The People of
the State of New York,
against
Reynardo Cuevas, Defendant.
|
2015BX00477
The People-Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx County by Jason
Navia
Defendant-The Law Offices of Arnold Pennington Keith, Jr. by Arnold P.
Keith, Jr.
Armando Montano, J.
Defendant is charged with defendant is charged with the unclassified misdemeanors
of Driving While Intoxicated (VTL §§ 1192[2] and [3]) and the traffic
infraction of Driving While Ability Impaired by Alcohol (VTL § 1192[1]).
Defendant moves for an order 1) suppressing any and all statements made by
defendant, or in the alternative, a Huntley hearing; 2) precluding the People from using
any and all statements allegedly made by defendant which have not been disclosed; 3)
suppressing any physical evidence seized from defendant, or in the alternative, a hearing
to determine the admissibility of such evidence; 4) dismissing the action, pursuant to
CPL §§ 170.30(1)(g) and 170.40, in the interest of justice; 5) directing the
People to provide defendant with a complete record of his prior criminal arrest,
convictions, and dispositions and a complete list of any vicious and/or immoral acts
allegedly attributed to defendant which may be used by the People for impeachment
purposes; 6) directing the People to provide defendant with any and all Brady material;
7) directing discovery of those items requested in his Demand to Produce; 8) directing
discovery of a Bill of Particulars as was requested in his Request for a Bill of Particulars;
and 9) granting defendant the right to make additional pretrial motions and the right to
amend and/or supplement this motion if made necessary or appropriate by the People's
future disclosure.
The complaint alleges that on February 1, 2015 at approximately 5:30 a.m.,
defendant was observed by the deponent, Police Officer Geidy Vincente, operating a
motor vehicle, without its headlights illuminated when it was dark out, in front of 1829
Jerome Avenue in Bronx County. The motor vehicle defendant was operating swerved
out of its lane of traffic and almost struck Officer Vicente's motor vehicle. Officer
Vicente further observed defendant to have a strong odor of alcohol emanating from his
breath, to be unsteady on his feet, had slurred speech, and had bloodshot watery eyes. A
chemical test analysis of defendant's breath revealed a blood alcohol content of .11 of
one per centum by weight.
Motion to Dismiss in the Interest of Justice
Defendant asserts that he is 38 years of age and prior to this incident, he has had no
prior contact with the criminal justice system. Defendant asserts that he resides with and
provides for his parents and his children (aged 15 and 8). Although he is not a citizen of
the United States, he has been employed for the past three years as a school bus driver.
Defendant hopes to gain citizenship and raise his children in this country. Defendant
readily admits that the offense of driving while intoxicated is a serious offense; however,
he denies all of the allegations contained in the complaint. Moreover, defendant avers
that the IDTU videotape clearly shows that he was not intoxicated. Defendant also asserts
that no harm was caused by the offense. Instead, he was the only one harmed because he
had to spend a night in jail and miss several days of work in order to appear in Court. In
fact, he has not been able to work since the date of his arrest, February 1, 2015.
If he was to enter a plea of guilty or was convicted after a trial, defendant maintains
that he would lose his Commercial Driver's License ("CDL") and his driving privileges
would be suspended for at least 90 days. As a school bus driver, defendant argues that he
would be ineligible for a Restricted Use license pursuant to VTL art. 21-A. Defendant
contends that a loss of his CDL license would deprive him of the means to support his
family. Most importantly, defendant avers that a conviction would jeopardize his chances
of becoming a citizen. Due to the unique circumstances of this case and in light of the
harsh consequences he and his family would face, defendant argues that the instant case
lacks prosecutorial merit. Defendant also contends that he does not pose a threat to the
safety of the community. He maintains that he has always been an upstanding, tax
paying, and productive member of society.
In support, defendant submits a copy of the "Results of Court Ordered Alcohol and
Substance Abuse Screening and/or Assessment" form indicating that he does not meet
the criteria for alcohol or substance abuse disorder, the first page of his 2014 tax return, a
letter dated April 17, 2015 from Montauk Student Transport, LLC, indicating that
defendant was employed as a school bus driver from February 15, 2013 to February 3,
2015, and three letters from former co-workers and a neighbor touting defendant's good
character.
In opposition, the People argue that defendant has failed to demonstrate a compelling
factor, consideration, or circumstance which would warrant dismissal in the interest of
justice. The People note that although defendant concedes that a violation of VTL §
1192 is a serious offense, defendant fails to specifically address why this Court should
overlook this fact in this case. The People also assert that defendant has ignored the
serious societal ramifications of driving while intoxicated, to wit: the possibility of grave
bodily injury or death to innocent pedestrians and motorists. Moreover, the absence of
actual physical harm in the instant case does not diminish the potential harm that could
have occurred as a result of defendant's actions.
In spite of defendant's lack of criminal history or the negative effects that a
conviction would have on defendant's family life, the People assert that the First
Department has repeatedly held that evidence of a defendant's good character and lack of
criminal history, standing alone, does not justify dismissal in the furtherance of justice. In
fact, the People contend that a dismissal of the instance case will only send a message to
defendant that there are no consequences for violating the law.
Contrary to defendant's arguments, the People contend that there is ample evidence
in the instant case. Further, a dismissal herein would adversely affect the public's
confidence in the criminal justice system, which requires consistency in the application
of the law. Given [*2]defendant's occupation as a school
bus driver, entrusted with the responsibility of transporting individuals to and from a
given destination, dismissal would have a serious and negative effect on the safety of the
general public.
CPL § 170.40 provides that a Court may dismiss an accusatory instrument in
the interest of justice where there exists "some compelling factor, consideration or
circumstance clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of the defendant upon
such accusatory instrument or count would constitute or result in injustice." CPL §
170.40 lists 10 factors which the Court must consider when determining whether to grant
dismissal in the interest of justice [FN1]
. The court need not "engage in a point-by-point catechistic discussion of all ten statutory
factors; instead, the court is required to consider the factors individually and collectively
in making a value judgment that is based upon striking a sensitive balance between the
interests of the individual and those of the state." People v. Gragert, 1 Misc 3d 646, 648 (Crim Ct, NY
County 2003); see also, People v. Rickert, 58 NY.2d 122 (1988).
Where the defendant fails to meet his burden of demonstrating by the
preponderance of the evidence that a compelling factor exists to warrant dismissal in the
interest of justice, the Court may summarily deny the motion. People v. Schlessel,
104 AD2d 501 (2d Dept. 1984). "The power to dismiss on such ground is, as provided in
the statutory text, committed to the trial court's discretion; it should be exercised
sparingly and only in that rare and unusual case where it cries out for fundamental justice
beyond the confines of conventional considerations." People v. Harmon, 181
AD2d 34, 36 (1st Dept. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court finds that none of the enumerated factors provides a basis for dismissal
pursuant to CPL § 170.40.
The Seriousness and Circumstances of the Offense
There is no dispute that driving while intoxicated is a serious offense.
The Extent of the Harm Caused by the Offense
"[D]riving while intoxicated is not a victimless crime as the defendant would
urge. Rather, it is an offense against society as a whole." People v. Kelley, 141
AD2d 764, 765 (2d Dept. 1988). According to the Institute for Traffic Safety and
Management and Research, in 2010, 30% of all vehicle fatalities were alcohol-related.
The potential harm to the safety of the public at large cannot be overstated.
In the case at bar, defendant's motor vehicle swerved out of its lane of traffic
and almost struck Officer Vicente's motor vehicle. But for sheer luck, no actual harm was
sustained by the officer or any other pedestrian and/or motorist.
The Evidence of Guilt
The complaint alleges that defendant was observed by the arresting officer
operating his motor vehicle without its headlights illuminated when it was dark out,
swerving out of its lane of traffic, and nearly striking the officer's motor vehicle. Officer
Vicente also asserts that he observed defendant exhibiting the classic signs of
intoxication and defendant had a blood alcohol level of .11. In contrast, defendant
unequivocally denies all of the allegations contained in the complaint. The circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offenses charged are in dispute and must be resolved
at trial.
The History, Character and Condition of Defendant
Defendant essentially asks to receive special treatment from this Court
because a conviction would have a deleterious effect on his ability to support his family
and it would hinder his chances of attaining citizenship. While defendant's dedication to
his family and his lack of criminal history are commendable, these factors are insufficient
to justify a dismissal in furtherance of justice. Kelley, 141 AD2d; People v.
Andrew, 78 AD2d 683 (2d Dept. 1980). Defendant's good character and lack of a
criminal record "does not immunize him from the normal processes of the criminal law."
People v. Varela, 106 AD2d 339, 340 (1st Dept. 1984). Also, several courts have
held that the fact that a defendant would face adverse immigration consequences if
convicted does not, standing alone, justify dismissal in the interest of justice. See,
People v. Reyes, 174 AD2d 87 (1st Dept. 1992); People v. Ramirez, 31 Misc 3d
1228(A) (Sup Ct, Bronx County 2011); People v. Doe, 159 Misc 2d 799
(Sup Ct, NY County 1993).
Any Exceptionally Serious Misconduct of Law Enforcement Personnel
Defendant concedes that there was no serious misconduct on the part of law
enforcement personnel herein.
The Purpose and Effect upon Defendant a Sentence Authorized for the
Offense
A dismissal herein would only serve to demonstrate to defendant that he is
deserving of special treatment in the eyes of the law.
The Impact of Dismissal on the Safety or Welfare of the Community
"Persons operating automobiles should be in full possession of their
faculties. An intoxicated person, who operates an automobile on a highway, is a menace
to the public." People v. Ritsky, 224 A.D. 425, 426 (2d Dept. 1928). Again, the
potential for harm to the safety of the public cannot be overstated.
The safety of the public is of paramount importance, especially where, as
here, defendant was employed as a school bus driver at the time of the offense. The
dangers that the school children would face if defendant imbibed alcoholic beverages
during his work shift are obvious and cannot be overlooked.
The Impact of Dismissal on the Confidence of the Public of the Criminal
Justice System
In 1789, George Washington wrote, "The due administration of justice is the
firmest pillar of good government." The criminal laws of this State must be applied
even-handedly to all citizens regardless of who they are as individuals. Dismissal of the
instant case would only [*3]undermine the public's
confidence in the criminal justice system.
This Court is not unsympathetic to defendant's concerns regarding the
possible consequences he will face should the charges not be dismissed. However, after
considering the enumerated factors set forth in CPL § 170.40, it cannot be said that
this case "cries out for fundamental justice beyond the confines of conventional
considerations." Harmon, supra. Accordingly, defendant's motion to
dismiss the instant action in the interest of justice is denied. Motion to Suppress Evidence
Defendant moves pursuant to CPL § 710.20(1) to suppress all physical evidence
and observations of the police obtained as a result of his unlawful arrest. Specifically,
defendant moves to suppress all physical evidence, statements, identification evidence,
and Breathalyzer results. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of any information relied
upon by the police when effectuating his arrest. Defendant denies the factual allegations
set forth in the complaint and denies engaging in any unlawful or criminal behavior prior
to his warrantless seizure and arrest. Therefore, defendant argues that the police lacked
probable cause to stop and seize him. Consequently, defendant avers that all evidence
obtained by the police must be suppressed. In the alternative, defendant requests a
Mapp/Dunaway hearing.
The People oppose defendant's motion to suppress as he has failed to allege
sworn allegations of fact in support as required under CPL § 710.60. The People
assert that defendant merely denies the allegations contained in the accusatory instrument
and posits in a wholly conclusory fashion that the police lacked probable cause.
Notwithstanding defendant's deficient showing, the People maintain that the police had
ample probable cause based upon the personal observations of the arresting officer.
A motion to suppress evidence "must state the ground or grounds of the
motion and must contain sworn allegations of fact." CPL § 710.60(1). A motion to
suppress must be summarily granted where the defendant alleges a legal ground
warranting suppression and the People concede the truth of the factual allegations. CPL
§ 710.60(2)(a). A Court may summarily deny a motion to suppress if the defendant
fails to allege a proper legal basis for suppression or if the "sworn allegations of fact do
not as a matter of law support the ground alleged." CPL § 710.60(3)(b). "[T]he
sufficiency of [the] defendant's factual allegations should be evaluated by (1) the face of
the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and (3) [the]
defendant's access to information." People v. Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 426
(1993). However, even if the defendant's factual allegations are deficient, summarily
denying a motion to suppress is disfavored. In Mendoza, supra, the Court
of Appeals explained:
The CPL does not mandate summary denial of defendant's motion even if
the factual allegations are deficient .If the Court orders a Huntley or Wade
hearing, and defendant's Mapp motion is grounded in the same facts involving
the same police witnesses, the court may deem it appropriate in the exercise of discretion
to consider the Mapp motion despite a perceived pleading deficiency. Indeed,
considerations of judicial economy militate in favor of this procedure; an appellate court
might conclude that summary denial of the Mapp motion as improper, requiring
the parties and witnesses to reassemble for a new hearing, often months or years
later.
This Court finds that defendant's moving papers are "minimally sufficient"
to warrant a hearing on the issue of suppression. People v. Harris, 160 AD2d 515,
515 (1st Dept. 1990). A stop of a [*4]motor vehicle
without probable cause constitutes a legal basis for the suppression of physical evidence.
Here, defendant was arrested based upon the purported personal observations of
criminality by the arresting officer. Defendant's denial of any wrongdoing challenges the
facts relied upon by the arresting officer to establish probable cause. "When the validity
of a warrantless arrest is challenged, the presumption of probable cause disappears and
the People bear the burden of coming forward with evidence showing that it was
supported by probable cause." People v. Chaney, 253 AD2d 562, 564 (3d Dept.
1998). Where, as here, material facts are in issue, a hearing must be held in order for the
Court to determine whether evidence was obtained lawfully [FN2]
. People v. Burton, 6 NY3d
584 (2006). A hearing shall be held to determine the propriety of defendant's
warrantless arrest and whether, in light of all the circumstances, probable cause existed
for it. Therefore, defendant's motion for a Mapp/Dunaway hearing is granted.
Motion to Suppress Statements
/i>
Defendant asserts that he was duly served with statement notice pursuant
to CPL § 710.30(1)(a). The statement notice indicates that defendant allegedly
stated the following to Officer Vincente: 1) "I'm coming from a party." and 2) "I drank
one beer early. I'm coming from my girlfriend's house."
Defendant argues that any and all properly noticed statements allegedly
made by and/or elicited from him should be suppressed because 1) they were obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights; 2) defendant was not properly informed of his rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); 3) he made the statements
without knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to remain silent; and 4) he made
the statements involuntarily.
The People assert that they should be permitted to use any of defendant's
statements should he choose to testify. However, should a Huntley hearing be ordered,
the People request that the scope of the hearing be limited to determine whether
defendant's statement was made voluntarily.
In a motion to suppress a statement, all that is required to warrant a Huntley
hearing is the mere claim that the defendant's statement was involuntary. People v.
Weaver, 49 NY2d 1012 (1980); People v. Bingham, 144 AD2d 682 (2d
Dept. 1988); Matter of Brian E., 206 AD2d 665 (3d Dept. 1994). Therefore,
defendant's motion for a Huntley hearing is granted.Motion to Preclude Statement Evidence
/i>
Defendant's motion to preclude the introduction of unnoticed statements is
denied, with leave granted for defendant to renew this branch of the motion upon
learning that the People intend to introduce any such evidence at trial.Sandoval/Molineaux/Ventimiglia
/i>
Defendant moves for an order precluding the People from introducing at trial
evidence of his prior criminal convictions, any underlying bad acts, and all prior
uncharged criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct. The People consent to disclosure of
defendant's prior charged and uncharged criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct which
they intend to use at trial for [*5]impeachment purposes.
Defendant's motion for a Sandoval/Molineaux/Ventimiglia hearing is respectfully
referred to the trial judge. Discovery
/i>
The People are reminded of their continuing obligation to supply all Brady
material. The People have already responded to defendant's request for a bill of
particulars and demand to produce. Therefore, defendant's motion to preclude the
offering of evidence for failure to respond to his request for a bill of particulars and
demand to produce is denied as moot. Future
Motions
/i>
Defendant's reservation of right to file further motions is unauthorized pursuant to
CPL § 255.20(3). Any future motions shall be summarily denied absent a showing
of good cause.
Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint in the furtherance
of justice is denied. Defendant's motion for a Map/Dunaway hearing is granted.
Defendant's motion for a Huntley hearing is granted. Defendant's motion to preclude
evidence of unnoticed statements is denied, with leave granted for defendant to renew
this branch of the motion upon learning that the People intend to introduce any such
evidence at trial. The People are reminded of their continuing obligation to supply all
Brady material. Defendant's motion to preclude the offering of evidence for failure to
respond to his request for a bill of particulars and demand to produce is denied as moot.
Defendant's motion for a Sandoval/Molineaux/Ventimiglia hearing is respectfully
referred to the trial judge. Defendant's request to file additional motions is denied subject
to rights under CPL § 255.20(3) to move for further leave upon good cause shown.
This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.
Dated:June 4, 2015
Bronx, New York
_______________________________
Hon. Armando Montano
Footnotes
Footnote 1:These factors are: (a) the
seriousness and circumstances of the offense; (b) the extent of harm caused by the
offense; (c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial; (d) the
history, character and condition of the defendant; (e) any exceptionally serious
misconduct of law enforcement personnel in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of
the defendant; (f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence
authorized for the offense; (g) the impact of a dismissal on the safety and welfare of the
community; (h) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in the
criminal justice system; (i) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the
complainant or victim with respect to the motion; and (j) any other relevant fact
indicating that a judgment of conviction would serve no useful purpose.
Footnote 2:All evidence gathered by
way of an unlawful search and seizure is inadmissible. Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S.643 (1961).