Appeal from an interlocutory judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Patricia Anne Williams, J.), entered November 12, 2014. The interlocutory judgment, upon an order of the same court which, following a jury verdict in favor of defendant on the issue of liability, granted plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for a directed verdict on the issue of liability and set aside the jury verdict, is in favor of plaintiff on the issue of liability.

ORDERED that the interlocutory judgment is reversed, without costs, so much of the order as granted plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for a directed verdict on the issue of liability is vacated, plaintiff's motion is denied, the remainder of the order is modified to provide that the verdict is set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a new trial on the issue of liability.

This personal injury action, commenced against Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation in the Supreme Court, Kings County, in July of 2006, arises out of an incident which occurred on August 28, 2005, when plaintiff, a bicyclist, was struck by an unidentified motor vehicle. At a trial on the issue of liability, the testimony revealed that the unidentified driver had come speeding out of a side street controlled by a stop sign without stopping and yielding, and had struck plaintiff who was riding through the intersection from the left of the unidentified motor vehicle. At the close of the evidence, plaintiff moved, pursuant to CPLR 4401, for a directed verdict, and the court reserved decision. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant, finding that, although the unidentified driver was negligent, his negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. The jury further found that plaintiff was negligent and that plaintiff's negligence was a substantial contributing factor in causing the accident. The Civil Court then granted plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of liability as a matter of law and set aside the jury verdict. An interlocutory judgment was entered pursuant to the order.

The Civil Court erred in finding as a matter of law in favor of plaintiff on the issue of liability (see Ramirez v Mezzacappa, 121 AD3d 770 [2014]), since there are issues

However, it is well settled that a jury verdict may be set aside as against the weight of the evidence where "the evidence so preponderates in favor of the moving party that the verdict [*2]could not have been reached upon any fair interpretation of the evidence" (Galimberti v Carrier Indus., 222 AD2d 649, 649 [1995]; see Kensig v Kaufmann, 29 AD3d 956 [2006]; Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129 [1985]). "A jury's finding that a party was at fault but that that fault was not a proximate cause of the accident is inconsistent and against the weight of the evidence only when the issues are so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause' " (Schaefer v Guddemi, 182 AD2d 808, 809 [1992], quoting Rubin v Pecoraro, 141 AD2d 525, 527 [1998]; see Won Sok Kim v New York City Tr. Auth., 29 AD3d 984 [2006]). The uncontroverted evidence at trial clearly established the unidentified driver's negligence as a matter of law in that the driver violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 by entering the intersection controlled by a stop sign without stopping and yielding to the bicycle which had already entered the intersection. In addition, every driver of a vehicle is required to exercise due care to avoid colliding with a bicyclist (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146).

Here, the jury's finding that both plaintiff and the unidentified driver were negligent but that only plaintiff's negligence was a substantial cause of the accident was contrary to the weight of the evidence (see Soto v New York City Tr. Auth., 295 AD2d 419 [2002]; Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129). The finding that the unidentified driver was negligent cannot be reconciled with the finding that this negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident (see Bucich v City of New York, 111 AD2d 646 [1985]). Under the circumstances, the Civil Court should have set aside the jury verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence and ordered a new trial on the issue of liability (see CPLR 4404 [a]).

Accordingly, the interlocutory judgment is reversed, so much of the order as granted plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for a directed verdict on the issue of liability is vacated, plaintiff's motion is denied, the remainder of the order is modified to provide that the verdict is set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a new trial on the issue of liability.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Elliot, JJ., concur.