Upon the foregoing papers, in this action by plaintiffs Danica Group LLC (Danica) and Stellar Mechanical Services of NY II, Inc. (Stellar) (collectively, plaintiffs) seeking to foreclose mechanic's liens and alleging claims for breach of contract, account stated, quantum meruit, and payment on lien discharge bonds, defendants 85 Adams Street LLC, Boymelgreen 85 Adams Street LLC (Boymelgreen), Alisa Construction Co., Inc. (Alisa) (collectively, the Adams Street defendants) move, by order to show cause, for an order: (1) pursuant to CPLR 5015, vacating a judgment entered against them and defendant Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland (F & D) in this action on December 1, 2014, (2) vacating the July 7, 2014 so-ordered stipulation of settlement executed by their attorney on their behalf, by plaintiffs' attorney on their behalf, and by F & D's attorney on its behalf, and (3) pursuant to CPLR 5519, staying plaintiffs from enforcing the December 1, 2014 judgment, pending an appeal taken by them from that judgment to the Appellate Division, Second Department.^[FN1]

85 Adams Street LLC is the sponsor and owner of the Beacon Tower Condominium, which is located at 85 Adams Street, in Brooklyn, New York (the property), and Boymelgreen is also an owner of the property by virtue of a deed dated June 6, 2008. A condominium construction project was commenced at the property, in which Alisa was the general contractor for the project, pursuant to a contract between it and 85 Adams Street LLC. Danica was a subcontractor for the project which performed plumbing and HVAC work, and Stellar was a subcontractor for the project which performed mechanical duct work, pursuant to contracts between each of them and Alisa, with the consent of 85 Adams Street LLC. Danica claimed that $291,403.64 remained due and owing to it and Stellar claimed that $46,675 remained due and owing to it for the work that they performed in connection with the improvement of the property. On [*2]November 7, 2007, Danica and Stellar both filed mechanic's liens in these amounts against the property. Since these sums were not paid to them, Danica and Stellar, as plaintiffs, filed this action, on November 3, 2008, against the Adams Street defendants, along with Quinn & Feiner Service Company, Inc. (Quinn), and Eglos Wood Flooring Corp., who are other subcontractors which have filed mechanic's liens against the property, and others. Plaintiffs simultaneously also filed a notice of pendency against the property.

F & D, as the surety for 85 Adams Street LLC, posted two bonds, dated November 28, 2007 and docketed with the Kings County Clerk on January 4, 2008, in order to discharge plaintiffs' mechanic's liens. By an order dated December 23, 2008, the court granted a motion to discharge the notice of pendency and permitted plaintiffs to amend their complaint to name F & D, as the bonding company which posted the bonds, as a defendant. On March 13, 2009, plaintiffs filed a supplemental summons and complaint, adding F & D as a defendant.

Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges a first cause of action on behalf of Danica and a second cause of action on behalf of Stellar to foreclose their mechanic's liens, a third cause of action on behalf of Danica and a fourth cause of action on behalf of Stellar for breach of contract against Alisa, a fifth cause of action on behalf of Danica and a sixth cause of action on behalf of Stellar for an account stated against Alisa, a seventh cause of action on behalf of Danica and an eighth cause of action on behalf of Stellar for quantum meruit against Alisa, and a ninth cause of action on behalf of Danica and a tenth cause of action on behalf of Stellar for payment on the lien discharge bonds against F & D. The Adams Street defendants interposed an answer, dated April 14, 2009, which asserted six counterclaims. The first counterclaim as against Danica and the second counterclaim against Stellar were by Alisa for breach of contract, alleging that it was damaged by plaintiffs' failure to complete the work under the contract in a workmanlike and timely manner. The third counterclaim as against Danica and the fourth counterclaim as against Stellar were by 85 Adams Street LLC, alleging willful exaggeration of their mechanic's liens. The fifth counterclaim as against Danica and the sixth counterclaim as against Stellar were by 85 Adams Street LLC and Alisa alleging negligence by them in failing to perform the contract work with reasonable diligence and with the level of skill and experience ordinarily exercised by contractors.

On July 7, 2014, the court conducted a settlement conference. Present at the settlement conference were: the Adams Street defendants' attorney, Brian B. Itzkowitz, Esq. (Mr. Itzowitz) (who, along with co-counsel Peter M. Levine, Esq., represents them); plaintiffs' attorney, Nicholas Fortuna, Esq. (Mr. Fortuna), of the law firm, Allyn & Fortuna LLP (who, along with co-counsel Megan J. Muoio, Esq. [Ms. Muoio], represents plaintiffs); and F & D's attorney, William R. Mait, Esq. (Mr. Mait) of the law firm, Mait, Wang & Simmons. At the settlement conference, these parties' attorneys, on behalf of their clients, reached a settlement of this action in the sum of $204,000 to be paid by these [*3]defendants to plaintiffs. The settlement was memorialized on the record in a written stipulation of settlement, dated July 7. 2014, executed by each of these attorneys on behalf of their clients.

The stipulation of settlement stated that "th[is] case is hereby settled by the parties in the amount of $204,000 subject to [a] long form formal agreement [that] the parties will reasonably cooperate to complete and execute." It also stated that the action would be discontinued against Quinn with prejudice. It did not state that any rights were reserved by the Adams Street defendants nor did it set forth that any claims or counterclaims by them would be continued. According to Mr. Fortuna, a long form agreement was requested by Mr. Mait in order to satisfy F & D's needs with respect to the indemnity agreement that it had with the Adams Street defendants. The stipulation of settlement was so-ordered by the court on July 7, 2014 and entered in the Kings County Clerk's office on July 15, 2014.

Following the execution of the so-ordered stipulation of settlement, Mr. Mait, on July 29, 2014, e-mailed a draft of the proposed formal stipulation of settlement to the attorneys for the other parties, which provided for the discontinuance of plaintiffs' action against the Adam Street defendants, F & D, and Quinn.^[FN2] This draft of the stipulation of settlement set forth that the attorneys for plaintiffs, the Adams Street defendants, and F & D had signed a stipulation providing for the settlement of this action for $204,000, which was so-ordered by the court on July 7, 2004, and which further provided for its terms to be formalized by the parties by this stipulation of settlement. The proposed formal stipulation of settlement set forth specific time frames and other formal language with respect to the discontinuance of the action and the execution of releases.

Specifically, the proposed formal stipulation of settlement provided that F & D would pay to plaintiffs the sum of $204,000 within 20 business days after the date that it received a fully executed counterpart of it, which was transmitted to its attorneys. It further provided that upon the receipt of the collection of the settlement amount, plaintiffs were to deliver to the Adams Street defendants, F & D, and Quinn a stipulation of discontinuance with prejudice of all of their claims asserted against them, which was to further provide for the discontinuance of the Adams Street defendants' counterclaims with prejudice. It also set forth that plaintiffs were to file releases or satisfactions of their liens within five business days after the collection of the settlement amount, and were to deliver filed copies of these releases or satisfactions of lien to the Adams Street defendants and F & D within 10 days after such filing. It additionally provided that upon the receipt and collection of the settlement amount, plaintiffs were to deliver to the Adams Street defendants, F & D, and Quinn releases in the form annexed and that the Adams Street defendants were to deliver to plaintiffs a release in the form annexed. [*4]These releases were also sent by Mr. Mait in this e-mail. With respect to the indemnity agreement between F & D and the Adams Street defendants, a paragraph was included, which stated that "[a]s between F & D and [the] Adams Street [defendants], nothing contained herein is intended to, nor shall, waive or release . . . any and all rights of F & D under a General Agreement of Indemnity executed by Jeshayahu Boymelgreen (Boymelgreen) and Sara Boymelgreen on behalf of [the] Adam Street [defendants], in favor of F & D, on October 24, 2007, which rights are hereby expressly reserved."

In an e-mail dated August 11, 2014 to the attorneys for the Adams Street defendants, plaintiffs, and Quinn, Mr. Mait stated that he had spoken or received their respective e-mails indicating their acceptance to the proposed form of the stipulation of settlement, and that the only revision made was to insert the date of Quinn's answer to plaintiffs' complaint, which was March 30, 2009. He requested that the attorneys sign the stipulations on behalf of their clients and submit the releases to their clients for their signatures.

By an e-mail dated August 11, 2014, Mr. Itzkowitz responded that he was still waiting to hear back from "AI attorney," referring to the attorney for AI Properties and Developments (USA) Corp. (AI), who was a partner with 85 Adams Street LLC's principal, Boymelgreen, in a project called AI Holdings (USA) Corp. AI was a defendant, along with 85 Adams Street LLC, Boymelgreen, and others, in an action brought by the Board of Managers of Beacon Tower Condominium (the Board of Managers) (Board of Managers of Beacon Tower Condominium v 85 Adams Street LLC, Sup Ct, Kings County, index No. 28165/2009) (the Beacon Tower Condominium action). In the Beacon Tower Condominium action, which involved the same condominium development involved in the present action, the Board of Managers brought claims alleging defective conditions in the condominium building.

By an e-mail dated September 2, 2014, Mr. Mait informed Ms. Muoio that Mr. Itzkowitz had just e-mailed him that he was waiting for AI's authority for him to sign off on the formal settlement agreement, and that he indicated that the Adams Street defendants were going to need similar reservation of rights language that had been used in a release in an action brought by Danica against Alisa and 15 Broad Street LLC, a company owned by the same principals who own 85 Adams Street and for which plaintiffs had performed construction work (Danica Group LLC v 15 Broad Street LLC, Sup Ct, NY County, index No. 115623/08) (the 15 Broad Street action), when plaintiffs' counsel had settled that action. The release in the 15 Broad Street action provided that 15 Broad Street LLC and Alisa had released their counterclaims against Danica in that action, but reserved all of its rights and claims asserted against Danica in a third-party action entitled, The Board of Managers of the Downtown Condominium and the Downtown Condominium v 15 Broad Street, LLC (Sup Ct, NY County, index No. 102963/09) and Alisa Construction Co., Inc. v Gibraltar Contracting, Inc. (Sup Ct, NY County, index No. 590734/12). Mr. Mait stated, in this e-mail to Ms. Muoio, that he had [*5]been unaware of this pending litigation involving AI, and that he had asked Mr. Itzkowitz to send him the caption of that action. Ms. Muoio responded that she was also not aware of that litigation, and asked for the name of the caption when Mr. Mait received it.

Mr. Itzkowitz, after hearing from AI's attorney, refused to accept the release included for signature by Mr. Mait, and asserted that the Adams Street defendants required a limited release that preserved their counterclaims in this action due to the claims brought by the Board of Managers in the Beacon Tower Condominium action. According to Mr. Itzkowitz, since the claims in the Beacon Tower Condominium action involved claims of defective work, 85 Adams Street LLC did not want to be precluded from asserting these counterclaims against plaintiffs. Mr. Itzkowitz informed Mr. Mait of this, and, by an e-mail sent to Mr. Itzkowitz on September 16, 2014, Mr. Mait enclosed a revised draft of the release, which then provided for the reservation of all of the Adams Street defendants' rights and claims that may exist against plaintiffs arising out of or in connection with the claims asserted against them in the Beacon Tower Condominium action. Mr. Mait asked Mr. Itzkowitz to forward this revised release to AI's attorneys for their approval, and stated that he was also e-mailing a copy of it to Ms. Muoio to make sure that it was acceptable to plaintiffs.

On September 18, 2014, after conferring with AI's attorneys, Mr. Itzkowitz provided proposed language for the limited release that AI's attorneys had requested. This proposed language provided that the Adams Street defendants specifically reserved all of their right, defenses, and claims that existed or may exist against them relating to, arising out of, or in connection with any and all claims asserted or which may be asserted against them in the Beacon Tower action, and all of its rights, defenses, and claims, including, but not limited to, claims for indemnification and contribution that exist or may exist against them relating to, arising out of, or in connection with any and all claims asserted or which may be asserted against them in any other pending or future actions or proceedings relating to, arising out of, or in connection with the Beacon Tower Condominium. By an e-mail dated September 18, 2014, Mr. Mait informed Ms. Muoio of this language which the attorneys for AI had requested be inserted into the release to them, noting that they also had requested a cross reference to this reservation of rights in the body of the stipulation of settlement, and he asked if she approved of this revision.

By an e-mail dated September 18, 2014, Ms. Muoio responded that this language was not acceptable. In an e-mail dated September 24, 2014, Ms. Muoio informed Mr. Itzkowitz that plaintiffs could not accept the revised release regarding the Beacon Tower Condominium action since Danica was not a party in that action and since it was a five-year old case that did not involve any allegations against Danica. She further pointed out that Mr. Itzkowitz had agreed to the settlement of plaintiffs' claims and the Adams Street defendants' counterclaims with prejudice in court on July 7, 2014, and it was only on September 16, 2014 that he had brought up this unrelated case for the first time. She further stated that plaintiffs had not agreed to a reservation of the Adam Street defendants' [*6]rights regarding the Beacon Tower Condominium action and would not do so now.

Mr. Itzkowitz, in a September 24, 2014 e-mail to Ms. Muoio, responded that since limited language in the releases was used in the 15 Broad Street action months earlier, she knew that similar language would need to be used in this action. Ms. Muoio responded that neither Mr. Fortuna, she, nor plaintiffs had any knowledge about the Beacon Tower Condominium action prior to September 16, 2014, and that they had no reason to know about it because Danica was not a party to it, and it was never discussed when they settled this action on July 7, 2014. She stated that only the language of the original release forwarded by Mr. Mait on August 11, 2014 was acceptable to plaintiffs.

Thereafter, the parties wrote letters to this court and engaged in telephone conferences, but the Adams Street defendants refused to execute the August 11, 2014 release or the formal stipulation of settlement. On October 14, 2014, plaintiffs served a notice upon Mr. Itzkowitz and Mr. Mait, pursuant to CPLR 5003-a, with an attached stipulation of discontinuance and releases executed by plaintiffs. The CPLR 5003-a notice requested that the Adams Street defendants and F & D tender the agreed upon settlement amount of $204,000 within 21 days of service of these documents, and that if they failed to do so, plaintiffs would enter a judgment against them for the amount of the settlement. By an e-mail to Mr. Fortuna dated October 15, 2014, Mr. Itzkowitz stated that the case was not settled until they could agree on the terms of the settlement agreement and release language and that no money would be paid. By an e-mail to Mr. Itzkowitz, Mr. Fortuna responded that he disagreed, that the stipulation stated that the case was settled, and that if plaintiffs did not receive payment, they would enter a judgment. Discussions continued between counsel, but they remained at odds.

Consequently, plaintiffs entered a judgment in their favor in the amount of $204,000, with interest thereon, on December 1, 2014. On December 19, 2014, the Adams Street defendants filed a notice of appeal from this judgment. Also on that date, plaintiffs obtained a payment, by check, of $204,000 from F & D in full and final settlement of all claims against its bonds discharging the mechanic's liens. Mr. Mait, in his December 19, 2014 letter accompanying the check, stated that F & D's delivery of its check was not intended to waive any of the Adams Street defendants' rights forming the basis of their counterclaims and that it also did not constitute an agreement by plaintiffs that the Adams Street defendants possessed any such rights. The judgment was satisfied, pursuant to a Satisfaction of Judgment filed on December 23, 2014, which acknowledged that the judgment had been fully paid. On December 23, 2014, the Adams Street defendants filed the instant order to show cause, seeking to vacate the December 1, 2014 judgment and the July 7, 2014 so-ordered stipulation of settlement.^[FN3]

CPLR 5003-a (a) provides that "[w]hen an action to recover damages has been settled, any settling defendant . . . shall pay all sums due to any settling plaintiff within twenty-one days of tender, by the settling plaintiff to the settling defendant, of a duly executed release and a stipulation discontinuing [the] action executed on behalf of the settling plaintiff." Here, plaintiffs tendered releases and a stipulation discontinuing the action pursuant to this section.

The Adams Street defendants, however, in support of their motion, argue that plaintiffs had no right to enter the December 1, 2014 judgment because the action was not settled by the July 7, 2014 stipulation of settlement. They contend that they stipulated at the July 7, 2014 court conference as to the amount of $204,000 only, and agreed that the final settlement would be subject to a long form formal agreement. They maintain that since no long form formal agreement was ever executed, they never reached a meeting of the minds of all terms of the settlement and there was never a definite agreement in writing enforceable under CPLR 2104. They contend that the July 7, 2014 stipulation of settlement was, therefore, not binding upon them and did not constitute an enforceable stipulation of settlement.

The Adams Street defendants, in their motion, seek to vacate the December 1, 2014 judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a), which permits a court, on motion, to relieve a party from a judgment "upon such terms as may be just . . . upon the ground of . . . fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party." The Adams Street defendants argue that the judgment should be vacated on the basis of misrepresentation and misconduct by plaintiffs' attorney, Mr. Fortuna. They contend that Mr. Fortuna, knowing that they had not agreed to the terms of the releases to be exchanged, misrepresented to the Kings County Clerk that the parties had reached a final settlement agreement, and had the judgment entered pursuant to CPLR 5003-a. They further assert that Mr. Fortuna, due to statements made during a November 25, 2014 telephone conference with the court, was aware that they were planning to bring a motion to vacate the July 7, 2014 stipulation of settlement within two weeks, but had the judgment entered on December 1, 2014, six days after that telephone conference.

The Adams Street defendants' argument must be rejected. Pursuant to CPLR 2104, where an agreement between parties or their attorneys relating to any matter in an action is made between counsel in open court or is in a writing subscribed by them or their attorney or is reduced to the form of an order and entered, it constitutes a binding stipulation. Here, the July 7, 2014 stipulation of settlement was in writing and executed by the attorneys for the parties, and was additionally so-ordered by the court and filed in the Kings County Clerk's office on July 15, 2014, and, therefore, meets the criteria for a binding stipulation pursuant to CPLR 2104.

"Stipulations of settlement are favored by the courts and not lightly cast aside" [*8](Hallock v State of New York, 64 NY2d 224, 230 [1984]; see also Forcelli v Gelco Corp., 109 AD3d 244, 247-248 [2d Dept 2014]). "Only where there is cause sufficient to invalidate a contract, such as fraud, collusion, mistake or accident, will a party be relieved from the consequences of a stipulation made during litigation" (Hallock, 64 NY2d at 230). "A so-ordered stipulation is a contract between the parties thereto and as such, is binding on them and will be construed in accordance with contract principles and the parties' intent'" (Aivaliotis v Continental Broker-Dealer Corp., 30 AD3d 446, 447 [2d Dept 2006], quoting Serna v Pergament Distribs., 182 AD2d 985, 986 [3d Dept 1992], lv dismissed 80 NY2d 893 [1992], rearg denied 80 NY2d 926 [1992]; see also Matter of Caruso v Ward, 146 AD2d 22, 29 [1st Dept 1989]).

The Adams Street defendants argue, however, that there was no contract ever formed by the July 7, 2014 stipulation of settlement because there was never an intent to enter into a binding settlement agreement at that time. They contend that the July 7, 2014 stipulation of settlement was merely an agreement to agree since it was subject to entry into a formal settlement agreement. In addressing this argument, the court notes that there is a distinction between "a preliminary agreement contingent on and not intended to be binding absent formal documentation,' which is not enforceable, and a binding agreement that is nevertheless to be further documented,' which is enforceable with or without the formal documentation" (Kowalchuk v Stroup, 61 AD3d 118, 123 [1st Dept 2009], quoting Hostcentric Tech., Inc. v Republic Thunderbolt, LLC, 2005 WL 1377853, *5, 2005 US Dist LEXIS 11130, *17 [SD NY 2005]). "The former is established by a showing that a party made an explicit reservation that there would be no contract until the full formal document is completed and executed" (Kowalchuk, 61 AD3d at 123). "But, the mere fact that the parties intended to draft formal settlement papers is not alone enough to imply an intent not to be bound except by a fully executed document" (id.).

Here, the Adams Street defendants' contention that the July 7, 2014 stipulation was a mere "agreement to agree" is devoid of merit. This stipulation of settlement was definite and complete on its face, and the parties' intent to be bound by it is indicated by the fact that it was signed and so-ordered by the court. At the time of the execution of the stipulation of settlement, the Adams Street defendants never expressed an intent not to be bound unless a long form agreement was executed. Rather, the plain language of the July 7, 2014 stipulation of settlement expressly stated that this case "is hereby settled by the parties in the amount of $204,000," thereby manifesting the intent of the parties to be bound by its terms at the time that it was made (see Shah v Wilco Sys., Inc., 81 AD3d 454, 455 [1st Dept 2011], lv dismissed 17 NY3d 901 [2011]; Bed Bath & Beyond Inc. v IBEX Constr., LLC, 52 AD3d 413, 414 [1st Dept 2008]).

The fact that the parties included language in the stipulation of settlement that it was subject to a long form agreement that the parties were required to reasonably cooperate to complete does not render the agreement non-binding since the execution of such a long form agreement merely constituted a ministerial act (see Tooker v Castille, [*9]260 AD2d 298, 298 [1st Dept 1999]). Indeed, as discussed above, Mr. Fortuna has attested and the Adams Street defendants do not deny that the long form agreement was requested by Mr. Mait in order to satisfy F & D's needs with respect to the indemnity agreement that it had with the Adams Street defendants. In this regard, it is noted that the formal long form settlement agreement initially prepared by Mr. Mait included a paragraph which addressed that indemnity agreement, stating that F & D's rights under the indemnity agreement were expressly reserved. This long form agreement also simply specified details as to the time frames for the payment of the settlement sum and the exchange of releases and satisfactions of the liens, and it formalized the stipulation of settlement by setting forth general language, such as language that all understandings and agreement theretofore had between the parties with respect to the matters covered by it were merged into it, that it could not be modified except by a written agreement, and that it was to be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of New York. The fact that it was necessary for the parties to execute general releases does not render the settlement agreement invalid (see Shah, 81 AD3d at 455; Tooker, 260 AD2d at 298). Thus, the executed and so-ordered July 7, 2014 stipulation of settlement was not a mere settlement proposal, but constituted a final resolution of this action and a binding agreement (see CPLR 2104).

While the Adams Street defendants argue that the July 7, 2014 stipulation of settlement was not final and should not be enforced because it did not reserve their counterclaims, the Adams Street defendants did not indicate, at the time of the entry into the July 7, 2014 stipulation of settlement, that their counterclaims were being reserved. Indeed, there is no mention whatsoever of their counterclaims in the stipulation of settlement. Mr. Fortuna has submitted his affirmation, in which he specifically attests that the issue of possibly preserving the Adams Street defendants' counterclaims was never raised during the July 7, 2014 settlement conference, and that reserving these counterclaims would not have been an acceptable settlement since it would essentially allow the Adams Street defendants to sue plaintiffs to get back the funds that the surety had just paid. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any correspondence dated prior to the July 7, 2014 settlement conference, which indicated that the Adams Street defendants were reserving their counterclaims against plaintiffs.

The fact that the original long form agreement drafted by Mr. Mait did not include the reservation of the Adams Street defendants' counterclaims demonstrates that none of the parties contemplated such a reservation in their settlement discussions on July 7, 2014. Significantly, the Adams Street defendants did not object to the standard language of the long form agreement drafted by Mr. Mait until weeks after it was circulated between the parties, and only objected to it on the basis that the attorney for a non-party to the settlement, AI, had demanded changes to it based upon an unrelated action in which plaintiffs were not parties. In construing the effectiveness of the stipulation of settlement and what it encompassed, the court may not write into it conditions the parties did not [*10]insert or add terms to it (see Hanau v Cohen, 121 AD3d 940, 941 [2d Dept 2014]). Thus, these counterclaims were encompassed in the settlement of this action in the amount of $204,000.

Since the court finds that the July 7, 2014 so-ordered stipulation of settlement is a valid settlement agreement, with no basis to invalidate it, there is no basis to invalidate the December 1, 2014 judgment under CPLR 5015 (a). There is no evidence that there was any fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by plaintiffs at the July 7, 2014 settlement conference where the parties agreed to settle the action for $204,000. Rather, the parties negotiated the settlement in good faith, and the settlement was made freely and with full knowledge of the entire matter. The judgment was filed by plaintiffs on December 1, 2014 after the Adams Street defendants and F & D failed to pay the settlement amount agreed to by them on July 7, 2014.

Although Mr. Itzkowitz argues that Mr. Fortuna engaged in misconduct because he procured the December 1, 2014 judgment while knowing that he was planning to move to vacate the stipulation of settlement, this argument must be rejected. Plaintiffs had already extended to the Adams Street defendants the courtesy of voluntarily holding off from filing the judgment on November 4, 2014, when the CPLR 5003-a period expired, and did not file the judgment until December 1, 2014. The Adams Street defendants did not make a motion to forestall the running of the 21-day time period of CPLR 5003-a. Plaintiffs were not required to further await the signing of a long form agreement since it became apparent that the Adams Street defendants would not cooperate in signing it unless it added terms which were not part of the July 7, 2014 stipulation of settlement. The fact that plaintiffs filed the judgment in no way constituted a fraudulent act, and there is no basis to set it aside pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a).

Finally, it is noted that F & D paid the judgment promptly after it was filed, and that the Adams Street defendants, in addressing the issue of this payment and the satisfaction of the judgment, argue that F & D had no authority to satisfy the judgment without their prior authorization. This argument is rejected. The bond application, dated November 26, 2007, executed by the Adams Street defendants, provided that "[F & D] shall have the right and is authorized, but not required, to adjust or settle or compromise any claim, demand, suit or judgment upon said bond." This language explicitly granted F & D the authority to settle the action on behalf of the Adams Street defendants (see International Fid. Ins. Co. v Spadafina, 192 AD2d 637, 639 [2d Dept 1993]). Furthermore, F & D was, in any event, authorized to pay this sum pursuant to the July 7, 2014 stipulation of settlement.

Since the court has found the July 7, 2014 stipulation of settlement and the December 1, 2014 judgment to be valid and binding, the Adams Street defendants' motion to vacate them must be denied. In view of this finding, the Adams Street defendants' motion, insofar as it further seeks an order, pursuant to CPLR 5519, staying plaintiffs from enforcing the December 1, 2014 judgment, pending an appeal taken by them from [*11]that judgment to the Appellate Division, Second Department, must also be denied.

Accordingly, the Adams Street defendants' motion is denied in its entirety.

This constitutes the decision, order, and judgment of the court.