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People v Cuevas
2015 NY Slip Op 50890(U) [47 Misc 3d 1229(A)]
Decided on June 4, 2015
Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Bronx County
Montano, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on June 4, 2015
Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County


The People of the State of New York,

against

Reynardo Cuevas, Defendant.




2015BX00477



The People-Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx County by Jason Navia



Defendant-The Law Offices of Arnold Pennington Keith, Jr. by Arnold P. Keith, Jr.


Armando Montano, J.

Defendant is charged with defendant is charged with the unclassified misdemeanors of Driving While Intoxicated (VTL §§ 1192[2] and [3]) and the traffic infraction of Driving While Ability Impaired by Alcohol (VTL § 1192[1]).



Defendant moves for an order 1) suppressing any and all statements made by defendant, or in the alternative, a Huntley hearing; 2) precluding the People from using any and all statements allegedly made by defendant which have not been disclosed; 3) suppressing any physical evidence seized from defendant, or in the alternative, a hearing to determine the admissibility of such evidence; 4) dismissing the action, pursuant to CPL §§ 170.30(1)(g) and 170.40, in the interest of justice; 5) directing the People to provide defendant with a complete record of his prior criminal arrest, convictions, and dispositions and a complete list of any vicious and/or immoral acts allegedly attributed to defendant which may be used by the People for impeachment purposes; 6) directing the People to provide defendant with any and all Brady material; 7) directing discovery of those items requested in his Demand to Produce; 8) directing discovery of a Bill of Particulars as was requested in his Request for a Bill of Particulars; and 9) granting defendant the right to make additional pretrial motions and the right to amend and/or supplement this motion if made necessary or appropriate by the People's future disclosure.



The complaint alleges that on February 1, 2015 at approximately 5:30 a.m., defendant was observed by the deponent, Police Officer Geidy Vincente, operating a motor vehicle, without its headlights illuminated when it was dark out, in front of 1829 Jerome Avenue in Bronx County. The motor vehicle defendant was operating swerved out of its lane of traffic and almost struck Officer Vicente's motor vehicle. Officer Vicente further observed defendant to have a strong odor of alcohol emanating from his breath, to be unsteady on his feet, had slurred speech, and had bloodshot watery eyes. A chemical test analysis of defendant's breath revealed a blood alcohol content of .11 of one per centum by weight.



Motion to Dismiss in the Interest of Justice

Defendant asserts that he is 38 years of age and prior to this incident, he has had no prior contact with the criminal justice system. Defendant asserts that he resides with and provides for his parents and his children (aged 15 and 8). Although he is not a citizen of the United States, he has been employed for the past three years as a school bus driver. Defendant hopes to gain citizenship and raise his children in this country. Defendant readily admits that the offense of driving while intoxicated is a serious offense; however, he denies all of the allegations contained in the complaint. Moreover, defendant avers that the IDTU videotape clearly shows that he was not intoxicated. Defendant also asserts that no harm was caused by the offense. Instead, he was the only one harmed because he had to spend a night in jail and miss several days of work in order to appear in Court. In fact, he has not been able to work since the date of his arrest, February 1, 2015.

If he was to enter a plea of guilty or was convicted after a trial, defendant maintains that he would lose his Commercial Driver's License ("CDL") and his driving privileges would be suspended for at least 90 days. As a school bus driver, defendant argues that he would be ineligible for a Restricted Use license pursuant to VTL art. 21-A. Defendant contends that a loss of his CDL license would deprive him of the means to support his family. Most importantly, defendant avers that a conviction would jeopardize his chances of becoming a citizen. Due to the unique circumstances of this case and in light of the harsh consequences he and his family would face, defendant argues that the instant case lacks prosecutorial merit. Defendant also contends that he does not pose a threat to the safety of the community. He maintains that he has always been an upstanding, tax paying, and productive member of society.

In support, defendant submits a copy of the "Results of Court Ordered Alcohol and Substance Abuse Screening and/or Assessment" form indicating that he does not meet the criteria for alcohol or substance abuse disorder, the first page of his 2014 tax return, a letter dated April 17, 2015 from Montauk Student Transport, LLC, indicating that defendant was employed as a school bus driver from February 15, 2013 to February 3, 2015, and three letters from former co-workers and a neighbor touting defendant's good character.

In opposition, the People argue that defendant has failed to demonstrate a compelling factor, consideration, or circumstance which would warrant dismissal in the interest of justice. The People note that although defendant concedes that a violation of VTL § 1192 is a serious offense, defendant fails to specifically address why this Court should overlook this fact in this case. The People also assert that defendant has ignored the serious societal ramifications of driving while intoxicated, to wit: the possibility of grave bodily injury or death to innocent pedestrians and motorists. Moreover, the absence of actual physical harm in the instant case does not diminish the potential harm that could have occurred as a result of defendant's actions.

In spite of defendant's lack of criminal history or the negative effects that a conviction would have on defendant's family life, the People assert that the First Department has repeatedly held that evidence of a defendant's good character and lack of criminal history, standing alone, does not justify dismissal in the furtherance of justice. In fact, the People contend that a dismissal of the instance case will only send a message to defendant that there are no consequences for violating the law.

Contrary to defendant's arguments, the People contend that there is ample evidence in the instant case. Further, a dismissal herein would adversely affect the public's confidence in the criminal justice system, which requires consistency in the application of the law. Given [*2]defendant's occupation as a school bus driver, entrusted with the responsibility of transporting individuals to and from a given destination, dismissal would have a serious and negative effect on the safety of the general public.

CPL § 170.40 provides that a Court may dismiss an accusatory instrument in the interest of justice where there exists "some compelling factor, consideration or circumstance clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of the defendant upon such accusatory instrument or count would constitute or result in injustice." CPL § 170.40 lists 10 factors which the Court must consider when determining whether to grant dismissal in the interest of justice [FN1] . The court need not "engage in a point-by-point catechistic discussion of all ten statutory factors; instead, the court is required to consider the factors individually and collectively in making a value judgment that is based upon striking a sensitive balance between the interests of the individual and those of the state." People v. Gragert, 1 Misc 3d 646, 648 (Crim Ct, NY County 2003); see also, People v. Rickert, 58 NY.2d 122 (1988).



Where the defendant fails to meet his burden of demonstrating by the preponderance of the evidence that a compelling factor exists to warrant dismissal in the interest of justice, the Court may summarily deny the motion. People v. Schlessel, 104 AD2d 501 (2d Dept. 1984). "The power to dismiss on such ground is, as provided in the statutory text, committed to the trial court's discretion; it should be exercised sparingly and only in that rare and unusual case where it cries out for fundamental justice beyond the confines of conventional considerations." People v. Harmon, 181 AD2d 34, 36 (1st Dept. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This Court finds that none of the enumerated factors provides a basis for dismissal pursuant to CPL § 170.40.



The Seriousness and Circumstances of the Offense



There is no dispute that driving while intoxicated is a serious offense.



The Extent of the Harm Caused by the Offense



"[D]riving while intoxicated is not a victimless crime as the defendant would urge. Rather, it is an offense against society as a whole." People v. Kelley, 141 AD2d 764, 765 (2d Dept. 1988). According to the Institute for Traffic Safety and Management and Research, in 2010, 30% of all vehicle fatalities were alcohol-related. The potential harm to the safety of the public at large cannot be overstated.



In the case at bar, defendant's motor vehicle swerved out of its lane of traffic and almost struck Officer Vicente's motor vehicle. But for sheer luck, no actual harm was sustained by the officer or any other pedestrian and/or motorist.



The Evidence of Guilt



The complaint alleges that defendant was observed by the arresting officer operating his motor vehicle without its headlights illuminated when it was dark out, swerving out of its lane of traffic, and nearly striking the officer's motor vehicle. Officer Vicente also asserts that he observed defendant exhibiting the classic signs of intoxication and defendant had a blood alcohol level of .11. In contrast, defendant unequivocally denies all of the allegations contained in the complaint. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the offenses charged are in dispute and must be resolved at trial.



The History, Character and Condition of Defendant



Defendant essentially asks to receive special treatment from this Court because a conviction would have a deleterious effect on his ability to support his family and it would hinder his chances of attaining citizenship. While defendant's dedication to his family and his lack of criminal history are commendable, these factors are insufficient to justify a dismissal in furtherance of justice. Kelley, 141 AD2d; People v. Andrew, 78 AD2d 683 (2d Dept. 1980). Defendant's good character and lack of a criminal record "does not immunize him from the normal processes of the criminal law." People v. Varela, 106 AD2d 339, 340 (1st Dept. 1984). Also, several courts have held that the fact that a defendant would face adverse immigration consequences if convicted does not, standing alone, justify dismissal in the interest of justice. See, People v. Reyes, 174 AD2d 87 (1st Dept. 1992); People v. Ramirez, 31 Misc 3d 1228(A) (Sup Ct, Bronx County 2011); People v. Doe, 159 Misc 2d 799 (Sup Ct, NY County 1993).



Any Exceptionally Serious Misconduct of Law Enforcement Personnel



Defendant concedes that there was no serious misconduct on the part of law enforcement personnel herein.



The Purpose and Effect upon Defendant a Sentence Authorized for the Offense



A dismissal herein would only serve to demonstrate to defendant that he is deserving of special treatment in the eyes of the law.



The Impact of Dismissal on the Safety or Welfare of the Community



"Persons operating automobiles should be in full possession of their faculties. An intoxicated person, who operates an automobile on a highway, is a menace to the public." People v. Ritsky, 224 A.D. 425, 426 (2d Dept. 1928). Again, the potential for harm to the safety of the public cannot be overstated.



The safety of the public is of paramount importance, especially where, as here, defendant was employed as a school bus driver at the time of the offense. The dangers that the school children would face if defendant imbibed alcoholic beverages during his work shift are obvious and cannot be overlooked.



The Impact of Dismissal on the Confidence of the Public of the Criminal Justice System



In 1789, George Washington wrote, "The due administration of justice is the firmest pillar of good government." The criminal laws of this State must be applied even-handedly to all citizens regardless of who they are as individuals. Dismissal of the instant case would only [*3]undermine the public's confidence in the criminal justice system.



This Court is not unsympathetic to defendant's concerns regarding the possible consequences he will face should the charges not be dismissed. However, after considering the enumerated factors set forth in CPL § 170.40, it cannot be said that this case "cries out for fundamental justice beyond the confines of conventional considerations." Harmon, supra. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss the instant action in the interest of justice is denied.

Motion to Suppress Evidence


Defendant moves pursuant to CPL § 710.20(1) to suppress all physical evidence and observations of the police obtained as a result of his unlawful arrest. Specifically, defendant moves to suppress all physical evidence, statements, identification evidence, and Breathalyzer results. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of any information relied upon by the police when effectuating his arrest. Defendant denies the factual allegations set forth in the complaint and denies engaging in any unlawful or criminal behavior prior to his warrantless seizure and arrest. Therefore, defendant argues that the police lacked probable cause to stop and seize him. Consequently, defendant avers that all evidence obtained by the police must be suppressed. In the alternative, defendant requests a Mapp/Dunaway hearing.



The People oppose defendant's motion to suppress as he has failed to allege sworn allegations of fact in support as required under CPL § 710.60. The People assert that defendant merely denies the allegations contained in the accusatory instrument and posits in a wholly conclusory fashion that the police lacked probable cause. Notwithstanding defendant's deficient showing, the People maintain that the police had ample probable cause based upon the personal observations of the arresting officer.



A motion to suppress evidence "must state the ground or grounds of the motion and must contain sworn allegations of fact." CPL § 710.60(1). A motion to suppress must be summarily granted where the defendant alleges a legal ground warranting suppression and the People concede the truth of the factual allegations. CPL § 710.60(2)(a). A Court may summarily deny a motion to suppress if the defendant fails to allege a proper legal basis for suppression or if the "sworn allegations of fact do not as a matter of law support the ground alleged." CPL § 710.60(3)(b). "[T]he sufficiency of [the] defendant's factual allegations should be evaluated by (1) the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and (3) [the] defendant's access to information." People v. Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 426 (1993). However, even if the defendant's factual allegations are deficient, summarily denying a motion to suppress is disfavored. In Mendoza, supra, the Court of Appeals explained:



The CPL does not mandate summary denial of defendant's motion even if the factual allegations are deficient .If the Court orders a Huntley or Wade hearing, and defendant's Mapp motion is grounded in the same facts involving the same police witnesses, the court may deem it appropriate in the exercise of discretion to consider the Mapp motion despite a perceived pleading deficiency. Indeed, considerations of judicial economy militate in favor of this procedure; an appellate court might conclude that summary denial of the Mapp motion as improper, requiring the parties and witnesses to reassemble for a new hearing, often months or years later.



This Court finds that defendant's moving papers are "minimally sufficient" to warrant a hearing on the issue of suppression. People v. Harris, 160 AD2d 515, 515 (1st Dept. 1990). A stop of a [*4]motor vehicle without probable cause constitutes a legal basis for the suppression of physical evidence. Here, defendant was arrested based upon the purported personal observations of criminality by the arresting officer. Defendant's denial of any wrongdoing challenges the facts relied upon by the arresting officer to establish probable cause. "When the validity of a warrantless arrest is challenged, the presumption of probable cause disappears and the People bear the burden of coming forward with evidence showing that it was supported by probable cause." People v. Chaney, 253 AD2d 562, 564 (3d Dept. 1998). Where, as here, material facts are in issue, a hearing must be held in order for the Court to determine whether evidence was obtained lawfully [FN2] . People v. Burton, 6 NY3d 584 (2006). A hearing shall be held to determine the propriety of defendant's warrantless arrest and whether, in light of all the circumstances, probable cause existed for it. Therefore, defendant's motion for a Mapp/Dunaway hearing is granted.

Motion to Suppress Statements


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Defendant asserts that he was duly served with statement notice pursuant to CPL § 710.30(1)(a). The statement notice indicates that defendant allegedly stated the following to Officer Vincente: 1) "I'm coming from a party." and 2) "I drank one beer early. I'm coming from my girlfriend's house."



Defendant argues that any and all properly noticed statements allegedly made by and/or elicited from him should be suppressed because 1) they were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights; 2) defendant was not properly informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); 3) he made the statements without knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to remain silent; and 4) he made the statements involuntarily.



The People assert that they should be permitted to use any of defendant's statements should he choose to testify. However, should a Huntley hearing be ordered, the People request that the scope of the hearing be limited to determine whether defendant's statement was made voluntarily.



In a motion to suppress a statement, all that is required to warrant a Huntley hearing is the mere claim that the defendant's statement was involuntary. People v. Weaver, 49 NY2d 1012 (1980); People v. Bingham, 144 AD2d 682 (2d Dept. 1988); Matter of Brian E., 206 AD2d 665 (3d Dept. 1994). Therefore, defendant's motion for a Huntley hearing is granted.

Motion to Preclude Statement Evidence


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Defendant's motion to preclude the introduction of unnoticed statements is denied, with leave granted for defendant to renew this branch of the motion upon learning that the People intend to introduce any such evidence at trial.

Sandoval/Molineaux/Ventimiglia


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Defendant moves for an order precluding the People from introducing at trial evidence of his prior criminal convictions, any underlying bad acts, and all prior uncharged criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct. The People consent to disclosure of defendant's prior charged and uncharged criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct which they intend to use at trial for [*5]impeachment purposes. Defendant's motion for a Sandoval/Molineaux/Ventimiglia hearing is respectfully referred to the trial judge.

Discovery


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The People are reminded of their continuing obligation to supply all Brady material. The People have already responded to defendant's request for a bill of particulars and demand to produce. Therefore, defendant's motion to preclude the offering of evidence for failure to respond to his request for a bill of particulars and demand to produce is denied as moot.

Future Motions


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Defendant's reservation of right to file further motions is unauthorized pursuant to CPL § 255.20(3). Any future motions shall be summarily denied absent a showing of good cause.



Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint in the furtherance of justice is denied. Defendant's motion for a Map/Dunaway hearing is granted. Defendant's motion for a Huntley hearing is granted. Defendant's motion to preclude evidence of unnoticed statements is denied, with leave granted for defendant to renew this branch of the motion upon learning that the People intend to introduce any such evidence at trial. The People are reminded of their continuing obligation to supply all Brady material. Defendant's motion to preclude the offering of evidence for failure to respond to his request for a bill of particulars and demand to produce is denied as moot. Defendant's motion for a Sandoval/Molineaux/Ventimiglia hearing is respectfully referred to the trial judge. Defendant's request to file additional motions is denied subject to rights under CPL § 255.20(3) to move for further leave upon good cause shown.



This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.



Dated:June 4, 2015

Bronx, New York

_______________________________

Hon. Armando Montano

Footnotes


Footnote 1:These factors are: (a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense; (b) the extent of harm caused by the offense; (c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial; (d) the history, character and condition of the defendant; (e) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the defendant; (f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized for the offense; (g) the impact of a dismissal on the safety and welfare of the community; (h) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in the criminal justice system; (i) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the complainant or victim with respect to the motion; and (j) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction would serve no useful purpose.

Footnote 2:All evidence gathered by way of an unlawful search and seizure is inadmissible. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.643 (1961).