Upon the following papers numbered 1 to7read on this motion to dismiss; Notice of Motion/ Order to Show Cause and supporting papers1-5; Notice of Cross Motion and supporting papers; Answering Affidavits and supporting papers; Replying Affidavits and supporting papers6-7; Other defendants' memorandum of law; plaintiffs' memorandum of law; defendants' reply memorandum of law; (and after hearing counsel in support and opposed to the motion) it is,

ORDERED that the motion by the defendants for an order pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) [*2](7), dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, is denied.

This is an action to recover moneys allegedly due and owing for real estate brokerage services rendered by the plaintiffs in connection with the proposed sale of the defendants' property at 114 Pacific Walk in the Village of Saltaire, located on Fire Island. It appears from the complaint that Lighthouse Vacation Properties is a partnership duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York and in which Ali Beqaj is a partner, and that Ali Beqaj was and still is a duly licensed real estate broker.

The plaintiffs plead two causes of action in their complaint, both for breach of contract: the first, to recover the agreed commissions, and the second, to recover the reasonable value of services performed.^[FN1] The plaintiffs allege, in part, that the defendants employed the plaintiffs to render certain work, labor, and services on their behalf as real estate brokers, namely, to find a buyer ready, willing, and able to purchase their property at a price and on terms satisfactory and agreeable to them; that the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs a brokerage commission in the amount of 5% of the price of the property; that in or about October 2013, as a result of the plaintiffs' work, labor, and services, the plaintiffs presented to the defendants an all-cash offer of $510,000.00 from Carl and Evelyn Abruzzo, who were ready, willing, and able to purchase the property; that the defendants accepted the offer; that the plaintiffs prepared a contract for the sale of the property which Abruzzos promptly executed and returned to the defendants; but that the defendants, without cause or just reason, failed to execute the contract. The plaintiffs further allege that in or about October 2013, as a result of the plaintiffs' work, labor, and services, the plaintiffs presented to the defendants a second and different offer of $540,000.00 from Anthony and Anna Spagnola, who were ready, willing, and able to purchase the property; but that the defendants subsequently advised the plaintiffs that they had decided to work with another, unrelated broker to finalize the sale of the property; and that the defendants have since failed and refused to have any contact with the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claim, therefore, to be the procuring cause in obtaining two buyers who were ready, willing, and able to purchase the property at prices and on terms satisfactory and agreeable to the defendants; that the defendants, consequently, are in breach of the parties' brokerage agreement; and, as a result, that there is now [*3]due and owing to the plaintiffs the sum of $53,000.00, or, alternatively, that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the sum of $53,000.00 as the reasonable value of their work, labor, and services.^[FN2]

The defendants now move, pre-answer, to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. As to the first cause of action, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs failed to plead the efforts they made to procure the sale of the property, or any connection between those efforts and the ultimate sale of the property, or even that a sale of the property resulted from those efforts. The defendants also contend, relative to the second cause of action, that the plaintiffs failed to allege the specific services performed on behalf of the defendants for which they seek to recover reasonable compensation.

On a motion to dismiss a complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the test is whether the pleading states a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has a cause of action (Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 904 NYS2d 153 [2010]). A court must determine whether, accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, those facts fit within any cognizable legal theory (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 614 NYS2d 972 [1994]), although bare legal conclusions and factual claims flatly contradicted by the record are not entitled to any such consideration (Doria v Masucci, 230 AD2d 764, 646 NYS2d 363 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 811, 657 NYS2d 404 [1997]). "Whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus" (EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19, 799 NYS2d 170, 175 [2005]).

Notwithstanding the defendants' assertions, the court finds that the complaint sets forth sufficient facts to state a cause of action for recovery of a real estate broker's commission. A real estate broker is generally entitled to recover a commission upon establishing that he or she (i) was duly licensed (Real Property Law § 442-d), (ii) had a contract, express or implied, with the party to be charged with paying the commission (Julien J. Studley, Inc. v New York News, 70 NY2d 628, 518 NYS2d 779 [1987]; Re/Max Homes & Estates v Leist, 308 AD2d 439, 764 NYS2d 107 [2003]), and (iii) procured a buyer ready, willing, and able to purchase on the seller's terms (Rusciano Realty Servs. v Griffler, 62 NY2d 696, 476 NYS2d 526 [1984]; Sutton & Edwards, Inc. v 68-60 Austin St. Realty Corp., 70 AD3d 810, 895 NYS2d 174 [2010]). Absent an agreement to the contrary, the broker's right to a commission is not contingent upon performance of the underlying real estate contract, receipt by the seller of the sale price, transfer of title, or even the formal execution of a legally enforceable sales contract (Coldwell Banker Vil. Green Realty v Pillsworth, 32 AD3d 568, 818 NYS2d 868 [2006]; accord Mecox Realty Corp. v Rose, 202 AD2d 404, 608 NYS2d 526 [1994]). To the extent the complaint may be said to lack specificity as to what the plaintiffs did to procure the potential buyers, it is nevertheless sufficiently detailed to give adequate notice of the transactions and occurrences constituting the [*4]alleged wrong (see CPLR 3013). And whether the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead a cause of action to recover in quantum meruit, as the defendants further claim, is of no moment (see n 1, supra).

Accordingly, the motion is denied. The defendants shall serve their answer to the complaint within 10 days after service of a copy of this order with notice of its entry (see CPLR 3211 [f]).

Dated: September 3, 2014_______________________________________

HON. JOSEPH C. PASTORESSA, J.S.C.