The People of
the State of New York,
against
Teodoro Matozzo, Defendant.
|
2014NA024166
Hon Madeline Singas, Acting Nassau County District Attorney
Michael Biniakewitz, Esq, Attorney for the Defendant
Andrew M. Engel, J.
The Defendant is charged with Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the
Seventh Degree, Operating a Motor Vehicle While Ability Impaired by Drugs, Operating
an Uninsured Motor Vehicle and Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle, all in
violation of Penal Law § 220.03 and Vehicle and Traffic Law §§
1192(4), 319(1) and 509(1), respectively.
The Defendant now moves for an order (1) dismissing the charge of
Operating a Motor Vehicle While Ability Impaired by Drugs; (2) suppressing any
statements allegedly made by the Defendant to law enforcement personnel or, in the
alternative, directing that a Huntley [FN1]
hearing be held; (3) suppressing all physical evidence, observations made by police
officers and chemical test results or, in the alternative directing that an
Ingle/Dunaway [FN2]
hearing be held; (4) precluding the introduction of evidence at that time of trial of any
statements made by, or identification of, the [*2]Defendant which were not properly noticed pursuant to
CPL § 710.30; (5) directing the People to provide the Defendant with all specific
instances of prior uncharged conduct which the People will seek to offer against the
Defendant on their direct case, during cross-examination of the Defendant or on their
rebuttal case, and further directing that a pre-trial hearing he held to determine the
admissibility of same; (6) directing the People to disclose all exculpatory material to the
Defendant; (7) directing the People to preserve and maintain written notes, memos,
drawings, summaries and/or other documents made or prepared in connection with this
case; (8) directing that any hearing which may be conducted in this matter be held at least
forty-five (45) days prior to trial; and, (9) granting the Defendant leave to make future
motions.
The People consent to the court conducting a hearing addressing the
voluntariness of any statements made by the Defendant to law enforcement personnel.
The People also consent to the court conducting a Sandoval/Ventimiglia
[FN3]
hearing immediately before the commencement of trial. The People oppose the
Defendant's motion in all other respects. DISMISS VTL
§ 1192(4)
In seeking dismissal of the charge of Driving
While Ability Impaired by Drugs the Defendant argues that "the elements of the charged
offenses (sic) are not supported by non-hearsay allegations, and the supporting
deposition fails to cure the defect." (Biniakewitz Affirmation 1/12/15, ¶ 6)
The Defendant further argues that the factual allegations asserted "are insufficient
because they do not support every element of VTL § 1192(4), nor the defendant's
commission thereof." (Biniakewitz Affirmation 1/12/15, ¶ 8) Specifically,
the Defendant alleges that the supporting deposition accompanying the charging
simplified traffic information fails to sufficiently support allegations concerning the
Defendant's operation of a motor vehicle and that the Defendant was impaired by a drug
listed in PHL § 3306.
In opposition to this branch of the Defendant's motion the People argue that
the Defendant failed to timely demand a supporting deposition in accordance with CPL
§ 100.25 and, as a consequence, the simplified traffic information need only
"include all pertinent information as required by the Department of Motor Vehicles,
including the defendant's name, date of birth, address, driver's license identification, date
of offense, time of offense, charge and location of the offense." (DePalo
Affirmation 2/2/15, ¶ 12) Nevertheless, the People further argue that they have
annexed a supporting deposition to the simplified traffic information and that, contrary to
the Defendant's argument, "there is no requirement that a simplified traffic information
be based upon non-hearsay allegations ." (DePalo Affirmation 2/2/15, ¶ 14)
Addressing the specifics of the Defendant's arguments, the People allege that the
Defendant's operation of a motor vehicle is demonstrated through allegations of a motor
vehicle accident and the Defendant's admission to having driven the vehicle. The People
do not directly address the Defendant's argument that the supporting deposition fails to
allege sufficient facts demonstrating that the Defendant was impaired by a drug listed in
PHL § 3306, and only argue that they "should be granted time to allow a Drug
Recognition Expert to evaluate the facts of this case, the symptoms Officer Butts
observed, and match them to a drug consistent with a violation of VTL §1192(4),
making the complaint sufficient." [*3](DePalo
Affirmation 2/2/15, ¶ 23)
As indicated, the Defendant is charged with Driving While Ability Impaired
by Drugs by way of a simplified traffic information accompanied by a supporting
deposition. Contrary to the Defendant's suggestion, the facial sufficiency of this
accusatory instrument is not to be determined by the standards applicable to informations
or misdemeanor complaints, as set forth in CPL §§ 100.15(1) and (3) and
100.40(1) and (4). Likewise, contrary to the People's suggestion, the facial sufficiency of
this accusatory instrument is not to be determined by the standards of a bare simplified
traffic information, as set forth in CPL §§ 100.25(1) and 100.40(2).
"The simplified information is a statutory creation designed to provide an
uncomplicated form for handling the large volume of traffic infractions and petty
offenses for which it is principally used." People v. Nuccio, 78 NY2d 102, 571
N.Y.S.2d 693 (1991) As such, the pleading requirements of CPL §§ 100.15
and 100.40(1) do not apply. See: People v. DeRojas, 180 Misc 2d 690,
693 N.Y.S.2d 404 (App. Term, 2nd Dept.1999) Where a supporting deposition in
support of the offense charged has been neither demanded nor provided, a simplified
traffic information must be substantially in the form prescribed by the Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, See: CPL §§ 100.10, 100.25 and 100.40(2), and will
be found facially sufficient if it so complies. See: People v. Nuccio,
supra.; People v.
Bize, 30 Misc 3d 68, 918 N.Y.S.2d 696 (App. Term 9th & 10th Dept.
2010); People v. Weinert, 178 Misc 2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 690 (App. Term 2nd
Dept. 1998) Under such circumstances, a simplified traffic information "need not provide
on its face reasonable cause to believe defendant committed the offense charged (CPL
100.25, 100.40, subd. 2)." People v. Key, 45 NY2d 111, 408 N.Y.S.2d 16
(1978)
Where, however, a supporting deposition is provided with a simplified
traffic information, either in response to a timely demand by a defendant, pursuant to
CPL 100.25(2), or voluntarily by the People in the absence of such a demand, the
accusatory instrument will be found facially sufficient when, as provided by
subdivision one of section 100.25, [the simplified traffic information]
substantially conforms to the requirements therefor prescribed by or pursuant to
law; See: CPL 100.40(2), and when the supporting depositions contain allegations
of fact, based either upon personal knowledge or upon information and belief, providing
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense or offenses
charged. CPL 100.25(2); See: People v. Key, supra;
People v. Hohmeyer, 70 NY2d 41, 517 N.Y.S2d 448 (1987); People v.
Titus, 178 Misc 2d 687, 682 N.Y.S.2d 521 (App. Term 2nd Dept. 1998); People
v. Chittaranjans, 185 Misc 2d 871, 714 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Co. 2000)
"Reasonable cause to believe that a person committed an offense exists when evidence
or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are
collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary
intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was
committed and that such person committed it. CPL 70.10(2).
Applying the foregoing to the matter sub judice, the accusatory
instrument charging a violation of VTL § 1192(4) will be found facially sufficient if
it sets forth facts providing reasonable cause to believe that the Defendant (1) ingested a
drug; (2) that the drug ingested is one proscribed by PHL § 3306; (3) that the
Defendant operated a motor vehicle after ingesting the drug; and, (4) that the Defendant's
ability to operate the motor vehicle was impaired by the ingestion of the drug.
See: People v. Kahn, 160 Misc 2d 594, 610 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Dist.Ct.
Nassau Co.1994); [*4]Property Clerk v. Lizziano,
302 AD2d 235, 754 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1st Dept. 2003)
The supporting deposition of Police Officer Arline E. Butts alleges, in
pertinent part, that on November 5, 2014 she received a radio assignment for a motor
vehicle accident in the vicinity of Midway Court and Franklin Avenue, in Franklin
Square. Upon arriving at that scene, after observing a red motor vehicle with rear end
damage in the middle of Midway Court, and being told by its driver that the vehicle was
struck in the rear while waiting at a red light, Officer Butts walked over to and spoke
with the Defendant, who was standing to the passenger's side of a white motor vehicle,
previously identified as the offending vehicle by the driver of the red vehicle. At that
time, Officer Butts "observed subject Matozzo with glassy eyes, slurred speech, his body
was shaking, the pupils of his eyes were small, and he was unsteady on his feet." Officer
Butts then "asked subject Matozzo what happened and he stated I was looking down and
hit the car in front of me.'" Thereafter, a Police Officer Hernon administered standardized
field sobriety tests to the Defendant and appears to have advised Officer Butts that
"[t]here were positive signs of impairment." Following the Defendant's arrest, a search of
his left pant pocket resulted in the recovery of "a small glass envelope believed to be
heroin[.]"
Contrary to the Defendant's contention, the allegation that the Defendant
stated to Officer Butts, "I was looking down and hit the car in front of me," along with
the allegations concerning a two vehicle, front to rear accident, provides reasonable
cause to believe that the Defendant was operating a motor vehicle. See:
People v. Booden, 69 NY2d 185, 513 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1987) [admission by
defendant, who was standing beside a vehicle in a ditch, that he had driven into the ditch
was sufficient to support operation]; People v. Blake, 5 NY2d 118 (1958)
[admission of operation by defendant sufficient to sustain conviction]; People v.
Polito, 128 Misc 2d 71, 488 N.Y.S.2d 593 (City Ct. Rochester 1985) [defendant's
admission of operation sufficient to sustain facial sufficiency of information charging
driving while intoxicated]
While Officer Butts' supporting deposition contains allegations concerning
her observations of the Defendant's possible impairment, exactly as in People v. Jackson, 32 Misc 3d
139(A), 936 N.Y.S.2d 60 (App. Term 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2011), "[t]he
supporting deposition in the instant case fails to provide reasonable cause to believe that
defendant was impaired by the use of any of the substances set forth in Public Health
Law § 3306 (see CPL 100.25[2]). Consequently, the accusatory instrument
charging defendant with driving while ability impaired by drugs (Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 1192[4]) is jurisdictionally defective and must be dismissed."
As in People v.
Ortiz, 6 Misc 3d 1024(A), 800 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Crim. Ct. Bronx Co. 2004), this
court finds unpersuasive "the People['s] argu[ment] that the officer's observations,
standing alone, are sufficient to provide reasonable cause to believe that the Defendant
was under the influence of a drug prohibited by VTL § 1192(4)." As that court
correctly explained, "[u]nlike the symptoms of intoxication, which are universally
recognizable (citation omitted), the effects of any particular drug or class of drugs listed
in Public Health Law § 3306, are not necessarily uniform in the way they affect an
individual's appearance."
The People's reliance on People v. Rose, 8 Misc 3d 184, 794 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Dist. Ct.
Nassau Co. 2005) is misplaced. While it is true that Rose, id., unlike
Ortiz, supra., found that "[t]he written record of an opinion of a DRE can,
, provide reasonable cause' for believing that the defendant committed the offense
charged[,]" there is no such written record of an opinion from a [*5]drug recognition expert in the matter before this court. As
specifically noted in Rose, supra., "[t]he issue devolves here to whether
the failure to have referred to, summarized, or annexed the drug influence evaluation to
the supporting deposition renders the accusatory instrument dismissible. It would appear
that it does." The court would point out that ultimately what saved the accusatory
instrument from dismissal in Rose, supra., was the defendant's lack of
diligence in moving for such dismissal, thereby waiving the alleged defect. The
Defendant herein does not have that problem.
The court would further note that the accusatory instrument as presently
constituted fails to satisfy that most fundamental pleading requirement that "the factual
allegations give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately
detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense ." People
v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 717 N.Y.S.2d 88 (2000); See also: People v. Kalin, 12 NY3d
225, 878 N.Y.S.2d 653 (2009); People v. Guaman, 22 NY3d 678, 985 N.Y.S.2d 209
(2014) There being no allegation concerning what drug, if any, was causing the signs of
impairment allegedly observed by Officer Butts, the Defendant has no way of knowing
against what drug he is to prepare a defense. The Defendant cannot be expected to
assume that because the People allege they found a drug believed to be heroin [FN4]
in his pocked after his arrest that heroin is the drug the People will argue was causing the
impairment. The People, so far, have made no such argument. Given the current state of
the accusatory instrument, the People could conceivably prosecute the Defendant on the
theory that he was impaired by heroin and, if unsuccessful, prosecute him on the theory
that he was impaired by some other drug proscribed by PHL § 3306, and if again
unsuccessful pick another proscribed drug, ad nauseum.
The People's request to "be granted time to allow a Drug Recognition Expert
to evaluate the facts of this case, the symptoms Officer Butts observed, and match them
to a drug consistent with a violation of VTL § 1192(4), making the complaint
sufficient[,]" (DePalo Affirmation 2/2/15, ¶ 23) is equally without merit.
CPL § 170.35(1)(a), upon which the People rely, provides:
1. An information, a simplified information, a prosecutor's information or a
misdemeanor complaint, or a count thereof, is defective within the meaning of paragraph
(a) of subdivision one of section 170.30 when:
It is not sufficient on its face pursuant to the requirements of section 100.40;
provided that such an instrument or count may not be dismissed as defective, but must
instead be amended, where the defect or irregularity is of a kind that may be cured by
amendment and where the people move to so amend;
The People have not brought a proper motion to amend. The People should
review Article 22 of the CPLR.
Moreover, although, as the People suggest, the court may not dismiss the
defective instrument "where the defect or irregularity is of a kind that may be cured by
amendment and where the people move to so amend[,]" CPL § 170.35(1);
See: People v. Casey, supra.; People v. Penn Central Railroad
Co. 95 Misc 2d 748, 417 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Crim.Ct. Kings Co.1978); People v.
Pacifico, 105 Misc 2d 396, 432 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Crim.Ct. Queens Co. 1980), the
People have failed to demonstrate their ability to so cure the defects herein. While the
People have given voice to their desire to try and cure the defects herein, by having "a
Drug Recognition Expert [] evaluate the facts of this case, the symptoms Officer Butts
observed, and match them to a drug consistent with a violation of VTL § 1192(4),"
(DePalo Affirmation 2/2/15, ¶ 23) they have not provided the court with
any information which indicates that such a review will be fruitful; they only hope it will
be. Unlike People v. Rose, supra., upon which the People rely, where " a
full DRE was administered at CTS'" before the Defendant's arrest, no DRE has been
conducted in the matter sub judice in the more than five (5) months since this
prosecution was commenced; and, the People provide no information as to when such an
evaluation will be conducted. Additionally, the People cannot assure that the DRE will
yield the results they hope to obtain. The People merely assume that a DRE conducted at
their request will yield the result they are looking for. There is no reason for the court to
allow the People to continue this prosecution while the People wait to find out.
The above notwithstanding, although a simplified traffic information cannot
be superseded by a long form information, CPL § 100.50(1); People v. Flood, 25 Misc 3d
843, 885 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Co. 2009); People v. Finch, 19 Misc 3d
840, 854 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Co. 2008), having commenced the charge
of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree by long form
information, which the Defendant does not seek to have dismissed, the People may, prior
to a plea of guilty or commencement of the trial, file a superseding information asserting
charges not contained in the original instrument, but stemming from the same
transaction, without leave of the court. CPL § 100.50(1); People v. Thomas, 4 NY3d
143, 791 N.Y.S.2d 68 (2005) This would include adding a charge of Driving While
Ability Impaired Drugs by long form information.
Accordingly, this branch of the Defendant's motion seeking an order
dismissing the charge of Driving While Ability Impaired by a Drug is granted, without
prejudice to the People filing a long form information reinstating such
charge.SUPPRESSION
CPL
§ 710.60 provides, in pertinent part, upon the Defendant's having made a motion to
suppress:
2. The court must summarily grant the motion if:
(a) The motion papers comply with the requirements of subdivision one and
the people concede the truth of allegations of fact therein which support the motion;
or
(b) The people stipulate that the evidence sought to be suppressed will not be
offered in evidence in any criminal action or proceeding against the defendant.
3. The court may summarily deny the motion if:
(a) The motion papers do not allege a ground constituting legal basis for the
motion; or
(b) The sworn allegations of fact do not as a matter of law support the
ground alleged; except that this paragraph does not apply where the motion is based upon
the ground specified in subdivision three or six of section 710.20.
4. If the court does not determine the motion pursuant to subdivisions two or
three, it must conduct a hearing and make findings of fact essential to the determination
thereof.
The Defendant seeks the suppression of any statements he allegedly made to
law enforcement personnel, all physical evidence, observations made by police officers
and the results of all chemical tests or, in the alternative, an order directing that an
Ingle/Dunaway/Huntley hearing be held. In addition to attacking the
voluntariness of any statements attributed to him, the Defendant argues that "the police
lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to arrest this defendant[,]"
(Biniakewitz Affirmation 1/12/15, ¶ 26) subjecting all evidence obtained
thereafter to suppression as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The only factual allegations
asserted by the Defendant in support of this argument are that the Defendant "was
driving in an orderly manner but was involved in a minor traffic accident. Subsequent to
the accident, the defendant remained on the scene and awaited the arrival of the police,
which were summoned to the area of the accident." (Biniakewitz Affirmation
1/12/15, ¶ 31)
The People argue that the police had a legal right, if not a duty, to approach
the Defendant at the scene of an accident for the purpose of investigating the accident.
Based thereon, the People suggest that there is no legal basis for suppressing any police
observations which preceded the Defendant's arrest. For this same reason, the People
correctly argue that there is no reason for this court to conduct an Ingle
hearing.
Accordingly, that branch of the Defendant's motion which seeks to suppress
all observations made by the police prior to the Defendant's arrest is denied.
Relying on People v. Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 604 N.Y.S.2d 922
(1993), the People further argue, "[g]iven that the Defendant has failed to set forth any
issues of fact that would warrant a pre-trial hearing to determine whether or not the
police had reasonable grounds' to believe the Defendant to have been operating a motor
vehicle in violation of V.T.L. § 1192, the Defendant's request for a
Johnson/Ingle/Dunaway hearing is therefore insufficient as a matter of law."
(DePalo Affirmation 2/2/15, ¶ 35) The People's reliance on Mendoza,
id. is misplaced.
While it is clear that the Defendant has failed to set forth "sworn allegations
of fact," See: CPL § 710.60(1), supporting his claim that the police lacked
probable cause to arrest him, precluding the court from summarily granting his motion, it
is equally clear that "[t]he CPL does not mandate summary denial of defendant's motion
even if the factual allegations are deficient (see, CPL 710.60[3] [ the court
may summarily deny the motion'] [emphasis added])." (italics in original)
People v. Mendoza, supra. at 429, 604 N.Y.S.2d 922, 929 (1993)
As the court pointed out in Mendoza, id. at 428, 604
N.Y.S.2d 922, 927 (1993), [*6]"[w]hether a defendant
has raised factual issues requiring a hearing can only be determined with reference to the
People's contentions." As discussed at length hereinabove, the People's factual
contentions concerning the legal basis for the Defendant's arrest for Driving While
Ability Impaired by Drugs are facially insufficient. In opposing this motion, the People
continue to ignore a gaping hole in their own recitation of the facts which they believe
support a finding of probable cause for the Defendant's arrest. In pertinent part, the
People set forth those alleged facts as follows:
While conducting an initial investigation, Officer Butts observed the
Defendant to have glassy eyes, slurred speech, restrictive pupils, his body was shaking,
and he was unsteady on his feet.
Police Officer Hernon was present at the scene assisting and administering
Standard Field Sobriety Tests on the Defendant. The tests indicated positive clues of
impairment. At 11:40 A.M., the Defendant was placed under arrest and transported to
Central Testing Section for processing. (DePalo Affirmation 2/2/15, ¶
¶ 5 & 6)
Once again, the People would have the court overlook that there are no
allegations even suggesting what the police reasonably believed was impairing the
Defendant or why they assumed it was a substance which would support a violation of
Section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. In the absence of same, it would appear
there was no probable cause for the Defendant's arrest.
Based upon all of the foregoing, the Court may neither summarily grant the
Defendant's motion to suppress, nor shall the court summarily deny the Defendant's
motion to suppress. Accordingly, the court must conduct a hearing and make findings of
fact essential to the determination thereof. See: CPL § 710.60(1)-(4) As
indicated, given the fact that there is no legal basis herein for the court to conduct an
Ingle hearing, at the time of the next conference in this matter the court shall
select the date for a Dunaway/Huntley hearing to be held.PRECLUDE STATEMENTS AND
IDENTIFICATION
The Defendant seeks to preclude the
admission into evidence at the time of trial all statements allegedly made by the
Defendant and any identification of the Defendant, alleging that the "Defendant has
received no notice of alleged statements/identifications (or the alleged notice defendant
received is insufficient and/or untimely) and therefore these alleged
statements/identifications must be precluded. (Biniakewitz Affirmation 1/12/15,
¶ 35) This branch of the Defendant's motion is disingenuous at best.
The Defendant admits that he "has received notice pursuant to CPL §
710.30 that the People intend to offer at trial evidence of statements made by the
defendant to law enforcement personnel. (Biniakewitz Affirmation 1/12/15,
¶ 21) That notice was timely served upon the Defendant on the date of his
arraignment and sufficiently provides the Defendant with notice of the statements the
People intend to use at the time of trial. The Defendant does not identify any other
statements for which notice was not provided.
The People's 710.30 notice does not identify any police arranged
identification procedures in this matter, nor does the Defendant allege that there was any
such procedure for which he was not provided with notice.
Accordingly, this branch of the Defendant's motion is denied.MOLINEAUX/SANDOVAL/VENTIMIGLIA
Those branches of the Defendant's motion which seek an order directing
the People to provide the Defendant with all specific instances of prior uncharged
conduct which the People will seek to offer against the Defendant on their direct case,
during cross-examination of the Defendant or on their rebuttal case, and further directing
that a pre-trial hearing he held to determine the admissibility of same is granted to the
extent of directing that a Molineaux [FN5]
/Sandoval/Ventimiglia hearing on these issues shall be held immediately before
the commencement of trial.PRESERVATION OF
DOCUMENTS
The People's affirmative duty to preserve and
maintain written notes, memos, drawings, summaries and/or other documents made or
prepared in connection with this case within their possession or control exists regardless
of any order confirming it.
Accordingly, Defendant's application for an order directing the People to
preserve and maintain same is denied as unnecessary.BRADY MATERIAL
Inasmuch as
the People's affirmative duty to disclose material pursuant to Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963) within their possession or control exists regardless of
any order confirming it, regardless of the People's good or bad faith concerning the
disclosure, Defendant's application for an order directing the People to turn over same is
denied as unnecessary. (cf. People v. Morgan, 178 Misc 2d 595, 682
N.Y.S.2d 533 (Co. Ct. Fulton Co. 1998); People v. Jackson, 154 Misc 2d 718,
593 N.Y.S.2d 410 (S.C. Kings Co. 1992).
HEARING TRANSCRIPTS
Unlike People v. Sanders, 31 NY2d 463, 341 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1973),
there are no "unusual circumstances here presented" which would require the court, at
this time, to mandate that any hearing held in this matter be held no less than forty five
(45) days before trial. In accordance with Sanders, id., the Defendant
shall request a copy of the hearing transcript, if desired, prior to the conclusion of the
hearing, and the Defendant shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to obtain
same.FUTURE MOTIONS AND RESERVATION OF
RIGHTS
Those branches of the Defendant's motion which
seek leave to serve and file additional motions, or to reserve the Defendant's right to do
so, based upon a blanket request, unsupported by the proper papers and grounds, is
denied as unauthorized. See: CPL 255.20(3) Any future motions will be
determined on an individual basis, based upon the timeliness and merits thereof.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
Dated: Hempstead, New York
April 20, 2015
___________________________
ANDREW M. ENGEL
J.D.C.
Footnotes
Footnote 1: People v.
Huntley, 15 NY2d 22, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965)
Footnote 2: People v.
Ingle, 36 NY2d 413, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975); Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979)
Footnote 3: People v.
Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1994); People v. Ventimiglia,
52 NY2d 350, 438 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1981)
Footnote 4:The court notes that
there is no laboratory report accompanying the charge of criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the seventh degree confirming that the recovered substance was
indeed heroin.
Footnote 5: People v.
Molineaux, 168 NY 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901)