Respondent Richard Savitt seeks leave to renew and reargue, pursuant to CPLR 2221, this Court's decision and order dated June 24, 2014 (the "Decision").^[FN1] Familiarity with this opinion is assumed. The Decision denied Savitt's motion to vacate, granted Petitioner Tribeca Equity Partners L.P.'s ("Tribeca") motion seeking attorneys fees, and sua sponte imposed sanctions against Savitt after a hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

It is black letter law that a motion seeking leave to renew must be supported by information that was not known or otherwise available to the party at the time of the original motion. Shapiro v. State, 259 AD2d 753, 753 (2d Dep't 1999). Here, Savitt is unable to meet this burden, as the information upon which he bases his motion was available at the time this matter was originally considered by this Court. Indeed, Savitt has had multiple opportunities to submit this information, including in a post-hearing submission, which he waived. Decision at 29-31. Having failed to demonstrate an entitlement to renewal, the instant motion is required to be denied by this Court. Shapiro, 259 AD2d at 753-74 (denying renewal because a party lacked a reasonable excuse for failing to submit an affidavit with the original motion).

Moreover, the materials submitted with the motion would not provide a basis for relief as they actually demonstrated the falsity of his testimony. For instance, Savitt provided the following testimony regarding a December 3, 2013 court appearance:

In his instant motion, Savitt's submission conclusively refutes the veracity of his representation that he personally appeared the morning of December 3, 2013, only to be misled by a court clerk regarding the calendaring of the case. Savitt submitted the affidavit of Ariel Govan, a New Jersey attorney, who attested that Savitt did not appear on December 3 until "immediately after 12:00 (I believe 12:02 or 12:03)." Govan Aff., sworn to July, 23, 2014, at ¶6. Savitt also submitted a letter addressed to this Court dated December 4, 2013, which is not in the court file and was not submitted during the hearings. In this letter, Savitt asserted that he was handling another matter in a different courthouse and apparently appeared for this matter after the entire Special Term I calendar had been completed:

The perplexing nature of Savitt's misrepresentation is that it was unnecessary. First, Savitt could have submitted an affidavit of actual engagement, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 125.1, relating to the conflicting court appearances on December 3.^[FN4] Second, Savitt was not sanctioned for failing to appear on December 3, but for making factual misrepresentations to this Court. Decision at 48, fn. 22 ("Savitt is not sanctioned for failing to attend the August 16 and December 3, 2013 court appearances").

The Court also finds no merit in Savitt's attempt to deflect blame for his own misconduct as it related to multiple defective subpoenas. Savitt engaged in frivolous behavior for serving defective subpoenas dated February 20, 2014.^[FN5] Far from attempting to thwart Savitt's ability to obtain discovery, the undersigned granted Savitt permission to serve subpoenas. In doing so, Savitt was instructed that he was not to sign the subpoenas:

Savitt submitted a so-called supplemental affidavit attaching a rent ledger and an online real estate listing. Savitt's attempt to supplement his moving papers after Tribeca has submitted its opposition was exactly the type of impermissible litigation conduct for which Savitt has been criticized by judges in multiple decisions. In any event, the documents do not support Savitt's assertion that an unidentified representative of his landlord orally agreed to waive rental arrears. For instance, the rental arrears are shown to be accruing from the time Savitt stopped paying his rent after August 1, 2006 until his departure from the premises in conformance with the time frame called for in the so-ordered stipulation of settlement. The rent ledger also documents Tribeca's legal fees relating to its efforts to prosecute the instant litigation to have Savitt removed from the subject apartment. Compare Rent Ledger with Exh. 24. Finally, a printout of a web-page apparently relating to Savitt's apartment being re-rented after it was later combined with a second apartment is not probative evidence of an agreement by Tribeca to waive the substantial unpaid rental arrears.

Accordingly, that branch of the motion seeking leave to renew the Decision is denied.

That branch of Savitt's motion seeking leave to reargue is also denied. A motion to reargue is required to be based "upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion." Mazinov v. Rella, 79 AD3d 979, 980 (2d Dep't 2010). The motion "is not designed to provide an unsuccessful party with successive opportunities to reargue issues previously decided, or to present arguments different from those originally presented." McGill v. Goldman, 261 AD2d 593, 594 (2d Dep't 1999).

Savitt has not demonstrated that this Court overlooked or misapprehended a material fact or applicable law. Instead, Savitt repeatedly attempts to obfuscate the actual bases for the various findings made by this Court. Without addressing his contentions seriatim, Savitt, for example, misstated the import of his two non-payment proceedings with the landlord immediately preceding his tenancy with Tribeca in Bowery at Spring Partners, LP v. Savitt, New York County Civil Court Index Nos. L & T 096767/03 (Spring Partners I) and L & T 82369/04 (Spring Partners II). Savitt was not questioned about these cases because they purportedly demonstrated a pattern of wrongful conduct in not paying his rent. Rather, Savitt was questioned about these two actions because he affirmatively represented to Judge Samuels that he had never [*3]been in Housing Court prior to the instant proceeding. Decision at 17-18. Savitt's attempt to misdirect from the purpose of the inquiry into these two actions was addressed during the evidentiary proceedings that led to the Decision as follows: "Once again, you're simply diverting attention to the merits of the underlying case, as opposed to the veracity of your affirmative statement." Tr. 57:15-18 (Mar. 18, 2014); see also id. at Tr. 56:8-9 ("It's the existence of Spring Partners that's the problem for you").

Accordingly, as this Court has not overlooked or misapprehended any facts or misapplied any controlling principle of law in rendering its ruling, that branch of the motion seeking reargument is denied.

Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that Savitt's motion

Hon. James E. d'Auguste, J.C.C.