The defendant, Joseph Dinorcia, is charged with two counts of Stalking in the Third Degree, Penal Law ["PL"] § 120.50(3), two counts of Stalking in the Fourth Degree, PL § 120.45(1), and four counts of Harassment in the Second Degree, PL §§ 240.26(1) & (3). The defendant moves to dismiss the information for facial insufficiency. Because the nonhearsay facts alleged, accepted as true, establish that the defendant committed every element of the following offenses, the Court sustains the information as to one count each of Stalking in the Third Degree, PL § 120.50(3), Stalking in the Fourth Degree, PL § 120.45(1) and Harassment in the Second Degree, PL § 240.26(1) & (3). The remaining counts are dismissed as multiplicitous.

An information is facially sufficient when the factual allegations provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged and the nonhearsay factual allegations, if true, establish every element of the offense charged and defendant's commission thereof (CPL § 100.40[1][b] and [c]; see People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729 [1986]; see also People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 [1987]). Where the factual allegations contained in an information "give an accused sufficient notice to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]; see also People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569 [2004]; People v Jacoby, 304 NY 33, 38-40 [1952]; People v Knapp, 152 Misc 368, 370 [1934], affd 242 App Div 811; People v Allen, 92 NY2d 378, 385 [1998]; People v Miles, 64 NY2d 731, 732-733 [1984]; People v Shea, 68 Misc 2d 271, 272 [1971]; People v Scott, 8 Misc 3d 428, 429 [2005]).

The information alleges, in pertinent part, that between July 12, 2014 and July 31, 2014, in Queens County, the defendant sent the complainant, Jasmine Dinorcia, over one hundred (100) text messages, "stating, in sum and substance, I'm gonna catch you and Katherine [Dinorcia] on Jamaica Avenue. I don't care about the officers. I'm gonna slap you, you're gonna get what's coming. Jamaica Avenue ain't that fucking big. You're gonna see who the real bad ass is.'" The information additionally alleges that the complainant texted the defendant, telling him to " stop harassing me please'" but that "the defendant continued to send her threatening text messages." The information further alleges that the "actions of the defendant served no legitimate purpose" and caused both the complainant and Katherine Dinorcia "fear of physical injury, annoyance and alarm."

In recognition of the "unfortunate reality that stalking victims have been intolerably forced to live in fear of their stalkers" and that "stalkers who repeatedly follow, phone, write, confront, threaten or otherwise unacceptably intrude upon their victims, often inflict immeasurable emotional and physical harm upon them," in 1999 the New York Legislature enacted the crime of stalking (People v Stuart, 100 NY2d 412, 417 [2003] [internal citations omitted]). Stalking does not require that the offender intend a specific result, such as fear or harm, to the victim (see id. at 426). Rather, the statute entails that the offender "must have intended to engage in a course of conduct targeted at a specific individual" (id.). Because the statute "focuses on what the offenders do, not what they mean by it or what they intend as their ultimate goal," it reaches so-called " delusional stalkers who believe either that their victims are in love with them or that they can win their victim's love by pursuing them'"(id. at 427, quoting Note, Anti-Stalking Laws: Do They Adequately Protect Stalking Victims?, 21 Harv Women's LJ 229, 254 [1998]). Regardless, the crime of stalking also demands that the offender know or reasonably should know that his conduct is likely to cause reasonable fear of material harm to the victim's physical health, safety or property (see id.). Indeed, the victim's fear "must be reasonable and not idiosyncratic" (id. at 428). Further, the offender's actions must be committed for no legitimate purpose, meaning "the absence of a reason or justification to engage [the victim], other than to hound, frighten, intimidate or threaten" (id.). In sum, the "course of conduct must be intentional; it must be aimed at a specific person; and the offender must know (or have reason to know) that his conduct will (or likely will) instill reasonable fear of material harm in the victim" (id. at 428-429; see also People v Brandel, 30 Misc 3d 134[A], 2, 2011 NY Slip Op 50082[U]).

Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Barona, 19 Misc 3d 1122[A], 1, 2008 NY Slip Op 50814[U] [Crim Ct, NY County 2008]), the facts alleged that the defendant sent Jasmine Dinorcia over one hundred (100) text messages within a two and a half week period, stating that he was "gonna catch [her] and Katherine [Dinorcia] on Jamaica Avenue;" that he "[didn't] care about the officers;" that he was "gonna slap her;" that she was "gonna get what's coming;" that "Jamaica Avenue ain't that fucking big;" and that she was "gonna see who the bad ass is," after the complainant texted the defendant and told him to "stop harassing her," are sufficient to establish that the defendant, intentionally and for no legitimate purpose, engaged in a [*2]course of conduct directed at Jasmine Dinorcia which was likely to cause her to reasonably fear physical injury (see PL § 120.50[3]; cf. People v Demisse, 24 AD3d 118, 119 [1st Dept 2005] [no reasonable fear of physical injury where defendant repeatedly declared his love for the victim but "his communications were neither abusive nor hostile in tone or in content, [and] did not convey any implied threat of harm"]); that the defendant intentionally and for no legitimate purpose engaged in a course of conduct directed at Jasmine Dinorcia when he knew or should have known that his conduct was likely to cause her to reasonably fear material harm to her physical health or safety (see PL § 120.45[1]; see also People v Clark Jr., 65 AD3d 755, 758 [3d Dept 2009]; People v Noka, 51 AD3d 468 [1st Dept 2008]); that with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm Jasmine Dinorcia and for no legitimate purpose, the defendant engaged in a course of conduct or repeatedly committed acts which seriously annoyed or alarmed her (see PL § 240.26[3]; see also People v Neil N., 93 AD3d 1107, 1109 [3d Dept 2012]; People v Curko, 34 Misc 3d 159[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50444[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]; cf. People v Chasserot, 30 NY2d 898 [1972]); and that with intent to harass, annoy or alarm Jasmine Dinorcia, the defendant threatened to subject her to physical contact (see PL § 240.26[1]).

Nevertheless, since the information alleges a course of conduct or action directed at only one individual - Jasmine Dinorcia - the second count of each one of the above offenses is mutiplicitous. An information is multiplicitous when a single offense is charged in more than one count (see e.g. People v Alonzo, 16 NY3d 267, 269 [2011] [internal citations omitted]; People v Kindlon, 217 AD2d 793, 795 [3d Dept 1995]). "If an [information] is multiplicitous it creates the risk that a defendant will be punished for, or stigmatized with a conviction of, more crimes than he actually committed" (id.). The statutory bar against multiplicitous counts applicable to indictments is incorporated by reference into CPL § 100.15, which prescribes the form and content of an information (see CPL § 100.15; see also People v Todd, 119 Misc 2d 488, 489 [Crim Ct, NY County 1983]).

The defendant's alleged threat to "catch you and Katherine on Jamaica Avenue" was communicated to Jasmine Dinorcia, and was part of a course of conduct directed at her ^[FN1] . Although the information alleges that the defendant's actions caused Katherine Dinorcia to fear physical injury as well as annoyance and alarm, it does not allege that the defendant expressed any threat to her or engaged in any conduct towards her. To the contrary, the facts in the information establish that Jasmine, not Katherine, was the defendant's specific target (see Stuart, 100 NY2d at 426). Accordingly, the duplicate counts cannot be sustained on the theory that they apply to Katherine Dinorcia. Because those counts charge the defendant twice for the same offense, therefore, they are dismissed as mutiplicitous.

Duplicate counts based on allegation that defendant sent text threatening to harm both complainant and second person, but facts alleged established that defendant engaged in course of conduct directed only at complainant