| Trebatch Lichtenstein Avrutine & Co., Inc. v Goro |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 51651(U) [45 Misc 3d 132(A)] |
| Decided on November 21, 2014 |
| Appellate Term, First Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Frank P. Nervo, J.), entered November 26, 2013, which granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the complaint and denied defendant's motion to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.
Per Curiam.
Order (Frank P. Nervo, J.), entered November 26, 2013, affirmed, with $10 costs.
Personal jurisdiction was obtained over defendant, a Nassau County resident, pursuant to CCA 404(a)(1), Civil Court's long-arm statute. It is undisputed that defendant's husband retained plaintiff in New York City to render accounting services for defendant, including the preparation of defendant's individual income tax returns; that, subject to the hiring, plaintiff performed services for defendant over the course of several years; that all of the services were rendered by plaintiff at its New York City offices; and that the within action was brought to obtain payment for services rendered by plaintiff in the very matter which formed the basis for his retention. These facts were sufficient to establish that defendant, in person or through her agent, transacted business in New York City (see Fischbarg v Doucet, 38 AD3d 270 [2007]; Kasczorowski v Black and Adams, 293 AD2d 358 [2002]).
Turning to the merits, plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by showing that it rendered the requested services on defendant's behalf, mailed itemized bills to defendant, and that defendant received and retained the invoices without objection (see Stephanie R. Cooper, PC v Robert, 78 AD3d 572, 573 [2010]; Berkman Bottger & Rodd, LLP v Moriarty, 58 AD3d 539 [2009]; Shea & Gould v. Burr, 194 AD2d 369 [1993]). In opposition, defendant did not deny plaintiff's rendition of the services or her own retention without objection of the invoices. Contrary to defendant's principal substantive point, plaintiff, in its efforts to collect on a debt owed directly to it, was not a debt collector governed by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (see 15 USCA § 1692[a][6]; United Cos. Lending Corp. v Candela, 292 AD2d 800, 801-802 [2002]).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.