[*1]
United Capital Source, LLC v Benisvy
2015 NY Slip Op 50947(U) [48 Misc 3d 1203(A)]
Decided on June 24, 2015
Supreme Court, Nassau County
Marber, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on June 24, 2015
Supreme Court, Nassau County


United Capital Source, LLC, Plaintiff,

against

Bryan Benisvy, Defendant.




602122/15



Moritt Hock & Hamroff LLP



Attorneys for Plaintiff



400 Garden City Plaza, Suite 202



Garden City, New York 11530



(516) 873-2000



Paykin, Richland & Falkowski, P.C.



Attorneys for Defendant



350 5th Avenue, 59th Floor



New York, New York 10118



(212) 561-5599


Randy Sue Marber, J.

Upon the foregoing papers, the Plaintiff's motion, brought by Order to Show Cause, seeking an Order enjoining the Defendant from: (1) entering into the employ of or rendering any services to any person, firm or corporation that is a customer, affiliate or referral partner of Plaintiff, [*2]or is in the business in competition with Plaintiff (including but not limited to, TransSwipe, Blackstone Capital and/or any of their affiliated entities), nor engage in such business on his own account as an individual partner, shareholder, director, officer, principal, agent, consultant, or in any other relationship or capacity whatsoever, at any location within fifty (50) miles of Plaintiff's principal office at 535 8th Avenue, 5th Floor, New York, New York 10018 for a period of 12 months; (2) soliciting an customers or affiliates of Plaintiff (including referral partners), to do business with him, or any other person or entity, in competition with the type of service he performed for Plaintiff for a period of 24 months; (3) disclosing or otherwise using Plaintiff's confidential information; and (4) retaining any of Plaintiff's property, including, but not limited to, its confidential information, currently in his possession, custody or control, is determined as hereinafter provided.



In support of its Order to Show Cause, the Plaintiff, United Capital Source, LLC (the "Plaintiff" or "United Capital"), submits the Affidavit of Jared Weitz, founder and Chief Executive Office of United Capital. In his Affidavit, Mr Weitz alleges that in 2011 he founded United Capital, which provides short-term funding to merchants. Mr. Weitz states that United Capital's business model is based on its ability to identify leads, which it does by implementing a digital marketing strategy that includes a search engine marketing strategy and pay-per-click strategy ("Digital Marketing Strategy"). Mr. Weitz alleges that United Capital's Digital Marketing Strategy is confidential, proprietary and a trade secret of the company. Mr. Weitz states that United Capital's employees are provided with confidential information including the Digital Marketing Strategy, methods of obtaining clients, credit and financial data of its customers and the underwriting guidelines of its outside lending sources. He states that his employees are also provided confidential information about its outside lenders, including key contacts at the lenders, their proprietary underwriting guidelines, their risk tolerance and the financial wherewithal a client must have for each type of funding option. Mr. Weitz alleges that such information is not publicly available and lenders only provide such information to established and reputable companies that have an extensive book of business. Mr. Weitz further states that approximately eighty (80%) percent of United Capital's business are long-term, repeat clients, and as such, fostering such relationships is a critical component of the business.



As to the allegations against the Defendant, Mr. Weitz alleges that in or about August 2014, Christopher Fiumara, the CEO of TransSwipe, told him that the Defendant was looking for a job in the business funding industry and recommended him as a good fit for United Capital. He states that TransSwipe is engaged in bank card and credit card processing services and devoted a small portion of its business to business funding.



Mr. Weitz states that he hired the Defendant as an account executive in August of 2014. He states that in October 2014, United Capital required the Defendant to execute an employment agreement, dated October 20, 2014 (the "Employment Agreement"), which contained covenants prohibiting soliciting of United Capital's clients, customers and referral partners, and otherwise competing with United Capital. Specifically, Mr. Weitz states that Section 15 (b) of the Employment Agreement prohibited the Defendant from soliciting any of United Capital's customers or affiliates, or otherwise doing business with anyone in competition with United Capital, for a period of two years after his employment with United Capital. He states that Section 15 (c) of the Employment Agreement prohibited the Defendant from entering the employ or rendering services that are in competition with United Capital for a period of one year after his employment, at any [*3]location within fifty miles from United Capital's office in New York, New York. Section 15 (d) states that the Defendant acknowledged and understands the prohibitions contained in the agreement and that he was provided additional compensation in order to ensure compliance with the Employment Agreement.



Mr. Weitz states that upon his arrival at United Capital, the Defendant was eager to learn as much as he could about the funding industry and that he took the Defendant under his wing in training him and overseeing his growth in the company. He states that starting in 2015, the Defendants' attitude changed, he became withdrawn and disinterested and on one occasion was caught taking pictures of his computer screen. Mr. Weitz states that on February 24, 2015, the Defendant informed him that he was resigning from United Capital to pursue a solar panel business with his uncle. Mr. Weitz alleges that the Defendant's story about going into business with his uncle was a ruse because on the same day he resigned he emailed National Locum Tenens, a referral partner of United Capital, "to get started on the approval process as soon as possible." (See Email annexed to the Affidavit of Jared Weitz as Exhibit "B")



Mr. Weitz alleges that the Defendant embarked on a competing business by joining TransSwipe and contacting United Capital's existing clients, including Gateway Auto Plaza, LLC, Jimmy's Bar and Grill and Brill Service Enterprises, Inc. Mr. Weitz alleges that between March 3, 2015 and March 16, 2015, the Defendant attempted to obtain payment for those clients from Merchant's Capital Group ("MCG"), which is one of United Capital's funding sources. Mr. Weitz alleges that the Defendant tried to conceal his identity by misspelling his first name and using a false last initial in his email correspondence with MCG.



The Plaintiff's counsel states that on March 13, 2015, when United Capital learned that the Defendant was working for TransSwipe, he sent a letter advising the Defendant of his continuing obligations under the Employment Agreement. The Defendant did not respond to that letter. (See letter annexed to the Order to Show Cause as Exhibit "B") The Plaintiff's attorney also sent a letter, dated March 13, 2015, to Mr. Fiumara that the Defendant was contractually precluded from providing services to competitors and referral partners of United Capital, including TransSwipe and its affiliates. (See letter annexed to the Order to Show Cause as Exhibit "C") By letter, dated March 19, 2015, counsel for TransSwipe advised the Plaintiff's counsel that the Defendant is not currently nor has he ever been an employee of TransSwipe. (See letter annexed to the Order to Show Cause as Exhibit "D") Thereafter, counsel for the Plaintiff sent an email, dated March 23, 2015, and a letter, dated March 25, 2015, to counsel for TransSwipe informing him of the Defendant's obligations under the Employment Agreement and requesting assurances that the Defendant was not providing services to United Capital's clients or otherwise competing with United Capital. The Plaintiff's counsel did not receive a response to either.



The Plaintiff contends that it has met its burden for entitlement to a preliminary injunction. First, the Plaintiff argues that it has shown its likelihood of success on the merits for its claim for breach of the Employment Agreement and restrictive covenants therein. Specifically, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendant's role as an account executive gave him access to confidential information such as United Capital's business strategies, methods of obtaining clients, credit and financial data of customers and the underwriting guidelines of its outside lending sources. The Plaintiff contends that such information is confidential as it is not known to anyone outside of the company. The Plaintiff contends that because 80% of its business is from repeat customers, United [*4]Capital has a legitimate interest in protecting this information.



The Plaintiff further argues that enforcement of the restrictive covenant will not impose an undue hardship on the Defendant because he acknowledged in the Employment Agreement that he was receiving additional compensation as consideration for the restrictive covenant. Finally, the Plaintiff argues that the restrictive covenant will not injure the public. The Plaintiff argues that the funding business is not localized and a merchant can turn to the internet to find companies that fit their needs in any location.



Second, the Plaintiff contends that in the absence of a preliminary injunction it will suffer irreparable harm. Specifically, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendant agreed, in the Employment Agreement, that United Capital would be entitled to injunctive relief to prevent him from breaching the restrictive covenants. However, even without the waivers by the Defendant, the Plaintiff argues that it will suffer irreparable harm without immediate injunctive relief. The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant contacted its referral partner on the day of his resignation and continues to contact clients of United Capital. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant sought to get a "second position" loan for one of United Capital's existing clients, which adds increased risk to United Capital's ability to be repaid on the loan it made to that merchant.



Finally, the Plaintiff argues that the balance of equities weighs in its favor. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant explicitly agreed that United Capital would be able to seek injunctive relief if he violated any of the covenants contained in the Employment Agreement.



In opposition, the Defendant submits his Affidavit and the Affirmation of Michal Falkowski, Esq., which contain differences from the facts contained in the Plaintiff's moving papers. The Defendant alleges that in the Merchant Cash Advance ("MCA") industry, a UCC-1 Financing Statement is filed against each borrower to protect the lenders' interest. However, the UCC filing provides information to other MCA brokers, such as identity of loan candidates and information regarding the outstanding loan. Additionally, the Defendant contends that MCA brokers advertise on the internet and use the two most common methods, which are Search Engine Optimization and pay-per-click campaigns. The Defendant argues that there is nothing confidential about the internet advertising techniques used by the Plaintiff.



The Defendant asserts that in August 20, 2014 he was working at Jetty Bar & Grill, which is owned by Mr. Fiumara. The Defendant was hired by United Capital upon a recommendation by Mr. Fiumara, who had a relationship with Mr. Weitz. The Defendant was hired as an account executive, which was the lowest position at the company. The Defendant alleges that on October 20, 2014, approximately three months after he started working at United Capital, and without any consideration, the Plaintiff demanded that he sign the Employment Agreement, which he did. The Defendant alleges that he finished as one of the top earning account executives each month. He further alleges his success created jealousy and resentment among the other employees and that Mr. Weitz told him he was a valuable contributor and to just "play the politics." The Defendant alleges that the constant resentment and jealousy from others played a role in his departure from United Capital in February 2015. The Defendant states that he had an opportunity for an investment in a solar panel company with his uncle, but he decided it would be best not to go into business with his uncle. The Defendant alleges that he sought to pursue the merchant cash advance business on his own.



The Defendant alleges that prior to seeing the papers in this action, he had never heard [*5]of Gateway Auto Plaza and Brill Services Enterprises and he did not know they were former or current clients of United Capital. He alleges that he has never been an employee of TransSwipe, but TransSwipe did provide him with a temporary email address until he got his business off the ground. The Defendant alleges that he never sought to conceal his identity and the misspelling of his name in his email address was a mistake.



The Defendant further alleges that the restrictive covenant is unreasonable and unduly burdensome. He states that United Capital is attempting to use the 50 mile geographical limit as a punitive measure as it serves no legitimate purpose, because United Capital solicits most of its business through the internet. The Defendant contends that it has been extremely burdensome on him and that he cannot pay his rent or make ends meet.



In Reply, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendant willingly entered into the Employment Agreement, not under duress as the Defendant alleges. The Plaintiff asserts that in October 2014, United Capital was undergoing changes and making efforts to improve its internal structure and governance. The Plaintiff alleges that at that time it required all employees that wanted to work at the company to sign the Employment Agreement, that Mr. Weitz advised all employees to take their time to review the Employment Agreement before executing it. Further, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendant received an increase in base salary from $24,000 to $40,000 and an increase in commission rate from 10% to 15% by agreeing to sign the Employment Agreement.



The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant's assertion that he left United Capital due to an untenable working environment is disingenuous and his story about leaving to work for his uncle is specious. The Plaintiff further contends that the Defendant breached his Employment Agreement by soliciting United Capital's customers including Jimmy's, which was an account that he secured funding for while working at United Capital.



The Plaintiff argues that the restrictive covenants are valid and enforceable. The Plaintiff argues that the restriction that the Defendant cannot work for a competitor for one year is a necessary restriction to protect its customers' confidential loan information, including funding arrangements, loan balances and expiration dates. The Plaintiff contends that because United Capital does business all over the United States, a 50 mile radius restriction is justified.



The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant's counsel, Mr. Falkowski's Affirmation is not based on personal knowledge, and as such, should be stricken. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant's Affidavit concerning his access to information is false in that he had full access to United Capital's client's social security numbers, tax returns, bank records and credit reports. Additionally, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendant was privy to United Capital's confidential Digital Marketing Strategy.



Finally, the Plaintiff argues that the balance of equities favors a preliminary injunction, because in the Employment Agreement the Defendant acknowledged his understanding of the restrictive covenants, he acknowledged the additional compensation for signing the Employment Agreement, he agreed to the Plaintiff's right to injunctive relief if he violated the restrictive covenants and he was referred by Mr. Fiumara who was a competing merchant. Also, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendant's claim of financial hardship is not credible because the restrictive covenant does not bar the Defendant from competing in the merchant funding industry at all, only within 50 miles from United Capital's New York City office. The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant has other sources of income from his modeling career, as owner of BeniFitness, his [*6]personal training business and as a bartender and waiter at several restaurants.



It is well settled that a Preliminary Injunction is a drastic remedy which will not be granted absent a showing by the movant of a clear right of entitlement thereto, which is established pursuant to the law and upon the undisputed facts as adduced in the record. (Abinanti v. Pascale, 41 AD3d 395 [2d Dept. 2007]; Peterson v. Corbin, 275 AD2d 35 [2000]) The party moving for a Preliminary Injunction must establish a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury in the event the injunctive relief is denied and that a balancing of the equities favors the granting of the injunction. (Aetna v. Capasso, 75 NY2d 860 [1990]; W.T. Grant Co., v. Sgroi, 52 NY2d 496 [1981]) Where the moving party has an adequate remedy at law by "which his or her rights can be protected and properly conserved", an injunction will not be granted. (67A NY Jur 2d, Injunctions §24; Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 NY2d 120 [1965] at 132)



Here, the Plaintiff has established its likelihood of success on the merits of its claims for breach of the Employment Agreement and restrictive covenants. It is undisputed that the Defendant executed the Employment Agreement and while the Defendant argues that he was forced to sign it under duress, he submits nothing to support that assertion. On the contrary, the Plaintiff submits evidence to support its assertion that all of United Capital's employees were asked to execute the Employment Agreement and they were compensated for doing so.



As to whether the restrictive covenants contained in the Employment Agreement are enforceable, an employee agreement not to compete is considered reasonable if it: (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public. (BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 NY2d 382) Further, "a restrictive covenant will only be subject to specific enforcement to the extent that it is reasonable in time and area, necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests, not harmful to the general public and not unreasonably burdensome to the employee." (Id.) However, a restrictive covenant will only be enforced to the extent necessary to protect the employer from unfair competition which stems from the employee's use of trade secrets or confidential customer lists. (IVI Environmental, Inc. v. McGovern, 269 AD2d 497 [2nd Dept. 2000])



Here, although the Plaintiff has not established that its Digital Marketing Strategy is considered a trade secret, it has established that the Defendant has used confidential customer information to compete with the Plaintiff's business. The Plaintiff has shown that the one year restriction is for the purpose of preventing the Defendant from strategically targeting its clients with the knowledge and information he obtained from United Capital.



The Plaintiff has further shown that the restrictions imposed by the Employment Agreement do not impose an undue hardship on the Defendant, because he willingly entered into the Employment Agreement and he was duly compensated for doing so. Furthermore, the restrictions imposed by the Employment Agreement will not impose injury on the public. The Defendant did not set forth any legitimate argument to show that the restrictive covenants would impose undue hardship on him nor that it will injure the public.



Accordingly, the Plaintiff established its likelihood of success on the merits. As to the remaining elements necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction, the Plaintiff has shown that it will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not granted.



As to the issue of irreparable injury, as a general proposition, a loss "which is compensable by money damages, does not constitute irreparable harm." (EdCia Corporation v. [*7]McCormack, 44 AD3d 991 [2d Dept. 2007]) However, "[o]ne of the tests of irreparability is whether a litigant can obtain adequate compensation by invoking the legal damage remedy." (Polling Transportation Corporation v. A & P Tanker, Corp., 84A.D.2d 796 [2d Dept. 1981] at 797) Further, the legal remedy which is available "must be as complete, practicable and efficient as the equitable one." (Id.; see also Lesron v. Junior, Inc. v. Feinberg, 13 AD2d 90 [2d Dept. 1961)



Irreparable injury may be shown through a loss of customers and permanent loss of revenue and loss of referral business garnered from customers. (Bollengier v. Gulati, 233 AD2d 721, 722 [3rd Dept. 1996]) Loss of goodwill associated with a business, which is difficult to quantify, can constitute irreparable injury even if monetary damages, as well as injunctive relief, are requested. (Frank May Assoc. v. Boughton, 281 AD2d 673 [3rd Dept. 2001])



Here, the Plaintiff has shown that on the same day that the Defendant resigned he contacted United Capital's referral partner to see if it was available to provide funding to United Capital's existing clients. The Plaintiff showed that the Defendant continued to attempt to obtain funding for an existing client on the same day he received a cease and desist letter from the Plaintiff's attorney. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has shown that the Defendant's actions, in violation of the Employment Agreement, have interfered with and may continue to damage the Plaintiff's business. The Court finds that, based on the facts and evidence submitted by the Plaintiff, the injunctive relief herein requested is a more efficient remedy than that of monetary damages.



Finally, in balancing the equities, the court should consider various factors, including the interests of the general public, whether the plaintiff was guilty of unreasonable delay and whether the plaintiff has unclean hands. (Peconic Surgical Group, P.C. v. Cervone, 31 Misc 3d 1240(A) [Sup. Ct. Suff. Cty. 2011]) Here, granting a preliminary injunction, which would enjoin the Defendant from continuing to solicit the Plaintiff's customers and compete with the Plaintiff, will not affect the interests of the general public. Further, the Plaintiff acted promptly, in bringing this Order to Show Cause seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, upon discovering that the Defendant may be in violation of the Employment Agreement. Further, there is nothing to show that the Plaintiff has unclean hands. Finally, the balance of equities favors the Plaintiff because the Defendant entered into the Employment Agreement, for which he received compensation, and his continuing violation of the restrictive covenants contained therein impose a risk of future injury to the Plaintiff.



Accordingly, it is hereby



ORDERED, that the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause seeking an Order enjoining the Defendant from: (1) entering into the employ of or rendering any services to any person, firm or corporation that is a customer, affiliate or referral partner of Plaintiff, or is in the business in competition with Plaintiff (including but not limited to, TransSwipe, Blackstone Capital and/or any of their affiliated entities), nor engage in such business on his own account as an individual partner, shareholder, director, officer, principal, agent, consultant, or in any other relationship or capacity whatsoever, at any location within fifty (50) miles of Plaintiff's principal office at 535 8th Avenue, 5th Floor, New York, New York 10018 for a period of 12 months; (2) soliciting an customers or affiliates of Plaintiff (including referral partners), to do business with him, or any other person or entity, in competition with the type of service he performed for Plaintiff for a period of 24 months; (3) disclosing or otherwise using Plaintiff's confidential information; and (4) retaining any of Plaintiff's property, including, but not limited to, its confidential information, currently in his [*8]possession, custody or control is GRANTED; and it is further



ORDERED, that a Preliminary Conference (see 22 NYCRR 202.12) in this matter shall be held at the Preliminary Conference Part, located at the Nassau County Supreme Court on July 29, 2015, at 9:30 a.m. This directive, with respect to the date of the Conference, is subject to the right of the Clerk to fix an alternate date should scheduling require; and it is further



ORDERED, that the Plaintiff's counsel shall serve a copy of this Order upon the Defendant's counsel pursuant to CPLR § 2103 (b) 1, 2 or 3 within ten (10) days of the date of this Order. PROOF OF SERVICE MUST BE FILED WITH THE COURT.



This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.



All applications not specifically addressed herein are DENIED.



DATED:Mineola, New York



June 24, 2015



________________________________



Hon. Randy Sue Marber, J.S.C.