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) Section 8 rent subsidy. It is undisputed that NYCHA Section 8 continued to make payment on petitioner's behalf until May 2014. Petitioner testified that he did not abandon or surrender possession and never spoke to respondents' agent about vacating the



subject apartment. He acknowledged that electrical utility service for the apartment was [*2]suspended for non-payment and alleges that he was seeking financial assistance from the Veterans Administration (VA) to pay the utility bill. He stated that he used candles to light the apartment and frequently stayed with friends away from the apartment. In May 2014 he traveled to Virginia to stay with family due to his grandmother's poor health. Petitioner's grandmother passed away on June 1, 2014. He returned on June 6, 2014 and learned that a third party, Mario Herrera, was occupying the subject apartment. Petitioner observed that his furniture and furnishings were still in the apartment. He was informed by Mr. Herrera that the apartment was rented by Mr. Anthony DeRosa, the building's managing agent, as a furnished apartment. Petitioner spoke to Mr. DeRosa regarding his clothing and was informed that they were stored in the building's basement. Petitioner states that he was unable to locate his clothing and other personal items.



Mr. DeRosa, testified that he had not seen petitioner and believed that he has vacated the subject apartment. He states that Section 8 stopped petitioner's rent payments in April 2014 and he received a telephone call from a representative for the VA indicating that petitioner was not returning to the subject apartment. He acknowledges that petitioner never surrendered the keys to the apartment and did not inform him that he was vacating the apartment. His belief that petitioner vacated the apartment was based upon information received from the representative of the VA and Section 8's suspension of rent payments. He testified that he found the door to the apartment unlocked and without electricity. On June 2, 2014 Mr. DeRosa entered into a one year lease for the subject apartment with the third party respondent, Mario Herrera.Abandonment of an apartment is defined as the "intent to abandon and engaging in some act or failure to act that indicates that the tenant no longer has an interest in the premises." (See, Scherer, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law, § 2:111; Delgado v. 1038 Souther Boulevard Realty Assoc.,N.Y.L.J., May 28, 2008, p/ 27, Co. 1 (Civ. Ct., Bronx Co.); Malik v. Hillside Clearview Apts. Realty, LLC,746 N.Y.S. 2d 251, 192 Misc 2d 181 (Civ. Ct., Queens Co., 2002); Bay Park Two v. Campionio, NYLJ, September 23, 1992, at 26, col 4.). Surrender is defined as "a tenant's relinquishment of possession before the lease has expired, allowing the landlord to take possession and treat the lease as terminated." (See, Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th Ed.). It must be established that two facts concurrently exist: (1) Intention to abandon or relinquish, and (2) some overt act or some failure to act which carries the implication that the owner neither claims nor retains any interest in the subject matter of the abandonment. The burden of proving an abandonment or surrender is on the party seeking to establish it or relying upon such abandonment or surrender. Sam & Mary Housing Corp. v. Jo/Sal Market Corp., 100 AD2d 901, 474 N.Y.S.2d 786 (2nd Dept., 1984). Gill v Central Queens Properties Corp., NYLJ, June 27, 2001, at 20, col 4. (App Term, 2nd Dept.); Johnson v. Manning, NYLJ, November 16, 1988, at 21, col 2, (App Term, 1st Dept.); Mitchell v. City of New York, 154 Misc 2d 222, 584 N.Y.S.2d 277,(Civ.Ct., Bx. Cty.1992). Failure to pay the utility bill was not an indication of abandonment but a financial crisis that petitioner alleges he was attempting to resolve with assistance from the V.A. See, Lee v. Park, 16 AD3d 986, 793 N.Y.S.2d 214 (3rd Dept. 2005).



The court concludes that respondent failed to establish that petitioner has abandoned or surrendered the subject apartment. It is undisputed that petitioner is the tenant of record of the apartment. There is no evidence that petitioner expressed an intent to abandon the apartment, relinquished possession or treated the lease as terminated. Nor was any evidence provided establishing that petitioner authorized anyone to surrender possession of the apartment. [*3]Respondent's reliance upon unverified statements allegedly made by third parties is insufficient to establish petitioner's abandonment or surrender.By order dated June 17, 2014 this matter was adjourned to June 21, 2014. The third party respondent, Mario Herrera, the current occupant of the subject apartment, was added as a respondent. The order adding the third party respondent and informing him of the adjourned return date, together with the initial Order to Show Cause, respondent Onsite's opposition papers and petitioner's reply affirmation were served upon respondent Herrera. On June 21, 2014 the matter was adjourned to June 30, 2014 for trial. Third Party Respondent, Mario Herrera failed to appear.



As stated in Padilla v. Padilla, 164 Misc 2d 740, 626 N.Y.S.2d 656 Civil Ct., Bx. Co., 1995) "00 [w]here an eviction is held to be illegal but a new tenant is already in place, the court must balance the equities between the evicted tenant and the new tenant in order to determine whether reinstatement is warranted or whether the evicted tenant is relegated to a damage action only". Columbia Assocs. v Miles, NYLJ, June 7, 1989, at 21, col 4 (App Term, 1st Dept). Timeliness of the evicted tenant's motion seeking reinstatement is among the factors to be considered in balancing the equities. In the matter before this court petitioner resided in the rent stabilized apartment for three years. His possessions remain in the apartment and are being used by Mr. Herrera. Petitioner commenced this proceeding seeking to be restored to possession on June 12, 2014, six days after he returned to the apartment following his Grandmother's funeral in Virginia. It is the finding of this court that the equities balance in favor of the petitioner.Accordingly, it is ordered that the petitioner herein be restored to possession of the subject apartment forthwith. It is further ordered that a judgment of possession be entered in favor of the petitioner and against respondents Onsite Property Management, Inc. and Mario Herrera. A warrant of eviction against Mario Herrera shall issue forthwith and execution is stayed until after service of a Marshal's Notice of Eviction.



Damages are reserved for a plenary action.The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.