| People v Doe |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 50945(U) [48 Misc 3d 1203(A)] |
| Decided on June 24, 2015 |
| Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Bronx County |
| Rodriguez-Morick, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
The People of
the State of New York
against Jane Doe, Defendant. |
Seventeen-year-old defendant Jane Doe ("Defendant") stands charged with assault and arson, and related charges, based on allegations that, during a verbal altercation with her biological mother ("Complainant" or "Mother"), she struck Complainant in the head, barricaded herself in a room, and tried to light a mattress on fire.
On January 22, 2015, the court held a hearing (the "Clayton Hearing") on Defendant's motion to dismiss in the interest of justice, dated September 25, 2014, filed pursuant to CPL 170.30 (1) (g), CPL 170.40, and People v Clayton, 41 AD2d 204 (2d Dept 1973).
Maria Kaidas, a social worker in the Juvenile Rights Practice of The Legal Aid Society, was the sole defense witness at the Clayton Hearing ("Hr'g Tr"). Her credible testimony was not controverted by the People.
Based on her testimony at the Clayton Hearing, all Clayton Hearing exhibits ("Clayton Ex"), defense counsel's motion [i.e., Notice of Motion, dated September 25, 2014; and the affirmation of Suzanne McElwreath, Esq., dated September 24, 2014 ("McElwreath Aff")]; the People's opposition papers, dated October 14, 2014 ("Aff in Opp'n"); the information, dated February 23, 2014; and court records, this court finds the following facts:
On February 22, 2014, during an argument between Defendant and Complainant, Defendant struck Complainant in the head with a television remote control (information 2). She then ran to and barricaded herself in her bedroom and attempted to light a mattress on fire (the "Incident") (id.). Complainant left her apartment, called 911, and waited for the police to arrive (Aff in Opp'n 5). Responding to the scene, police officers observed white smoke emanating from beneath the barricaded bedroom door. When the officers gained entry to Defendant's room, they discovered a smoldering mattress.[FN1] Defendant stated, in relevant part, the following: "I didn't hit her. I threw the remote. My mom . . . just came in screaming at me. I was upset at my mom so I lit the bed on fire. I took all the pills" (id.). There were about five people in the apartment at that time (information 2). The apartment is found inside of a multi-level apartment building (see Clayton Ex 1).
Defendant was arrested on the instant charges and immediately admitted to the Psychiatric Emergency Room at St. Barnabas Hospital on account of the potential overdose (Hr'g Tr 23:11—15).
The overdose, it turns out, was one in a series of several self-injurious acts following Defendant's 2012 disclosure that her Mother's boyfriend, Luis Gallardo, had sexually abused her for several years commencing in 2007, when Defendant was 10 years old (Clayton Ex D, E; Hr'g Tr 8:13—9:8).[FN2]
This disclosure precipitated the filing of a family court petition (Clayton Ex D) and separate criminal charges against Gallardo, alleging that he had sexually abused Defendant. The Bronx Family Court proceedings resulted in a finding of abuse (Hr'g Tr 11:5), and the criminal case resulted in Gallardo's guilty plea (Clayton Ex E at 5:2—14). Gallardo was deported as a result of the plea (id. at 3:3—5; 7:2—6; Hr'g Tr 11:7). Defendant was ultimately placed in foster care (Hr'g Tr 28:21—31:9).
In December 2012—during the pendency of the family and criminal court cases commenced against Gallardo—Defendant was admitted to an outpatient mental health clinic, The Vida Guidance Center ("Vida"),[FN3] where she was diagnosed with "Major Depression, Recurrent, severe, [] and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder" (Clayton Ex B).
In November 2013, Defendant began counseling services with Ms. Kaidas (Hr'g Tr 8:9—10). As a social worker in the Juvenile Rights Practice of the Legal Aid Society, Ms. Kaidas is responsible for interviewing, assessing, and counseling her child-clients. She also confers with adult caregivers and makes assessments and recommendations on behalf of her clients regarding appropriate services and interventions (id. at 7:18—25).
Ms. Kaidas testified that once Defendant revealed Gallardo's sexual abuse, Defendant's life changed as her relationship with her Mother deteriorated significantly. Defendant's Mother believed Defendant had fabricated the sexual abuse allegations (Clayton Ex C, addendum 1, ¶ 1 [c]). When her Mother appeared in court, it was in support of Gallardo. And Defendant was aware of this (Hr'g Tr 14:22—15:2).
Defendant sought mental health treatment, but her efforts were frustrated by her Mother's apparent denial of and refusal to accept what had happened.[FN4] Defendant's mental health records reflect that "conflicts with her mother including physical confrontations" were triggers for Defendant's "suicidal ideations, suicide attempts, and cutting." The mental health records establish the obvious:
Given her Mother's indifference to Defendant's condition, the Administration for Children's Services filed a petition ("Neglect Petition") against Complainant in family court alleging medical neglect. According to the Neglect Petition:
The Incident at issue here arose in the context of this turmoil.
Ms. Kaidas visited Defendant in the hospital and observed that Defendant looked "so depressed. Her hand was handcuffed to the bed, her foot was like cuffed to the bed . . . she hadn't showered in four days" (Hr'g Tr 24:8—20). Hospital personnel were unable to provide Defendant with her prescription medication because they needed her Mother's signature and could not reach her (id.).
Complainant's parental rights were ultimately terminated and Defendant was placed, on September 24, 2014, in a therapeutic foster home, where she receives monthly home visits and meets with a socio-therapist at the home on a weekly basis (id. at 28:21—29:12). Since then, Defendant has not engaged in self-injurious or suicidal behavior (id. at 31:24—32:5).
In fact, despite the odds against her, Defendant "has made great strides" (Clayton Ex A). Defendant has continued going to school, passed her classes, taken the SATs, and applied to several colleges, even interviewing at Bard College (id.; Hr'g Tr 32:10—15).
Complainant is no longer cooperating with the prosecution (Aff in Opp'n 10).
Where a Defendant establishes "some compelling factor, consideration, or circumstance clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of a defendant upon [an] accusatory instrument or count would constitute or result in injustice" (CPL 170.40 [1]), the court is empowered to dismiss the accusatory instrument, in its discretion (see id.; Clayton, 41 AD2d at 207).
In determining whether such compelling circumstances exist, the court is required to assess certain statutory factors.[FN5] Because "the statute does not compel catechistic on-the-record discussion" [*2]of the ten statutorily enumerated factors (see People v Rickert, 58 NY2d 122, 128 [1983]), the court addresses only the salient ones below.
Arson and assault are serious charges. As the People observe, "[w]hile no greater damage than burning of the mattress occurred, the potential for greater damage cannot be ignored" (Aff in Opp'n 6).
Concerning the arson, based on a photo of the mattress depicted in Clayton Ex 4, only a small portion of the mattress was burned.
As to the remaining charges, Defendant struck Complainant with a remote control, which resulted in bruising, swelling, and pain to Complainant's head. As the People acknowledge, these injuries "were minimal and did not require medical treatment" (Aff in Opp'n 6). The court finds that the harm actually caused was minor.
Given Complainant's refusal to cooperate with the prosecution, the People will not be able to meet their burden of proof at trial on any of the charges (see People v Prunty, 101 Misc 2d 163, 167 [Crim Ct, Queens County 1979] ["(I)t is the evidence available to the People that is contemplated by this factor."]).
Here, by dismissal, "the public interests are as fully protected as [Defendant's] individual interests . . . for justice and mercy" (see Clayton, 41 AD2d at 206). On the other hand, a denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss would erode the public's confidence in the criminal justice system.