| Tranquility Salon & Day Spa, Inc. v Caira |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 50682(U) [47 Misc 3d 143(A)] |
| Decided on May 1, 2015 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, Sixth District (Janine A. Barbera-Dalli, J.), dated March 29, 2013. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the action.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, and the matter is remitted to the District Court for the entry of a judgment in favor of plaintiff in the principal sum of $3,500.
In this small claims action, plaintiff seeks to recover pursuant to a written agreement whereby defendant received advanced cosmetology classes offered by plaintiff as a requirement for her employment at plaintiff's salon. Defendant took 14
On an appeal from a small claims judgment, the standard of review is whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantial law" (UDCA 1807). Upon a review of the record, we are of the opinion that substantial justice requires that the judgment be reversed and that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff in the principal sum of $3,500, the amount due plaintiff for the classes which defendant attended. The agreement at issue is not an adhesion contract. "A contract of adhesion contains terms that are unfair and nonnegotiable and arises from a disparity of bargaining power or oppressive tactics" (Matter of Love'M Sheltering, Inc. v County of Suffolk, 33 AD3d 923, 924 [2006]). The agreement here does not fall into this category since there is no showing that plaintiff used high pressure tactics or deceptive language in the contract, or that there was an inequality of bargaining power between the parties (see Sablosky v Gordon Co., 73 NY2d 133, 138-139 [1989]). Pursuant to the agreement, defendant obtained the opportunity to take advanced training classes to improve her professional skills and knowledge, and was aware that she would be required to reimburse plaintiff therefor should she leave her employment before a certain specified period of time. Defendant does not dispute that she has failed to pay for the classes that she attended.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the matter is remitted to the District Court for the entry of a judgment in favor of plaintiff in the principal sum of $3,500.
Garguilo, J.P., Marano and Connolly, JJ., concur.