| People v Smith |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 50932(U) [48 Misc 3d 1201(A)] |
| Decided on June 10, 2015 |
| Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Bronx County |
| Rosado, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
The People of
the State of New York, Plaintiff,
against Anthony Smith, Defendant. |
Defendant is charged with Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree (Penal Law § 220.03) and Promoting Prison Contraband in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 205.20 [2]). By Notice of Motion and Affirmation dated March 14, 2015 (served and filed on April 20, 2015), Defendant moves for the dismissal of all charges on the ground that the accusatory instrument is facially insufficient and for other relief. By Affirmation in Opposition dated June 3, 2015, the People oppose dismissal, arguing that the accusatory instrument is facially sufficient. In rendering a decision, this ourt reviewed Defendant's Affirmation dated March 14, 2015, People's Affirmation in Opposition dated June 3, 2015, the court file, and relevant statutes and case law.
The information alleges, in pertinent part, that on or about August 12, 2014, at approximately 8:30 PM, at the Anna M. Kross Center, the following occurred:
The Court of Appeals has stated that CPL § 100.40 (1) places "the burden on the People to make out their prima facie case for the offense charged in the text of the information" (People v Jones, 9 NY3d 259, 261 [2007]). It should be noted that the prima facie case requirement is not the same as the burden required at trial of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, "nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at the trial" (People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 230 [2009]). Rather, what is required is that the factual allegations in the information "give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense" (Id. at 230 [internal citations and quotations omitted]). Ultimately, the information "should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]).
The accusatory instrument establishes that Defendant possessed a controlled substance. Deponent alleges that Informant recovered two orange strips from Defendant. Based on Informant's training and experience, she believed the strips were Suboxone. Suboxone is a pharmaceutical drug that contains Buprenorphine and Naloxone. Buprenorphine, in any quantity, is classified as a schedule III controlled substance (Public Health Law § 3306). An attached laboratory report confirms the presence of Buprenorphine on one of the strips recovered from Defendant. Possess is defined as "physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property" (Penal Law § 10.00 [8]). Defendant actually possessed a controlled substance because he was wearing the identification card on the inside of which the Buprenorphine strip was found.
Defendant argues that Informant's training and experience in recognizing controlled substances may not be the sole basis for showing that the orange strips contained Suboxone (Affirmation at p. 5). The People have filed a supporting laboratory report corroborating the presence of Buprenorphine on one of the orange strips. The identification of Buprenorphine is grounded not only in Informant's training and knowledge, but also a verified, controlled substance analysis report. Thus, Defendant's argument is without merit.
An essential element of this offense is a defendant's knowledge concerning the nature of the possessed substance (People v Reisman, 29 NY2d 278, 285 [1971]). Knowledge of a substance's nature may be inferred by the possession of said substance on one's person (Id.; See also People v Camacho, 47 AD2d 527, 527 [2d Dept 1975]). Here, the orange strip containing Buprenorphine was located on the inside of Defendant's identification card. At the time of discovery, Defendant was wearing his identification card. Defendant's physical possession of the strip is enough to support an inference that he knew the orange strip contained Buprenorphine. It is particularly informative that Defendant kept the orange strips on the inside of his identification card, out of plain view. It is a reasonable inference that Defendant did so because he knew that one of the strips contained a controlled substance, and he wanted to conceal it. Additionally, Defendant unlawfully possessed a controlled substance because his possession of the Buprenorphine strip constituted a violation of Promoting Prison Contraband in the Second Degree, as discussed below.
The accusatory instrument and its supporting documents establish that Defendant knowingly possessed contraband. According to Informant, the New York City Department of Correction issues an Inmate Rule Book to all inmates. She further alleges that the Rule Book contains a provision prohibiting inmates from possessing "any amount of heroin, cocaine, LSD, marijuana, pills, or any controlled substance" (Emphasis added) (Complaint at p. 1). Defendant [*4]received and signed a copy of the Inmate Rule Book. The strip, containing Buprenorphine, was discovered on the inside of Defendant's identification card. As previously discussed, Defendant's physical possession supports the inference that he knew the nature of the contraband as well.
Defendant's request for a Mapp/Dunaway hearing is granted.
Defendant's request for a Sandoval/Ventimiglia hearing is referred to the trial judge.
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Mary V. Rosado, J.C.C.