| Henderson v Navaro |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 50077(U) [46 Misc 3d 138(A)] |
| Decided on January 15, 2015 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, Fourth District (Andrea Phoenix, J.), dated September 26, 2012. The order denied a motion by defendant Herman Navaro to vacate a default judgment entered against him and to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him. The appeal from the order dated September 26, 2012 brings up for review so much of an order of the same court dated January 2, 2013, as, upon reargument and renewal, adhered to the prior determination (see CPLR 5517 [b]).
ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated September 26, 2012 is dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order dated January 2, 2013, made upon reargument and renewal; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order dated January 2, 2013, insofar as reviewed, is reversed, without costs, and the matter is remitted to the District Court for a determination de novo, following a traverse hearing, of defendant Herman Navaro's motion to vacate a default judgment entered against him and to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him.
Plaintiff commenced this action in 1991 to recover for property damage to his automobile. Two affidavits of service executed by a process server stated, respectively, that Herman Navaro had been personally served with the summons and complaint on February 25, 1991 and that Auto Europa Imported Cars (Auto Europa) had been served on the same date by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to Navaro. The affidavits of service further stated that Navaro and Auto Europa had been served at 553 Burnside Ave., Inwood, New York, and the affidavits described Navaro as a male with white skin and black hair, of the approximate age of 40 years, and with an approximate height of 5 feet 8 inches and approximate weight of 160 pounds. Defendants were found to be in default, and a notice of inquest was served by mail on both defendants at the Burnside Avenue address on January 22, 1992. Auto Europa subsequently entered into a two-attorney stipulation with plaintiff, providing that so much of the default judgment as was against Auto Europa was vacated, and Auto Europa was permitted to [*2]serve an answer. Auto Europa's answer asserted, among other things, that Navaro was employed as its service manager, and the answer contained a cross claim against Navaro, alleging, upon information and belief, that Navaro had agreed to repair or service plaintiff's vehicle off premises "during his off-duty hours and/or his own time." Following an inquest, which proceeded only against Navaro (defendant), a judgment was entered on October 22, 1992, awarding plaintiff the principal sum of $18,084 in damages.
In August of 2012, defendant moved, pursuant to CPLR 317 and 5015, to vacate the default judgment and to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him, arguing that he had not been personally served with process and stating that he had learned of the judgment only when his bank account had been restrained in May of 2012. Plaintiff opposed the motion. By order dated September 26, 2012, the District Court denied defendant's motion. Defendant subsequently moved for leave to reargue and renew his prior motion, again maintaining that he had not been served while employed at Auto Europa and that he had no knowledge of the action until his bank account had been restrained. Plaintiff submitted opposition. By order dated January 2, 2013, the District Court, upon granting leave to defendant to reargue and renew his prior motion, adhered to its original determination.
We note that defendant appeals only from the September 26, 2012 order denying his motion to vacate the default judgment and to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him, which order was superseded by the January 2, 2013 order. Consequently, the appeal from the September 26, 2012 order is dismissed. The appeal from the September 26, 2012 order, however, brings up for review so much of the January 2, 2013 order as, upon reargument and renewal, adhered to the prior determination (see CPLR 5517 [b]).
A process server's affidavit of service gives rise to a presumption of proper service (see Machovec v Svoboda, 120 AD3d 772 [2014]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Final Touch Interiors, LLC, 112 AD3d 813 [2013]; Stephan B. Gleich & Assoc. v Gritsipis, 87 AD3d 216 [2011]). To be entitled to vacatur of a default judgment and dismissal of a complaint under CPLR 5015 (a) (4), a defendant must overcome the presumption raised by the process server's affidavit of service. A sworn denial containing a detailed and specific contradiction of the allegations in the process server's affidavit will refute the presumption of proper service (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v DaCosta, 97 AD3d 630 [2012]; Scarano v Scarano, 63 AD3d 716 [2009]; Bankers Trust Co. of Cal. v Tsoukas, 303 AD2d 343 [2003]; Yellowbook, Inc. v Kiddie Kampus W., Inc., 43 Misc 3d 139[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50782[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2014]). If the presumption is rebutted, a hearing to determine the propriety of service of process is warranted to prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence (see Matter of Romero v Ramirez, 100 AD3d 909 [2012]; Tikvah Enters., LLC v Neuman, 80 AD3d 748 [2011]; Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Chaplin, 65 AD3d 588 [2009]; Severn Trent Water Purification, Inc. v C & C Duplicators, Inc., 11 Misc 3d 128[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 50248[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2006]; Bethpage Motel, Inc. v Greenstein, 2003 NY Slip Op 51310[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2003]; C & H Envtl. v Rothkrug, 2002 NY Slip Op 50519[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2002]).
In the present case, defendant expressly denied that he had ever been personally served with process. Indeed, defendant stated that he did not meet the description of the person set forth in the affidavit of service of the summons and complaint, as there were specific discrepancies between his appearance and the process server's description of the person he had served. In light of defendant's unequivocal denial that he had been personally served, the District Court should have held a hearing before deciding defendant's motion.
Accordingly, the order dated January 2, 2013, insofar as reviewed, is reversed, and the matter is remitted to the District Court for a determination de novo, following a traverse hearing, of defendant Herman Navaro's motion to vacate a default judgment entered against him and to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him.
Marano, J.P., Tolbert, and Garguilo, JJ., concur.