[*1]
1541 Williamsbridge Realty, LLC v Anna Ramsay
2014 NY Slip Op 51707(U) [45 Misc 3d 1224(A)]
Decided on December 3, 2014
Civil Court Of The City Of New York, Bronx County
Vargas, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on December 3, 2014
Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County


1541 Williamsbridge Realty, LLC, Petitioner-Landlord,

against

Anna Ramsay, Respondent-Tenant, and ROSS RAMSAY, "JOHN DOE" and "JANE DOE," Respondents-Undertenants.




L & T 021002/2014



Todd Rose, Esq.



Rose & Rose



291 Broadway, 13th Floor



New York, New York 10007



Harry Hertzberg, Esq.



1526 Williamsbridge Road



Bronx, New York 10461


Javier E. Vargas, J.

Upon the foregoing papers and for the following reasons, the motions by Respondent-Undertenant Ross Ramsay ("Mr. Ramsay"), for vacatur of the parties' Stipulation of Settlement and Judgment of Possession, are denied.



For several years, Respondent-Tenant Anna Ramsay ("Tenant") had been the rent-stabilized tenant-of-record of the subject Premises located at 1541 Williamsbridge Road, Apt. 3-K, in the Bronx, New York, which are owned by Petitioner-Landlord 1541 Williamsbridge Realty, LLC ("Landlord"). It is undisputed that the Premises, which are subject to the Rent Stabilization Laws of 1969 and have been duly registered with the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal ("DHCR"), have a monthly rental of $773.06, according to the Petition.



Tenant was a senior citizen, whose son, Mr. Ramsay, lived next door to her in Apartment 3-L for some years. However, sometime in 2013, Landlord commenced a holdover summary proceeding in Bronx Housing Court against Mr. Ramsay apparently based on the fact that he was operating a commercial contracting business at his residence in violation of the governing lease. In March 2014, after Mr. Ramsay was duly evicted from his next door apartment, Landlord discovered that Mr. Ramsay had unlawfully altered the subject Premises by cutting through a common wall between his apartment and the Premises for the purpose of illegally combining the two apartments. After recovering possession of Apartment 3-L, Landlord then sealed the illegal common door installed by Mr. Ramsay. Undeterred, it is undisputed that Mr. Ramsay illegally broke through the seal into Apartment 3-L, and stole various items of property therefrom. He was subsequently arrested and charged with the crimes of burglary, criminal mischief and trespass.



By Notice of Petition and Petition filed April 8, 2014, Landlord commenced the instant nonpayment summary proceeding against Tenant to recover three months of rent arrears totaling $2,819.24, possession of the apartment and reasonable costs and legal fees. By Verified Answer dated April 16, 2014, Mr. Ramsay, not Tenant, answered the Petition, generally denying the allegations and raising several Affirmative Defenses, inter alia, that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because service was not properly effectuated, that the rent had been timely paid but not credited, and that Mr. Ramsay is the actual tenant in possession of the Premises after succeeding to the tenancy upon the death of his mother, Tenant.



It was allegedly only after the commencement of this nonpayment proceeding and receipt [*2]of the Answer that Landlord became aware of the passing of Tenant, who actually died on February 4, 2010. Landlord was also unaware of Tenant's death because an April 2011 renewal lease agreement had been pretendedly signed by Tenant, but in reality her signature was undisputedly forged by Mr. Ramsay. These additional facts and Mr. Ramsay's damage to the Premises served as a predicate for a licensee holdover summary proceeding commenced almost simultaneously with this nonpayment proceeding by Landlord against Mr. Ramsay in Bronx Housing Court. Mr. Ramsay has appeared by counsel in both this proceeding and the holdover summary proceeding.



After several adjournments, on April 23, 2014, Landlord and Mr. Ramsay entered into a two-attorney, "so ordered" Stipulation of Settlement settling both proceedings before the undersigned, adding Mr. Ramsay as a party respondent, converting the nonpayment proceeding to a holdover proceeding, and consenting to the issuance of a Final Judgment of Possession in favor of Landlord with execution of the warrant stayed until August 31, 2014, when he was to vacate the Premises. Mr. Ramsay additionally agreed to pay rent arrears, use & occupancy ("U & O") and restitution for the property damages caused, in the total sum of $4,619, by making an initial payment of $2,379 by May 2, 2014, and then installments of $650 plus monthly U & O by the 10th of the ensuing months until paid in full by August 2014. In relevant part, Landlord waived its rights to pursue the criminal charges currently pending against Mr. Ramsay as well as the costs, disbursements and attorney's fees of this proceeding in exchange for Tenant's "full and faithful compl[iance] with every term obligation imposed by this agreement," including timely payment of the arrears and restitution to Landlord.



In accordance with the Stipulation, a Final Judgment of Possession and Money Judgment for the arrears was duly signed by the undersigned on April 23, 2014, and a Warrant of Eviction was issued. Almost immediately, Mr. Ramsay failed to comply with the Stipulation's terms and a Notice of Eviction was subsequently served upon him, resulting in his pro-se application for an Order to Show Cause on May 30, 2014, which application was withdrawn because of the absence of his counsel. Mr. Ramsay again sought a pro-se Order to Show Cause on September 11, 2014, which was denied for that same reason. However, on that same date, he filed an Affidavit in Support of an Order to Show Cause to Permit a Represented Party to Appear in Person (Pro se), affirming that he can no longer afford his previous counsel, and that the counsel had not sent him a release, as requested. Then, by Order to Show Cause dated September 11, 2014, Mr. Ramsay now moves pro se for vacatur and a stay of execution of the Judgment alleging that: "I have not found a place I can afford and I am continuing to look for a place. I have [the] rent and need a place to stay for 6 months. I am requesting a 6-month stay of execution till I find a place to live."



Upon retaining new counsel, Mr, Ramsay also moves, by Notice of Motion returnable October 29, 2014, for an order vacating the Stipulation of Settlement entered between the parties on April 23, 2014, presumably pursuant to CPLR 3212(a). In his Affirmation, counsel argues that Mr. Ramsay's previous counsel entered into the Stipulation absent his permission and without apprizing him of its contents and ramifications, including the possibility of an eviction for failure to comply. He points out that neither Ramsay's signature nor his initials appear on the Stipulation and that, in fact, Ramsay first became aware of the existence of the Stipulation upon receiving the Marshal's Notice of Eviction. Counsel further argues that Mr. Ramsay, as a long-time tenant, has been paying the rent for several years and should be entitled to stay in the [*3]Premises as long as he abides by Landlord's rules and regulations. No affidavit by Mr. Ramsay or other exhibit is attached in support.



In opposition to the motion, Landlord argues that Mr. Ramsay's motion should be denied not only because there is no affidavit from him or someone with personal knowledge of the facts as required by CPLR 3212(b), but because he entered into the Stipulation freely, knowingly and voluntarily under the guidance of counsel, who had presumptive authority to act on his behalf. Landlord also argues that, in any event, Mr. Ramsay complied with and ratified the Stipulation by making all payments required thereunder, and should not be permitted to disavow the Stipulation, now that it appears inconvenient for him. This Court agrees.



It is well settled that stipulations of settlement between parties on pending proceeding are binding contracts enforceable by the court and, as such, they are favored and "will not be lightly cast aside" (Hallock v New York, 64 NY2d 224, 230 [1984]; see Matter of Galasso, 35 NY2d 319, 321 [1974]), "especially where, as here, the party seeking to vacate the stipulation was represented by counsel" (Kelley v Chavez, 33 AD3d 590 [2d Dept 2006]; see Town of Clarkstown v M.R.O. Pump & Tank, Inc., 287 AD2d 497 [2001]). Only where there is a legally sufficient cause to invalidate a contractual obligation, such as where it is manifestly unfair to one party because of the other's overreaching or where its terms are unconscionable or constitute fraud, collusion, mistake or accident, will a party be relieved from the consequences of the bargain struck with the stipulation (see Matter of Matinzi v Joy, 60 NY2d 835, 386 [1983]; Barzin v Barzin, 158 AD2d 769, 770 [1990], lv dismissed 77 NY2d 834 [1991]; 44 Wall Owner, LLC v Failla, 29 Misc 3d 133[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51925[U] [AT 1st 2010]). More than mere and conclusory allegations are required, however, since stipulations of settlement serve the interests of efficient dispute resolution, the proper management of court calendars and the integrity of the litigation process (see Hallock, supra, at 231); a fortiori considerations in the endless number of Housing Court summary proceedings (see Chelsea 19 Assoc. v James, 67 AD3d 601 [2009]).



Applying the foregoing principles to the matter at bar, Mr. Ramsay has failed to demonstrate any sufficient cause to invalidate the so-ordered Stipulation of Settlement or, much less, vacate the Final Judgment and Warrant of Eviction. From the beginning of this proceeding, except for a brief period, Mr. Ramsay has been represented by competent counsel, who after negotiations, reached a very favorable agreement on his behalf with Landlord, which not only permitted him to remain at the Premises as a licensee for over four months despite the lack of succession rights from the deceased Tenant while paying the very low rent-stabilized U & O, but, more importantly, he was spared of the prosecution of the serious criminal charges pending against him for the burglary and property damage. Contrary to Mr. Ramsay's contentions, the fact that he did not sign, although present in court, when the Stipulation was reviewed and signed by the undersigned does not invalidate it since, under the circumstances of this case, it is evident that counsel was "clothed with apparent authority" to bind him to the agreement "and the [Landlord] reasonably relied upon that appearance of authority" (Hallock v State of New York, supra at 231; see 7 E. 75 LLC v Bekuraidze, 45 Misc 3d 127[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51481[U] AT 1st 2014]).



Other than conclusorily stating that Mr. Ramsay's prior counsel unilaterally entered into the Stipulation, he points to no coercion, fraud, overreaching or any other improper conduct by [*4]Landlord or either counsel in entering into the Stipulation (see Montgomery Trading LLC v Siegel, 25 Misc 3d 128[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52075[U] [AT 1st 2009]). Nor may Mr. Ramsay feign ignorance about the Stipulation, since he was copied with emails between counsel and personally filed no less than two Orders to Show Cause seeking more time to pay the U & O and/or to move out of the Premises. It is very telling that he has failed to provide a sworn affidavit in support of his motion, where he could have affirmed under oath that he was ignorant of the Stipulation or its consequences. A bare attorney affirmation without personal knowledge, as provided here, is without probative value and "patently insufficient" to oppose the motion (Vermette v Kenworth Truck Co., 68 NY2d 714, 717 [1986]; see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).



Moreover, Mr. Ramsay repeatedly ratified the Stipulation terms by making the required monthly payments representing U & O and arrears — totaling over $4,619 — as well as the $400 restitution amount, assented to by Mr. Ramsay upon advice of prior counsel. It is well-settled that payment or acceptance of payment as required thereat, constitutes ratification of the Stipulation (see Daniel Gale Assoc. v Hillcrest Estates, 283 AD2d 386, 387 [2001]; 7 E. 75 LLC v Bekuraidze, 45 Misc 3d at 127[A]). It is also undisputed that the Court oversaw the proceedings, reviewed the Stipulation, and ultimately gave its imprimatur and approval to the Stipulation. On its face, the Stipulation's "uncomplex and unremarkable terms represented an equitable and balanced surrender of interests" and there is nothing unduly harsh or unjust about the stipulated provisions, "which, if proved, would implicate the stipulation's validity" (Poplar Realty v Po, 3 Misc 3d 22, 24 [AT 1st 2003]). To the contrary, Landlord appears to have been more than generous by permitting Mr. Ramsay to remain at the Premises and waiving the costs and criminal charges against him, despite his aberrant uncontroverted behavior. In accordance with the foregoing as well as the strong public policy favoring enforcement of settlements, this Court finds no grounds to relieve Mr. Ramsay from the consequences of the bargained for Stipulation.



In conclusion, Mr. Ramsay's motions for vacatur of the Stipulation of Settlement and Judgment of Possession are denied. Following service with Notice of Entry of this Order and Decision, all stays are vacated and Notice of Eviction shall be remailed forthwith. No further extension shall be granted. The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

E N T E R:



Dated: December 3, 2014

Bronx, New YorkJ.H.C.