| Kandel v Marino |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 50486(U) [47 Misc 3d 135(A)] |
| Decided on March 26, 2015 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Fred J. Hirsh, J.), entered May 30, 2013. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $5,000.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, and the matter is remitted to the District Court for the entry of a judgment dismissing the action.
Plaintiff commenced this small claims action to recover the sum of $5,000, alleging that defendant, a veterinary facility, did not obtain her consent to perform certain procedures on her 16-year-old dog on December 5, 2012. These procedures were preliminary to a tracheal stent placement, which was performed, with her consent, several weeks later. The dog died a little over a week after the tracheal stent placement procedure had been performed.
At a nonjury trial, plaintiff testified that, in November 2012, she had discussed the tracheal stent placement with one of defendant's veterinarians and had been given a treatment plan as well as an estimate for the procedure, for which she had paid $5,624.56. On December 5, 2012, she signed a consent form authorizing defendant to administer the procedures described in the treatment plan and to provide any other procedures deemed medically advisable and/or necessary. She acknowledged in the form that defendant had provided her with sufficient information to understand the advantages of, and possible complications arising from, the medical treatment, and indicated that she had read and understood the information therein. The defense witness testified that, on December 5, 2012, the dog was examined and measurements were taken for the purposes of placement of the tracheal stent. The measurements indicated that the dog would require a custom-ordered stent, which could not have been foreseen prior to the examination. It thus became necessary, during the course of the December 5, 2012 examination, for defendant to perform a soft palate resection in order to open the dog's airway and allow for the placement of the tracheal stent. The latter procedure, with which plaintiff did not have an issue, was ultimately performed several weeks later. The District Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $5,000, the monetary jurisdictional limit of the small claims court, finding that defendant was liable for having treated plaintiff's dog without obtaining her consent. A judgment in that amount was entered on May 30, 2013, from which defendant appeals.
On an appeal in a small claims matter, our review is limited to determining whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of [*2]substantive law" (UDCA 1807; see UDCA 1804). Upon a review of the record, we find that the District Court's determination regarding defendant's liability failed to provide the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see UDCA 1804, 1807).
To succeed on a cause of action to recover damages for lack of informed consent, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant failed to disclose the material risks, benefits and alternatives to the treatment or procedure; that a reasonably prudent person would not have undergone the treatment or procedure had that person been fully informed; and that the lack of informed consent was a proximate cause of the injury or condition from which the plaintiff suffered (see 3-68 Warren's Negligence in New York Courts § 68.07 [2014]). Contrary to the determination of the District Court, plaintiff did not establish her prima facie case. She failed to demonstrate the qualitative insufficiency of the consent to the procedures performed on December 5, 2012, or that a reasonably prudent person in her position would not have consented to such procedures if fully informed. Nor did she show that her alleged lack of informed consent proximately caused any injuries to the dog.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the matter is remitted to the District Court for the entry of a judgment dismissing the action.
Iannacci and Garguilo, JJ., concur.
Marano, P.J., taking no part.