Upon the foregoing papers, the motion for summary judgment of defendants THE CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION, is granted.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained when he slipped and fell on snow and ice on the street in front of his home at 89 Thornycroft Avenue on Staten Island. According to plaintiff, the accident occurred on January 21, 2011, late in the day between the hours of 5:00 and 7:00pm. Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that THE CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION (hereinafter, collectively, "defendants"), were negligent in failing, inter alia, to properly maintain the street in front of plaintiff's residence free of snow and ice prior to the time of his fall. As a result of said fall, plaintiff claims to have sustained, inter alia, fractures of the left foot and ankle requiring open reduction surgery. According to plaintiff, he was confined to his bed and home for an extended period of time, and he continues to suffer from side effects resulting from said injuries.

In the current application, defendants move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that they are not liable for the subject accident since it occurred while a storm/precipitation was in progress. Defendants further argue that even if the snow/precipitation had stopped, they are permitted a reasonable period of time following the cessation of a storm in order to commence snow removal operations.

In support of their motion, defendants submit copies of the weather records maintained by the National Climatic Data Center located at the weather station at Newark Liberty Airport in New Jersey for the month of January 2011. These records indicate that 4.5 inches of snow had fallen on the day the subject accident occurred, with precipitation beginning at 3:00 am and continuing through 7:00pm. Since plaintiff testified that his accident occurred around 6:30pm, defendants maintain that the "storm in progress" rule bars any finding of liability against defendants based on their failure, if any, to remove snow and ice from the street in front of plaintiff's home.

Defendants further argue that even if the snow/precipitation had stopped prior to the time plaintiff fell, the accident occurred during the reasonable period of time following the cessation of a storm that is afforded to a municipality to allow the commencement of snow removal operations. In this regard, defendants explain that when determining what is a reasonable time to commence snow removal operations following the cessation of a snow storm, the various factors are to be considered include (1) the amount of snow which fell, (2) time of day the storm ended, and (3) the fluctuations in temperature both before and after the storm. According to defendants, in addition to the snow that fell on the date of plaintiff's accident, there had been several snow storms during the previous two weeks, which had deposited snow that would have been subject to intervening cycles of melting and re-freezing during the following days. As proof, defendants have submitted copies of DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION (DOS) records, including "spreader routes" and "plow routes", in order to establish that snow removal operations were already under way in an effort to clear the streets of snow and ice from the earlier storm(s) in the following order of their significance: primary streets first, then secondary streets, followed [*2]by tertiary streets. According to defendants, plaintiff's street was considered a secondary route and, as such, would have been plowed and salted on the morning of the date in question.

In opposition, plaintiff contends that defendants' motion for summary judgment should be denied since they have not met their burden of establishing their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. In the first place, plaintiff argues that defendants rely on inadmissable evidence, e.g., uncertified copies of the weather records from Newark Liberty Airport. According to plaintiff, CPLR 4540 requires, inter, alia, that official records be authenticated in order to be admissible and considered by the Court on a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff also argues that defendants have failed to submit the narrative of a meteorological expert to interpret such records, and to explain the significance of the information contained therein.

In addition, plaintiff argues that defendants have failed to establish that the weather conditions memorialized in those records are the same as the conditions existing at the time and place where plaintiff's accident occurred. Plaintiff argues that Newark, New Jersey is a significant distance from the accident location, and that the conditions there should not be considered determinative of the conditions on Staten Island at the time and place of plaintiff's fall. Moreover, plaintiff argues that defendants have failed to establish that snow removal operations were actually conducted on the street outside his residence. Rather they have only provided proof of general plowing procedures for primary, secondary, and tertiary roadways.

Plaintiff further argues that defendants have failed to establish that the subject accident occurred during a "storm in progress". According to plaintiff, it was not still snowing at the time of his accident, although there was approximately a foot of snow on the ground. According to plaintiff, the snowpack was comprised of three to four inches of "old" snow and slush that had remained on the street from previous snow storms, on top of which the new snow had accumulated. Plaintiff also claims that his street was plowed only once after previous snow storms, and never salted. Finally, plaintiff contends that the uncertified weather records submitted by defendants indicate that there were several significant snow events which occurred in the days prior to plaintiff's fall, which began on or about January 11, 2011, and continued on-and-off through January 20, 2011. According to plaintiff, the previous storm(s) had ended on the day prior to the date of the subject accident on January 21, 2011, during which only trace evidence of precipitation fell. As a result, plaintiff claims that a triable issue has been created as to whether the snow that caused him to fall was deposited by the earlier storms or the snow which fell on January 21.

In their reply affirmation, defendants argue that CPLR 4528, rather than CPLR 4540 specifically addresses the admissibility of weather records, and provides that "[a]ny record of the observations of weather, taken under the direction of the United States weather bureau, is prima facie evidence of the facts stated". According to defendants, their Exhibit G is a copy of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) National Climatic Data Reports for January, 2011 from the weather station located at Newark Liberty Airport in New Jersey. Moreover, those records are accompanied by a certificate which indicates that NOAA operates the National Weather Service under the direction of the United States weather bureau. Accordingly, the reports are admissible under CPLR 4538, and constitute prima facie evidence of the weather conditions existing at or around the time of the subject accident.

Finally, defendants argue that expert testimony is not required to interpret the weather [*3]records, which speak for themselves insofar as they relate to the weather conditions existing at the time of plaintiff's accident. Thus, it is claimed that further interpretation is not required.

The motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, by tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issue of fact (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320). Once this initial burden has been satisfied, however, the burden of production shifts to the party opposing the motion to produce sufficient evidence of the existence of a material issue of fact to require a trial of the action (id.). Here, it is the opinion of this Court that defendants have established their prima facie entitlement to judgment. In opposition, plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

It is well settled that defendants are not chargeable with the duty to remove snow and ice from the streets and sidewalks during a snowstorm (see Taylor v .New York City Tr. Auth., 266 AD2d 384). It is further well settled that defendants are entitled to a reasonably sufficient time following the cessation of a snowstorm to begin snow removal operations (see Hill-Thomas v. Metropolitan Trans. Auth., 289 AD2d 447, 448). In this regard, what constitutes a "sufficient time" has been held to vary with the amount of snowfall, the temperature and the priority for clearing snow from the various streets, roads and sidewalks located within a city (see Valentine v. City of New York, 86 AD2d 381, 382-383, afffd 57 NY2d 932 (1982).

Here, while the parties disagree with regard to whether the snow had ceased prior to the time of plaintiff's fall, the weather reports indicate that there were several significant snow events in the two-week period preceding the day of plaintiff's fall. More specifically, the weather records ^[FN1] submitted by defendants indicate that the extent of precipitation that continued throughout the prior two-week period included: nine inches of snow on January 12, 2011; seven additional inches on January 13, 2011; seven more inches on January 14, 2011; five inches on January 15, 2011; another five inches on January 16, 2011; four inches on January 17, 2011; six inches on January 18, 2011; four inches on January 19, 2011 and two inches on January 20, 2011. In addition, the records indicate that additional snow fell on January 21, 2011, the day on which plaintiff claims to have fallen. Given the severity of these unusual conditions, and the additional precipitation which fell on the date of the subject accident, it cannot be said that a sufficient time had elapsed for defendants to have remedied all of the hazardous conditions existing on the City's streets and roadways prior to the time of plaintiff's fall.

Moreover, DOS records and the deposition testimony of DOS witness Anthony Buzzetta, collectively indicate that snow removal operations had, in fact, commenced prior to the date of plaintiff's fall, and that while all of the roadways (including primary and secondary streets) may [*4]not have been completely salted or plowed, operations were ongoing throughout the two-week period preceding plaintiff's fall. In view of the severity of the prior snow storms, along with the temperature fluctuations which caused an accumulation of snow and ice on the roadways, plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding defendants alleged negligence in failing to clear plaintiff's street prior to the time of his purported fall.

Finally, plaintiff's allegation that he fell on snow or ice left over from a storm that had occurred three days earlier is mere speculation and, therefore, insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Simmons v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 207 AD2d 290, 291, affd 84 NY2d 972).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted and the complaint is dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that the clerk enter judgment accordingly.