The People move to consolidate the charges contained in Docket #13-4696 charging the defendant with criminal contempt in the second degree (PL 215.50), with Docket #13-3961 charging the defendant with petit larceny (PL 155.25), assault in the third degree (PL 120.00) and harassment in the second degree (PL 240.26). The defendant opposes the motion.

The People contend that consolidation is warranted under CPL 200.20 (2)(b), (c). They argue that the two cases are factually inextricably interwoven, as both incidents involve the defendant committing crimes against his ex-girlfriend Jasmine Syndor. The People maintain that proof of the offense under Docket 13-3961 is admissible as evidence in the People's case in chief during the trial of the matter under Docket #13-4696.

The defendant opposes the motion, arguing that the informations should not be consolidated since the offenses charged are not part of the same criminal transaction, do not contain the same elements, and would not be properly admissible as evidence at [*2]the trial of the other offense. Defendant argues that proof of a violation of the temporary order of protection as charged under Docket #4696 would not necessarily be admissible at the trial of the charges arising from first Docket #3961. Defendant also argues that overlapping of the testimony would be limited to background history about the defendant and alleged victim and would not cause an unnecessary burden to the witness to appear for both trials. The defendant argues that the People have wholly ignored the prejudice that defendant will suffer if consolidation of the two dockets for trial is granted by this Court. He specifically argues that presentation of these two unrelated incidents would lead a jury to believe that defendant has a propensity to violate court orders and engage in assaultive conduct and violate his fundamental right to a fair trial.

Pursuant to CPL 200.20, two offenses are "joinable" when such offenses, or the criminal transactions underlying them "are of such nature that either proof of the first offense would be material and admissible as evidence in chief upon a trial of the second, or proof of the second would be material and admissible as evidence in chief upon a trial of the first" (CPL 200.20(2)(b)). Two offenses are also joinable if such offenses are defined by the same or similar statutory provisions and consequently are the same or similar in law (CPL 200.20(2)(c)).

The decision to consolidate separate indictments, or informations (see CPL 100.45), is committed to the sound discretion of the trial Judge in light of the circumstances of the individual case (People v Lane, 56 NY2d 1 (1982)). "Trial courts should generally weigh the public interest in avoiding duplicative, lengthy and expensive trials against the defendant's interest in being protected from unfair disadvantage" (Id.; People v Gonzalez, 229 AD2d 398 (2d Dept 1996)).

In this case, the defendant is charged with having committed petit larceny, assault in the third degree, and harassment in the second degree on September 7, 2013 by taking the victim's IPhone and walking away with it. Defendant then allegedly returned and repeatedly struck the victim in the face and pulled her down a flight of steps. As a result of the defendant's actions, the victim allegedly sustained injuries about her body and received medical attention at Lawrence Hospital. As a result of those charges, a temporary Order of Protection was issued on September 9, 2013, requiring the defendant to stay away from the complainant, and prohibiting any written, oral or telephone communication with the complainant. The defendant was then charged under Docket #13-4696 with criminal contempt in the second degree, for violating the temporary order of protection by walking towards the alleged victim as she was walking down the street and repeatedly screaming out her name and son's name in order to get their attention.

Based upon the circumstances of this case, the Court exercises its discretion and denies the People's application for the consolidation of the above charges for trial pursuant to CPL 200.20(2)(b), (c) and 200.20(4). Courts are encouraged and afforded reasonable latitude in exercising discretion to consolidate charges when justice, economy and convenience can be achieved (People v McHugh, 126 Misc 2d 116 (1984)). However, "the compromise of a defendant's right to a fair trial free of undue prejudice as the quid pro quo for the mere expeditious disposition of criminal cases will not be tolerated" (People v Lane, 56 NY2d 1 (1982)). Although both cases allegedly [*3]have the same victim, the differences between the charges outweigh the similarities, and consolidating the matters for the purposes of trial would be prejudicial to the defendant. The People need not prove the charges under Docket #13-3961 in order for the defendant to be found guilty of criminal contempt as charged under Docket #13-4696. Similarly, the People need not demonstrate that the defendant violated a valid temporary order of protection in order to prove the charges under Docket #13-3961.

Accordingly, the People's motion is denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.

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HON. ADAM SEIDEN

Associate City Judge of Mount Vernon