Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (John J. Toomey, J.), rendered April 7, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of driving while ability impaired. The appeal from the judgment of conviction brings up for review so much of an order of the same court dated November 5, 2009 as denied the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the accusatory instrument on constitutional speedy trial grounds.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

On December 17, 2003, defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]) and was issued an appearance ticket. An information charging defendant with driving while intoxicated was filed on February 23, 2004, upon which defendant was arraigned. Motion practice ensued, and the case was placed on the trial calendar on April 14, 2005. On March 4, 2009, defendant moved to dismiss the information on statutory (CPL 30.30) and constitutional (see CPL 30.20) speedy trial grounds. By order dated August 6, 2009, the District Court (John J. Toomey, J.) denied the motion, addressing only defendant's statutory claim under CPL 30.30. By order dated November 5, 2009, defendant's motion for leave to reargue was granted and, upon reargument, the District Court (John J. Toomey, J.) denied, among other things, the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the information on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. Following a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted of driving while ability impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [1]). On appeal, defendant contends that the District Court improperly denied the branch of his motion seeking to dismiss the information on constitutional speedy trial grounds.

By order dated March 8, 2012, this court held the appeal in abeyance and remitted the matter "to the District Court for a new determination, following a hearing, of defendant's constitutional speedy trial claim" (People v Keane, 34 Misc 3d 159[A], 2012

In order to determine whether a defendant was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.20, the following factors must be considered: "(1) the extent of the [*2]delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay" (People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 [1975]). Upon weighing the Taranovich factors in the case at bar, we agree with the District Court that defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial (see People v Watts, 57 NY2d 299 [1982]; People v Johnson, 184 AD2d 862 [1992]; People v Dury, 179 AD2d 821 [1992]), particularly since defendant was not incarcerated for any period of time and he did not demonstrate that any prejudice resulted from the delay or that his defense was impaired. While there was a protracted delay here, such delay will not "in and of itself be sufficient to warrant the drastic measure of dismissal" (People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d at 446). Moreover, it is noted that defendant's due process right to prompt prosecution and his constitutional right to a speedy trial are evaluated using the same Taranovitch factors (see People v Decker, 13 NY3d 12, 14-15 [2009]).

Tolbert, J.P., Marano and Garguilo, JJ., concur.