Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Village of Croton-on-Hudson, Westchester County (Sam R. Watkins, J.), rendered January 23, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of attempted assault in the third degree, menacing in the third degree, and harassment in the second degree.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

After a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted of attempted assault in the third degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.00 [1]), menacing in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.15), and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]). Defendant's conviction arises from an incident in which he was attempting to park his car on a street in the Village of Croton-on-Hudson, Westchester County. Defendant was unable to completely park his car because the space was partially blocked by the complainant's car, which could not move because of traffic. Defendant became angry, walked into the street to the driver's side window of the complainant's car, screamed and yelled at her, and slapped her in the face.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant's guilt of attempted assault in the third degree (see People v Kassebaum, 95 NY2d 611, 618 [2001]; People v Agron, 106 AD3d 1126, 1128 [2013]; People v Baez, 13 AD3d 463, 464 [2004]; People v Kitchings, 301 AD2d 749, 749-750 [2003]; Matter of Shaheed W., 298 AD2d 204 [2002]; Matter of Marcel F., 233 AD2d 442, 442-443 [1996]; People v Clergeot, 20 Misc 3d 87, 89 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008]), menacing in the third degree (see People v Stroud, 91 AD3d 1026, 1027 [2012]; Matter of Willie W., 32 AD3d 479, 480 [2006]; People v Madsen, 2003 NY Slip Op 51409[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2003]), and harassment in the second degree (see People v Falletta, 34 Misc 3d 136[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52396[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2011]).

In exercising our factual review power (see CPL 470.15 [5], People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]), this court accords great deference to the opportunity of the finder of fact to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, observe their demeanor, and assess their credibility (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; People v Zephyrin, 52 AD3d 543 [2008]). We must weigh "the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), [*2]determine whether an acquittal would not have been unreasonable based upon the evidence, and whether the finder of fact failed to accord the evidence the weight it should have been accorded (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495; see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348). In the case at bar, the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence.

Defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Marano, P.J., Iannacci and Tolbert, JJ., concur.