[*1]
People v Ramos
2015 NY Slip Op 50923(U) [48 Misc 3d 1201(A)]
Decided on June 4, 2015
Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Bronx County
Montano, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on June 4, 2015
Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County


The People of the State of New York,

against

Destiny Ramos, Defendant.




2014BX018483



For The People:



Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx County by Gerard Donahue, Assistant District Attorney


Armando Montano, J.

The motion by the People for an order, pursuant to CPL §§ 200.20(2)(b), and 200.20(4), consolidating docket number 2014BX018483 and indictment number 2487/2014 for trial is denied without prejudice.

Docket No.: 2014BX018483


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By misdemeanor complaint filed under Docket No.: 2014BX018483, defendant Destiny Ramos is charged with Assault in the Third Degree (PL §120.00[1]), Menacing (PL §120.15), and Harassment in the Second Degree (PL § 240.26[1]).

The complaint, sworn to by Crystal Blanco, the complaining witness, alleges that on or about April 5, 2014 at approximately 3:00 a.m., at 810 East 152nd Street, Apt. 312 in Bronx County, defendant Destiny Ramos grabbed her by the hair, scratched her about the body, and struck her about the face seven times with a closed fist. In addition, the aforementioned conduct caused Ms. Blanco to experience substantial pain, annoyance, alarm, and fear for her public safety.

Indictment No.: 2487/2014


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According to the People, during the same incident as described in Docket No.: 2014BX018483, defendant Anthony Smith stuck Crystal Blanco with a chair and sprayed household cleaner in her face causing her to experience substantial pain.

The People assert that although based upon different criminal transactions, these offenses are of such a nature that either proof of the first offense would be material and admissible as evidence in chief upon a trial of the second or proof of the second would be material and admissible as evidence in chief upon trial of the first. The People further argue that these actions should be consolidated because: 1) consolidation serves judicial economy to try the defendants simultaneously; 2) it would be unduly burdensome on the People to conduct separate trials; and [*2]3) the evidence and witnesses to be presented at trial are similar as to each case.



This Court did not receive any papers in opposition from defendant Destiny Ramos.



"[I]n all cases, a strong public policy favors joinder, because it expedites the judicial process, reduces court congestion and avoids the necessity of recalling witnesses." People v. Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174, 38 (1989). The decision to grant consolidation is committed to the sound discretion of the Court. Although the Court is "afforded reasonable latitude in exercising discretion", the Court of Appeals cautioned that "compromise of a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial free of undue prejudice as the quid pro quo for the mere expeditious disposition of criminal cases will not be tolerated." People v. Lane, 56 NY2d 1, 8 (1982). "The test, which is fact specific, requires the court to foretell whether granting of consolidation will result in a situation that causes undue prejudice at trial. Id. at 7-8.



The People have erroneously moved pursuant to CPL § 200.20, which relates to the joinder of separate charges against a single defendant. The guidelines for determining whether two or more defendants can be joined for the purposes of trial are set forth in CPL § 200.40 (made applicable to informations pursuant to CPL § 100.45).



CPL § 200.40(2) provides in pertinent part:



When two or more defendants are charged in separate indictments with an offense or offenses but could have been so charged in a single indictment under subdivision one above, the court may, upon application of the people, order that such indictments be consolidated and the charges be heard in a single trial.

CPL § 200.40(1) provides that "[t]wo or more defendants may be jointly charged in a single indictment" in the following instances: "all such defendants are jointly charged with every offense alleged therein", "all of the offenses charged are based upon a common scheme or plan", or "all of the offenses charged are based upon the same criminal transaction as that term is defined in subdivision two of section 40.10." The term "criminal transaction" is defined as:



conduct which establishes at least one offense, and which is comprised of two or more or a group of acts either (a) so closely related and connected in point of time and circumstance of commission as to constitute a single criminal incident, or (b) so closely related in criminal purpose or objective as to constitute elements or integral parts of a single criminal venture. CPL § 40.10(2).



Here, the People's motion is supported solely by a two-page affirmation from Assistant District Attorney Gerard Donahue comprised wholly of conclusory assertions and arguments. Notably, the People have failed to submit a copy of the indictment or the grand jury testimony of Crystal Blanco, the complaining witness, in defendant Anthony Smith's case. In his affirmation in support, ADA Donahue writes that "this affidavit is made upon information and belief ." An attorney's affirmation that is not based on personal knowledge has no probative value. Warrington v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 35 AD3d 455 (2d Dept. 2006); Israelson v. Sidney Rubin, 20 AD2d 668 (2d Dept. 1964). Consequently, the People have provided no proof to establish any of the factual allegations or charges pertaining to defendant Anthony Smith's case. Moreover, the misdemeanor complaint charging defendant Destiny Ramos does not allege that she was acting in concert with defendant Anthony Smith. In fact, the misdemeanor complaint [*3]makes no mention of Anthony Smith at all. In short, there is nothing to connect defendants Destiny Ramos and Anthony Smith for the purposes of a joint trial. Based upon the papers submitted, this Court cannot determine whether the two defendants are joinable under CPL § 200.40(1).



In addition, the People have failed to submit an affidavit of service indicating that the instant motion was served on defendant Anthony Smith [FN1] . CPLR 2103(e) requires a movant to serve all motion papers on every party who has appeared. In a motion to consolidate, where a defendant's right to a fair trial is at stake, due process and fundamental fairness require the People to serve all defendants who will be affected by joinder. This Court cannot grant the relief requested herein without defendant Anthony Smith having an opportunity to be heard.



Accordingly, the People's motion for an order, pursuant to CPL §§ 200.20(2) and 200.20(4), consolidating docket number 2014BX018483 and indictment number 2487/2014 for trial is denied without prejudice.



This constitutes the decision of this Court.



Dated:June 4, 2015

Bronx, New York

_______________________________



Hon. Armando Montano

Footnotes


Footnote 1:Although there is no affidavit of service related to defendant Destiny Ramos, it appears from a review of the action sheet that the People served the instant motion upon defendant Destiny Ramos in Court.