The People of
the State of New York,
against
Omar Vigueras, Defendant.
|
2014BX010064
The People - Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx County by Rajbir
S. Datta, Assistant District Attorney
Defendant — The Bronx Defenders by Camilla Hsu
Armando Montano, J.
The motion by the People for an order, pursuant to CPL §§ 100.45,
200.20(2)(c), and 200.20(4), consolidating docket numbers 2014BX010064,
2014BX064050, and 2015X011069 for trial is denied.
Docket No.: 2014BX010064
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By misdemeanor complaint filed under Docket No.: 2014BX010064, defendant
is charged with one count of Driving While Intoxicated (VTL § 1192[3]) and one
count of Driving While Ability Impaired by Alcohol (VTL § 1192[1]).
The complaint alleges that Officer Johnfran Tullo observed defendant operating a
2012 black Honda Suburban on or about February 22, 2014 at approximately 3:48 a.m. at
the corner of Metcalf Avenue and Westchester Avenue in Bronx County. Officer Tullo
further alleges that when he asked defendant to exit the motor vehicle, he observed
defendant to have bloodshot, watery eyes, slurred speech, a strong odor of an alcoholic
beverage on his breath, and to be unsteady on his feet. Defendant was placed under arrest
and taken to the 45th Precinct. There, defendant refused to take a Breathalyzer test.
Docket No.: 2014BX064050
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By misdemeanor complaint filed under Docket No.: 2014BX064050,
defendant is [*2]charged with one count of Driving
While Intoxicated (VTL § 1192[3]) and one count of Driving While Ability
Impaired by Alcohol (VTL § 1192[1]).
The complaint alleges that Officer Josue Sepulveda observed defendant
operating a 2001 Chevrolet Tahoe on or about December 2, 2014 at approximately 4:20
a.m. at the southwest corner of Bruckner Expressway and Pelham Parkway in Bronx
County. Officer Sepulveda alleges that he asked defendant to exit the motor vehicle and
he observed defendant to have watery eyes, slurred speech, a strong odor of an alcoholic
beverage on his breath, and to be unsteady on his feet. Defendant was placed under arrest
and taken to the 45th Precinct. There, defendant refused to take a Breathalyzer test.
Docket No.: 2015BX011069
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By misdemeanor complaint filed under Docket No.: 2015BX011069,
defendant is charged with one count of Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor
Vehicle (VTL § 511[1][a]), one count of Driving While Intoxicated (VTL §
1192[3]), and one count of Driving While Ability Impaired by Alcohol (VTL §
1192[1]).
The complaint alleges that Officer Ronald Hobson observed defendant
operating a 2001 Chevy Tahoe on or about March 8, 2015 at approximately 5:20 a.m. at
the southeast corner of East Fordham Road and Jerome Avenue in Bronx County. Officer
Hobson alleges that he observed defendant to have an odor of alcohol on his breath,
slurred speech, and to be unsteady on his feet. Defendant stated the following to Officer
Hobson, "Alright, I had two beers." Officer Hobson further alleges that he conducted a
search of the Department of Motor Vehicles records which revealed that defendant's
license was suspended pending a hearing. Defendant was placed under arrest and taken
to the 45th Precinct. There, defendant refused to take a Breathalyzer test.
The People move to consolidate the above-captioned dockets under CPL §
200.20(c). Not only are the dockets joinable, the People argue that consolidation is in the
public interest to avoid duplicative, lengthy, and expensive trials. The People also assert,
in a wholly conclusory fashion, that defendant would face no prejudice should the
dockets be consolidated.
Defendant argues that this Court should not exercise its discretion to consolidate
as it would prove to be unduly prejudicial and unfair to him. First, defendant asserts that
while all three cases involve driving, the commonalities end there. Defendant points out
that the cases involve different witnesses, locations, conduct, and as such, judicial
economy would not be served by consolidation. Second, defendant argues that his right
to a fair trial would be severely compromised should the dockets be consolidated.
Defendant avers that consolidation would allow the People to submit to a single trier of
fact evidence that would not be admissible if the offenses were tried separately.
Consequently, defendant contends that he will be forced to present a generically
applicable defense as to all charges so as not to confuse the jury. Furthermore, defendant
asserts that he is likely to testify in one case and not the others. Therefore, consolidation
would force him to forgo either his right to testify on his own defense or to be free from
being forced to testify. Finally, defendant argues that a jury would likely convict based
upon the cumulative effect of evidence of three unrelated DWI cases rather than on the
strength of the specific evidence regarding each case.
In a motion to consolidate, the movant has the burden of showing that 1) the
offenses charged in the separate indictments are joinable pursuant to CPL §
200.20(2) and 2) combination for a single trial is a prudent exercise of judicial discretion.
People v. Lane, 56 NY2d 1 (1982). The decision to grant consolidation is
committed to the sound discretion of the Court. In [*3]exercising its discretion, the Court should "generally weigh
the public interest in avoiding duplicative, lengthy and expensive trials against the
defendant's interest in being protected from unfair advantage. Id. at 8. Although
the Court is "afforded reasonable latitude in exercising discretion", the Lane
Court cautioned that "compromise of a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial free of
undue prejudice as the quid pro quo for the mere expeditious disposition of
criminal cases will not be tolerated." Id. "The test, which is fact specific, requires
the court to foretell whether granting of consolidation will result in a situation that causes
undue prejudice at trial. Id. at 7-8.
This Court finds that the People have met their burden of demonstrating that
the charges set forth in the three dockets are properly joinable pursuant to CPL §
200.20(2)(c) as they allege offenses "defined by the same or similar statutory provisions
and consequently are the same or similar law." In each docket, defendant is charged with
VTL § 1192(3) and related charges stemming from his alleged drunk driving.
However, the People have failed to establish that consolidation would be a proper
exercise of this Court's discretion in light of the prejudice defendant will undoubtedly
face during a single trial.
Joinder under CPL § 200.20(2)(c) "is one only of convenience, usually
to the State, and, notwithstanding instructions to the jury to compartmentalize the
evidence relating to each of the separate criminal incidents being tried, there is a real
danger that evidence relating to one crime will improperly affect consideration of the
other or others." People v. Yuk Bui Yee, 94 Misc 2d 628, 630 (Sup Ct, NY
County 1978). Here, the benefits of judicial economy are minimal, at best.
It bears emphasizing that "[t]he general rule of evidence applicable to
criminal trials is that the state cannot prove against a defendant any crime not alleged in
the indictment, either as a foundation for a separate punishment, or as aiding the proofs
that he is guilty of the crime charged." People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264, 291
(1901). "The basis for the rule is the fear that a jury might convict not for the crime
charged, but because, as evidenced by other criminal conduct, the accused is a person
deserving of punishment." People v. Fiore, 34 NY2d 81, 84 (1974). "It is
axiomatic that propensity evidence invites a jury to misfocus, if not base its verdict, on a
defendant's prior crimes rather than on the evidence—or lack of
evidence—relating to the case before it." People v. Rojas, 97 NY2d 32, 37
(2001). "While such evidence may be marginally relevant to the question of the accused's
guilt, its probative value is deemed to be outweighed by its potential for prejudice, and,
accordingly, the evidence is excluded as a matter of judicial policy." People v.
Santarelli, 49 NY2d 241, 247 (1980).
Nevertheless, where the evidence sought to be introduced is relevant to a
material fact in the case, other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crimes
charged, then such evidence may be admissible. People v. Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d
350 (1981). The Molineux rule provides that evidence of a defendant's prior
crimes or bad acts is inadmissible unless it is probative of a material issue other than
criminal propensity and its probative value outweighs the risk of prejudice to the
defendant. People v. Alvino, 71 NY2d 233 (1987); People v. Alweiss, 48
NY2d 40 (1979); Molineux, 168 NY 264. The Molineux Court identified
the following five exceptions under which evidence of prior crimes or bad acts may be
introduced to prove: 1) motive; 2) intent; 3) the absence of mistake or accident; 4) a
common scheme or plan; or 5) the identity of the person charged. Molineux, 168
NY2d at 293. This list of exceptions is not exhaustive and are merely illustrative of the
instances where evidence of prior criminal conduct may be admissible. People v.
Alvino, 71 NY2d 233 (1987); People v. Vails, 43 NY2d 364 (1977).
Although the offenses charged are "defined by the same or similar statutory
provisions", each of the three alleged drunk driving incidents constitutes three separate
criminal transactions. The cumulative effect of a single trier of fact considering evidence
of three unrelated drunk driving incidents would unduly prejudice defendant. In addition,
there is no indication that proof from one case would be material and admissible as
evidence upon trial of the others, i.e, none of the Molineux exceptions apply
herein. Notwithstanding instructions to the jury to consider the evidence of each crime
separately, there is a substantial likelihood that a jury would be swayed by evidence of
defendant's general propensity to commit the offenses charged. This Court will not
impinge upon defendant's right to a fair trial for the sake of expediency.
Accordingly, the People's motion for an order, pursuant to CPL §§
100.45, 200.20(2)(c), and 200.20(4), consolidating the above-captioned dockets is
denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.
Dated:May 28, 2015
Bronx, New York
_______________________________
Hon. Armando Montano