The following papers numbered 1 to 2 read in this proceeding:

Upon the foregoing papers and after oral argument held on the record before the court in this proceeding, brought pursuant to Article 16 of the Election Law to declare invalid the designating petition purporting to designate Respondent-Candidate Sharon Clarke for Judge of the Civil Court of the City of New York from the 6th Municipal Court District, Assigned Vacancy #4 in Kings County, in the September 9, 2014 Democratic Party Primary Election and enjoining Respondent Board of Elections (Board) from certifying the name of Respondent-Candidate as an official candidate for said Public Office in said Primary Election, and enjoining said Board from printing said name on ballots to be used at said Primary Election, the court finds as follows:

At the oral argument before the court, the petitioner-objectors have limited their claims to two alleged legal defects with the petitions submitted to the respondent Board of Elections in the City of New York (Board) by the respondent-candidate Sharon Clarke. The first alleged defect relates to all of the witness statements contained in volumes KG140128 (28), KG1401429 (29), KG1401430 (30) and KG 1401431 (31) of the petition. Each of these statements include language stating "Each of the individuals whose names are subscribed to this petition sheet containing ___ signatures, subscribed the name in my presence on the dates above indicated and identified himself to be the individual who signed this sheet." Petitioners contend that this language is defective because the statutory form for witness statements requires the placement of the words "or herself" following the word "himself" (Election Law § 6-132 [2]). Petitioners further contend that the all of the signature lines in petition volume KG1401437 (37) are defective because "Brooklyn NY" is inserted in the county column for each of the signatories in violation of Election Law § 6-130's requirement [*2]that the signor indicate the county of his or her residence.

Initially, the court finds that the witness statements contained in petition volumes 28-31 substantially comply with the form required by Election Law § 6-132 (2) despite the omission of the words "or herself" from the witness statements. Section 6-132 (2), by its terms, requires only substantial compliance with the statutorily prescribed format (Matter of Alamo v Black, 51 NY2d 716, 717 [1980]).^[FN1] The legislative intent to avoid penalizing a candidate for innocent violations of the Election Law that have no bearing on the underlying purpose of preventing fraud is further reflected in the enactment of The Election Reform Act of 1992 (L 1992 ch 79) (Matter of Cozzolino v Columbia County Bd. of Elections, 218 AD2d 921, 922-923 [3d Dept 1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 704 [1995]; Matter of Pascazi v New York State Bd. of Elections, 207 AD2d 650, 652 [3d Dept 1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 802 [1994]; see also Matter of Fromson v Lefever, 112 AD2d 1064, 1066 [2d Dept 1985], affd 65 NY2d 946 [1985]). While, on the other hand, matters of prescribed content require strict compliance with Election Law provisions (see Matter of Hutson v Bass, 54 NY2d 772, 774 [1981]; Matter of Alamo, 51 NY2d at 717; Matter of Williams v Westchester County Bd. of Elections, 65 AD3d 653, 654 [2d Dept 2009]), this court finds, based on the legislative history of section 6-132 (2) and the omitted language at issue, that the defect is a matter of form, rather than content, and that the omission here thus does not constitute a fatal defect.

In this regard, the court notes that the language in the witness statements at issue reflects the language required by section 6-132 (2) prior to the amendment of the section in 2006 (L 2006, ch 447). In 2006, the legislature amended various provisions of the Election Law relating to petitions solely in order make the language gender neutral (L 2006, ch 447). This limited purpose behind the amendment is readily seen from the actual changes in language in the provision and the Senate's Memorandum in Support, in which it was noted that the change was required because the Election Law was archaic in its continued use of the masculine gender (L 2006, ch 447; Memorandum in Support, New York State Senate, 2006 McKinney's Session Laws of NY at 1916). Although the change removed outmoded language, it effected no substantive change to the provision, given that General Construction Law § 22 and Election Law § 1-104 (14) require that statutory references to the masculine gender apply to both male and female persons (see Burgard v Gunsschel, 196 Misc 868, 870 (Sup Ct, New York County 1949]). Indeed, even absent General Construction Law § 22 and Election Law § 1-104 (14), the court notes that the witness statement language at issue can be read to include female signors in light of older conventions of style, however archaic those conventions may be (see Wikipedia, Gender-Specific and Gender Neutral Pronouns, http://en.wikipedia. org /wiki/ Gender-specific _and _ gender-neutral _ pronouns). Considered in this light, despite the omission of the words "or herself," the witness statements at issue here convey the same essential meaning as the language currently [*3]mandated.

Nothing in the caselaw involving other petition defects suggests that the defect here must be deemed substantive. This defect here is akin to petitions found to be in substantial compliance despite defects involving a misplaced witness statement or notary signature (Matter of DiNonno v Castioni, 43 AD3d 476, 476-477 [2d Dept 2007] [notary signature stapled to bottom of sheet], lv denied 9 NY3d 804 [2007]; Matter of Bay v Santoianni, 264 AD2d 488, 489 [2d Dept 1999] [notary signature appeared on reverse side of each sheet], lv denied 93 NY2d 817 [1999]; Matter of Rothstein v Healey, 23 AD2d 758, 758 [2d Dept 1965] [witness statement on separate sheet attached to signature sheet]), a failure of a notary to obtain a statement from the signatories attesting to the truth an accuracy of the matter to which they subscribed there names (see Matter of Finn v Sherwood, 87 AD3d 1044, 1045 [2d Dept 2011]), a mistake in title of the petition on the cover sheet (Matter of Wilson v McClean, 175 AD2d 935, 935 [2d Dept 1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 857 [1991]), or in the description of the office (Matter of Felsen v Scaringe, 54 NY2d 932, 934 [1981]). Readily distinguishable is the decision in Matter of Alamo, in which the Court of Appeals found that the failure to include in the witness statement a declaration that the signatories had subscribed their names on the dates indicated was a substantive defect (Matter of Alamo, 51 NY2d at 717). In contrast, the technical requirement relating to the use of the word "or herself" in the witness statement cannot be deemed to have any logical bearing on the issue of fraud (see Matter of Cozzolino, 218 AD2d at 923; Matter of Fromson, 112 AD2d at 1064). Accordingly, even without the words "or herself" the witness statements here fulfilled the substantiative requirements of insuring the witness observed the requirements for the taking of signatures (see Insanally v Nassau County Bd. of Elections, 16 Misc 3d 1120 [A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51523 *1 [U] [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2007]; cf. Matter of Alamo, 51 NY2d at 717).^[FN2]

Given this ruling finding no substantial defect with respect to petition volumes 28 through 31, Clarke has sufficient valid signatures regardless of whether petition volume 37 is defective. The court, however, will address the issue relating to the placement of "Brooklyn NY" in the county column of each of the signature lines of that volume for the sake of completeness. Here, petitioners contend that writing the words "Brooklyn, NY" into the county column is the equivalent of failing to identify the county of the signers. Although petitioner correctly notes that Brooklyn, NY is not a county in New York state, the court finds that its use here is sufficient to indicate that the signors' county is Kings County.

Election Law § 6-130 provides that "[t]he sheets of a designating petition must set forth in every instance the name of the signer, his or her residence address, town or city [*4](except in the city of New York, the county), and the date when the signature is affixed." The requirement that a City of New York (City) signer set forth the county of his or her residence was added as part of an amendment intended to simplify the petition process by removing, among other things, a requirement that the signer indicate his or her ward, election district and assembly district (see Matter of Stoppenbach v Sweeny, 98 NY2d 431, 433 [2002]). While this requirement must be strictly complied with, as it is a matter of prescribed content (see Matter of Stoppenbach v Sweeny, 98 NY2d 431, 433 [2002]; Matter of DiSanzo v Addabbo, 76 AD3d 655, 656 [2d Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 704 [2010]), it is evident that the a City signatory is required to indicate his or her county in order greater particularize his or her location in the City.^[FN3] Here, this function is effectively done by the identification of the county as Brooklyn, NY. In this regard, the territory of Kings County and that of the Borough of Brooklyn is coextensive (Administrative Code of the City of NY § 2-202 [3]). With the consolidation of Kings County's governmental functions, first into the City of Brooklyn in 1895 (L 1895, ch 954) and into the City of New York in 1898 with the passage of the Greater New York City Charter (L 1897, ch 378), Kings County retains little political relevance other than certain county offices continued as a matter of state administration, such as those of the District Attorney and County Clerk (see McGrath v Grout, 171 NY 7, 10-15 [1902]). The court thus finds that the identification of the county as Brooklyn, NY, effectively identifies the signatories' county as Kings County, and that petition sheets contained in volume 37 strictly comply with the requirements of Election Law § 6-130 (cf. Matter of Hinkley v Egan, 181 Misc 2d 921, 922-923 [Sup Ct, Dutchess County 1999]).

Accordingly, the petitioners' petition to validate their respective designating petitions is denied and dismissed and the counterclaim is denied as moot.

This constitutes the decision, order and judgment of the court.