Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Helen Voutsinas, J.), entered November 14, 2012. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the action.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

In this small claims action, plaintiff seeks to recover the principal sum of $2,130, based on defendant's failure to return a brokerage commission. At a nonjury trial, plaintiff testified that, acting individually and as attorney-in-fact for her husband, she had entered into a residential lease and, upon instruction from her broker, had paid half of the commission to her broker and half of the commission to defendant, which was the listing broker for the premises. The lease included a rider which enumerated plaintiff's requirements for repairs. Upon returning with her husband to inspect the premises two days prior to the commencement of the lease, plaintiff and her husband noticed other perceived deficiencies in the premises which had not been listed in the rider. Plaintiff and her husband concluded that the premises were unsatisfactory. They never moved in or paid any rent for the premises. Plaintiff's broker returned to plaintiff the half commission she had paid it, but defendant refused to return its half commission.

Mitra Mirjani, the broker employed by defendant who had shown plaintiff the premises, and Mozaffar Goltche, who was one of the owners of the premises, both testified. They each stated that all the repairs requested in the rider to the lease had been performed by the time plaintiff had returned with her husband to view the premises. Goltche added that when, upon inspection of the premises with plaintiff and her husband, an odor of gas was detected, he immediately called a plumber to rectify the problem. He also cleaned a window. Goltche and Mirjani both testified that, upon viewing the premises, plaintiff's husband had expressed dissatisfaction. They implied that the problems plaintiff mentioned with respect to the premises were pretexts upon which she sought to rely in an attempt to avoid an obligation she had undertaken on her own and her husband's behalf. Following the trial, the District Court, citing "the credible evidence produced," dismissed the action. Upon a review of the record, we find that the judgment provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see UDCA 1804, 1807; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]).

At trial, plaintiff failed to substantiate her claim that certain of the problems with the premises which had not been listed on the rider, and which she had noticed for the first time [*2]when she inspected the premises with her husband, were hazardous or rendered the premises uninhabitable. Apart from the problem with the gas odor, which Goltche testified was immediately addressed, there was no suggestion that the deficiencies in the premises which plaintiff observed when she visited the premises with her husband had not been present when plaintiff had signed the lease and rider. Moreover, from the trial testimony, it could be concluded that plaintiff failed to request remediation of the problems before she decided not to move into the premises.

The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court, given the limited scope of review (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126). Here, the record supports the District Court's determination.

We find no merit in plaintiff's contention that because she prevailed in an action against the landlord for the return of her security deposit, she was entitled to prevail against defendant for the return of a commission.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Marano, J.P., Tolbert and Garguilo, JJ., concur.

Decision Date: January 15, 2015