The following papers numbered 1 to 4 read on this motion

Defendant, the City of New York, moves inter alia for summary judgment, dismissing plaintiff's complaint and all cross-claims asserted against it.

This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff on July 14, 2012 as a result of a trip and fall due to the presence of a lock on a cellar door embedded in the sidewalk abutting the premises located at 125-07 101st Avenue, in the County of Queens, City and State of New York.

On a motion for summary judgment, the proponent "must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case . . ." (Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Center, 64 NY2d 851, 852 [1985]). Once the proponent has made this showing, the burden of proof shifts to the party opposing the motion to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form to establish that material issues of fact exist which requires a jury trial (Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).

Pursuant to New York City Administrative Code § 7-210, the owner of real property abutting a public sidewalk is liable for damages resulting from his or her failure to maintain the sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition except in the case of one-, two, or three-family residential real property that is in whole or in part owner occupied and is used exclusively for residential purposes.

The City submits inter alia properly authenticated Department of Finance (DOF) records and the affidavit of Frank Engoron, a principal title examiner with the New York City Law Department, which demonstrate that on the date of plaintiff's accident, the subject property was owned by co-defendant Nadira Persaud, not the [*2]City, and that the subject property is classified as an "Office Building; Fireproof up to 9 Stories" *Business Class "01"). This is sufficient to establish that the City cannot be held liable pursuant to Administrative Code § 7-210 (See Nicoletti v. City of New York, 77 AD3d 715, 716-17 [2d Dept. 2010]).

Plaintiff fails to raise any issue of fact in opposition to the City's prima facie demonstration that it did not have a duty to maintain the subject sidewalk pursuant to Administrative Code § 7-210.

Notably, the language of §�7-210 reflects the duties and obligations of property owners with respect to sidewalks as set forth in New York City Administrative Code §�19-152 (See Vucetovic v. Epsom Downs, Inc., 10 NY3d 517, 521 [2008]; see also Harakidas v. City of New York, 86 AD3d 624, 626 [2d Dept. 2011]). Pursuant to §�19-152, it is the responsibility of the property owner to inter alia repair substantial defects in sidewalks, including "cellar doors that . . . are otherwise in a dangerous or unsafe condition." As plaintiff maintains that the big metal lock attached to the embedded metal doors constituted a dangerous or unsafe condition, it was the responsibility of the abutting property owner pursuant to §�19-152, and the City cannot be held liable pursuant to §�7-210 (See Vucetovic, supra, at 521; see also Harakidas, supra, at 626).

In addition, plaintiff's contention that the City may still be held liable because the City failed to establish that it lacked prior written notice of the defective condition is wholly without merit. Plaintiff fails to submit any support for her contention that the mere existence of prior written notice creates a duty where none existed before.

Indeed, the prior written notice statute actually serves to limit the City's duty to maintain its streets and sidewalks by imposing liability only for those defects of which the City was aware (See Poirer v. City of Schenectady, 85 NY2d 310, 314 [1995]). This implies a pre-existing duty on the part of the City to maintain the area in question. As the City did not have a duty to maintain the area in question pursuant to Administrative Code §�7-210, it cannot be held liable even if it had prior written notice of the defective condition (See Adamson v. City of New York, 104 AD3d 533 [2d Dept. 2013]).

Finally, the work permits issued by the City to enable Welsbach to perform work at the general, but not precise, location of plaintiff's accident are insufficient to raise an issue of fact regarding whether the entity actually performed any work on behalf of the City (See Gee v. City of New York, 304 AD2d 615, 617 [2d Dept. 2003]). In any event, none of the work allowed under the permit would have created the specific defect complained of; to wit, the presence of a large lock on the door embedded in the sidewalk.

Accordingly, defendant's motion is granted, in its entirety, and plaintiff's complaint and all cross-claims are dismissed as asserted against defendant, the City of New York, only.