B. K.,
Plaintiff,
against
J. N., Defendant.
|
*****/13
Attorneys:
Harry Chiu, Esquire
136 Bay Street
Staten island, New York 10301
Attorney for Child
Benjamin Haber, Esq.
36 Richmond Terrace
Staten Island, New York 10301
Attny for Husband
Robert Hiatt, Esquire
1819 Richmond Road
Staten Island, New York 10306
Attny for Wife
Catherine M. DiDomenico, J.
The parties to this action for divorce were married on October 27, 2012 and only
lived together as spouses for a period of months. There is one child of this union, M. N.
(d.o.b. June **, 2012). By Summons with Verified Complaint dated April 10, 2013,
Plaintiff Wife, B. K. (hereinafter "Wife" or "Mother") commenced this action for divorce
against Defendant Husband, J. N. (hereinafter "Husband" or "Father"). Issue was joined
by the service of a Verified Answer with Counterclaims by Husband on or about July 30,
2013. On the parties' first day of trial, an inquest was conducted on the issue of the
grounds for divorce pursuant to a prior Order dated January 28, 2015 which resolved that
issue. Wife testified that the parties marriage had broken down irretrievably for a period
of six months, sufficient to satisfy Domestic Relations Law '170(7). (Tr. 1/28/15,
p.15).
In addition to this resolution of the issue of grounds, the parties agreed, by
Short Form Order dated April 16, 2014, to settle the issues of equitable distribution and
maintenance by mutual waiver. By Consolidation Order dated June 21, 2013, the parties
agreed to consolidate cross family offense and custody petitions that were filed in Family
Court. On the first day of trial, both parties withdrew their cross family offense petitions.
The temporary orders of protection that were entered on those dockets were vacated (Tr.
1/28/15, p. 93-94). At this trial, both parties argued that they presented as the more
suitable custodial parent for the subject child, and requested an award of child support in
the event that they were awarded custody. Wife's attorney also made a request for
attorney's fees incurred as a result of this action.
By consent Order dated October 3, 2013, Dr. Stephen Herman was
appointed as a neutral forensic evaluator to examine the issues of custody and visitation
as it pertained to the parties and the subject child. His report, dated March 22, 2014, was
admitted into evidence at trial without objection (AFC Ex. No.1). Dr. Herman testified at
trial on February 26, 2015. No party objected to his qualification as an expert in the field
of forensic psychology (Tr. 2/26/15, p. 26).The
Trial
/i>
This matter was tried on January 18, 2015, February 10, 2015, February
11, 2015, February 26, 2015, and February 27, 2015. Plaintiff Wife testified on her own
behalf and called (1) Margaret K. (maternal grandmother); (2) Sherry N. (paternal aunt);
and (3) S. Florich (subject child's service provider) as witnesses. During trial Wife did
not offer any documentary evidence in support of her claims other than a Statement Of
Net Worth.[FN1]
Defendant Husband testified on his own behalf and called (1) Dr. Stephen Herman
M.D. (forensic evaluator) and (2) Dr. S. Clemente M.D. (subject child's developmental
evaluator) as witnesses. Husband offered various documents into evidence (Def. Exs.
A-E). Judicial notice was taken of various documents (Jud No. 1-12). Based on the
young age of the child and her special needs, all counsel agreed that an in camera
examination would not be practicable or particularly useful to the Court in this case. (Tr.
1/28/15, p.13). Post trial written summations were received from all counsel.
Factual Findings
At trial, both parties attempted to show that they present as the better
custodial parent for the subject child M.N. In support of their claims, both parties
testified as to a litany of events that occurred during the course of their brief relationship
and throughout this litigation. Many of these incidents were not critical to this Court's
determination of custody. Rather than dignify each and every incident between the
parties, this Court discusses herein only those significant findings of fact that weighed
most heavily in this decision.
a. Plaintiff Wife
Plaintiff Wife was born in February of 1981. She is currently 34 years old. Wife
attended college and earned a Bachelor's Degree in Business Administration in 2005
from Maywood University located in Scranton, Pennsylvania. She filed for chapter 7
bankruptcy protection in 2007 and discharged about $35,000 of consumer debt
at that time.
In March of 2009, Wife began dating an individual named J. Sanchez who was
serving a seventeen years to life sentence in Woodbourne State Correctional facility after
being convicted of murder in the second degree. She testified that Sanchez "was a nice
guy who was incarcerated as a minor for a mistake". (Tr. 1/28/15, p. 27). She explained
that Sanchez had dropped out of high school and was making money as a street drug
dealer. Wife testified that Mr. Sanchez sold cocaine, heroin and other "regular" street
drugs (Tr. 1/28/15, p. 34). Sanchez had previously been shot five times by another drug
dealer. One night, Sanchez opened fire in a public area in Brooklyn and killed an
innocent bystander. Wife testified that Mr. Sanchez was attempting to shoot the rival
drug dealer who had shot him in the past. (Tr., 1/28/15, pp.32-33).
After two months of "romantic" letter writing and weekly prison visits, Wife
married Mr. Sanchez in a ceremony held at the prison in May of 2009. Wife later filed
for an uncontested divorce from Mr. Sanchez in or around December of 2011. The
divorce was finalized in January [*2]of 2012. When
asked why she filed for divorce from Mr. Sanchez, Wife testified that she made a "really
terrible mistake" and realized that she "should not be married to a murderer". (Tr.
1/28/15, p. 32; 36-37).
On November 21, 2009, while she was living in Pennsylvania with her parents, Wife
was arrested and charged with making terroristic threats, weapon possession, and
aggravated assault among other charges. Specifically, Wife claims that she was the
victim of a road rage incident in the parking lot of a department store. She claims that she
was confronted by the driver and passenger of the other vehicle involved for not stopping
at a stop sign. During this confrontation a physical altercation ensued. Wife claims that
during the altercation she pulled out a knife in self defense after being punched in the
face. When the other driver and passenger saw the knife, they backed away. Following
this incident, Wife was arrested, bail was set, and she was released two days later (Tr.
1/28/15, p. 54-55; Def. Ex. A). Almost a year later, on October 25, 2010, Wife pled
guilty to the making of terroristic threats and simple assault as defined by Pennsylvania
Law. Based on that plea, Wife was sentenced to three months of house arrest and nine
months probation (1/28/15, pp. 55-57). At the time she pled guilty, Wife understood that
the aggravated assault charge carried a potential sentence of seven years incarceration.
She further understood that if she violated the terms of her probation, she would face one
year in prison. (Tr.1/28/15, p. 58; 2/10/15 p. 72).
Following her period of house arrest, Wife relocated to New York and resided in
Riverdale from January to September 2011. While her divorce from Mr. Sanchez was
pending, Wife met Defendant Husband. Wife claims that she told Husband that she had
filed for bankruptcy, had a criminal history for which she was on probation, and was
married to a convicted murderer and was in the process of divorcing him when they met
(Tr. 1/28/15, p. 50, 58-59). While Husband admits that he was aware of much of Wife's
history, he testified that he was willing to give Wife a chance as "everyone makes
mistakes."
In or around October of 2011, when Wife's Riverdale lease ended, she
moved into Husband's home in Staten Island, New York. Shortly thereafter, Wife became
pregnant with the subject child. Husband was shocked, but happy at the news of a
pregnancy. The subject child was born on June 15, 2012. In or around August of 2012,
the parties moved into a private residence on Wardwell Avenue in Staten Island, New
York. Wife testified that their relationship immediately began to deteriorate as Husband
allegedly reminded her "where she came from" and how he "bettered her life" (Tr.,
1/28/15 p. 80). Husband credibly denied making these statements to Wife though he
admits that their relationship was not a happy one.
Wife claims that even though she was "extremely unhappy", she married
Husband on October 27, 2012 when M.N. was about four months old (Tr. 1/28/15 pp.
66-68). Despite going through an elaborate ceremony with Husband, Wife believed that
since the parties did not sign a marriage certificate, the "marriage" would be invalid.
Wife claims that she participated in the wedding ceremony not to "embarrass" Husband's
family who were paying for an elaborate reception which was held on the Dyker Beach
Golf Course in the presence of a clergyman and somewhere between 100 and 200 invited
guests (Tr. 1/28/15 pp. 81-86).
Husband admits that he knew Wife's intentions regarding the marriage
license on the day of their wedding, but that he proceeded with the ceremony and
reception anyway as he wanted to [*3]marry Wife. At
their reception the parties' jointly received over $32,000 in wedding cash gifts,
which they divided equally. Wife admits that Husband and his mother repeatedly asked
her to sign a marriage license but that she flatly refused. (Tr. 1/28/15 p. 87). Husband
credibly testified that he wanted to be married to Wife, and that he hoped she would
change her mind and would obtain the license after the fact. It is well settled law that the
failure to obtain a marriage certificate does not invalidate a marriage ceremony held
between parties as that marriage has been solemnized. See DRL '25; See also, Matter of Farraj, 72 AD3d
1082 (2d Dept. 2010); Persad v. Balram, 187 Misc 2d 711 (Sup. Ct. Queens.
Cty. 2001).
According to Wife, she has not worked since she found out in October 2011 that she
was pregnant with M.N. (Tr. 1/28/15 p. 65-66). Prior to her marriage she had briefly
worked for a temporary job placement agency. Wife testified that since she was not
working, Husband expected her to clean the house, take out the garbage, and basically be
"a slave". Wife does not claim that Husband prevented her from working at any time.
Wife has recently taken classes to become a professional beautician. She has formed a
company known as "Aesthetics and Ink, LLC" but is still in the process of securing the
necessary licenses for waxing and other beauty services (Tr. 2/10/15, p. 153-57). Wife
speculates that she could easily make about $50,000 a year from this business.
Wife claims that she currently receives monthly support from her parents and has no
personal responsibility for her expenses.
In or around October of 2012, Wife attended a settlement mediation
conference for a personal injury action she filed after being involved in a car accident in
March of 2009. This accident resulted in her being prescribed pain killers and receiving
spinal surgery. According to Wife the case settled for approximately $450,000,
with Wife receiving $162,900 in October or November of 2012. (Tr. 1/28/15,
pp. 60-62; 2/10/15, p. 36).
From December 17, 2012 to January 06, 2013, Wife admits she
communicated with her former Husband, Mr. Sanchez, approximately 59 times by
telephone, culminating in over thirty hours of conversation. (Tr. 1/28/15, p. 43). At his
request, She also assisted in getting various letters and other information he needed,
helped him prepare a resume, and assisted him in a job search. (Tr. 1/28/15, p. 42). When
asked at trial why she made these extensive efforts to secure Sanchez's release, Wife
testified that she "was not a vindictive person" and that Sanchez had "never did anything
to her." (Tr. 1/28/15 p. 43). Wife admits she did not tell Husband that she was in contact
with Mr. Sanchez nor did she inform Husband about the substantial efforts she was
making to secure Mr. Sanchez's release from prison. Wife initially claimed that she had
no contact with Sanchez to both the Administration of Children's Services and to the
Family Court, but then later admitted to her ongoing association with Mr. Sanchez when
presented with evidence of the numerous phone calls she had made to him.
b. Defendant Husband
Defendant Husband was born in October of 1979 and is presently 35 years old. Since
the summer of 2012, Husband has resided at the former marital home located at **
Wardwell Avenue in Staten Island, New York. That property is a detached private home
with four bedrooms and several bathrooms. Husband lives there with the subject child
during his parenting time. He co-owns this home with his mother.
Since 2003, Husband has been employed full time as manager of a window factory
business owned by his parents located in Brooklyn, New York. He works on Mondays
after he drops off the subject child, full days on Tuesdays and Wednesdays and half a day
on Thursday until he leaves to pick up M.N. (Tr. 2/10/15, pp. 10-12). He earns
approximately $84,000 per year. His schedule is flexible based on the needs of
the subject child. Husband also enjoys an extensive family support system including, his
parents, his two sisters, multiple cousins, aunts and uncles, all of who reside close to his
home. (Tr. 2/26/15, pp. 99-100).
While Husband admits that Wife informed him about her criminal history
and the fact that she was previously married to a convicted felon, he credibly testified
that Wife told him she had moved on from that "dark period" of her life. Moreover, Wife
assured Husband she had nothing to do with Mr. Sanchez since she was divorced from
him. Husband testified that in his interactions with Wife he saw a "different person" than
the person she was describing when she informed him of her past.
Despite Wife's assurances that her relationship with Mr. Sanchez was
concluded, Husband discovered Wife's ongoing communication with Mr. Sanchez when
he reviewed their joint cell phone bill and caught her having secret conversations in her
car. (Tr. 2/26/15, p. 130). In or around the Fall of 2013, Wife claims the marital
relationship deteriorated when she advised Husband she intended to move to the Bronx
with the subject child. (Tr. 1/28/15, pp. 89-92). Husband testified that, in fact, Wife
threatened to take the subject child not to the Bronx but to Florida. On December 28,
2013, Husband went to Family Court in an effort to prevent Wife from relocating the
subject child from her home in Staten Island. Wife was served with a Family Court
Petition for Custody and an Order prohibiting her from relocating the subject child
without Court approval.
On January 18, 2013, Wife filed a Family Offense Petition and a Custody
Petition in Family Court against Husband. She received a limited Temporary Order of
Protection in her favor. Husband was not excluded from the home. Notwithstanding
Husband's objection, in March of 2013, Wife moved her mother, father and their dog
into the marital home. Husband credibly testified that although he owned this home,
Wife and her mother treated him badly. "Every night it was a bombardment of words"
(Tr. 2/10/15, p 23). He went to his bedroom each night fearful he would be arrested" (Tr.
2/10/15, p 23). For example, Wife told him that the next time he called the child by a
nickname he had created for her, he would "spend the night at Rikers" (Tr. 2/10/15, p.
23). Wife "let" Husband see M.N. at set times after he returned from work but would
remove the child to her bedroom and lock the door behind them at night. Husband
testified that he could often hear M.N. crying but he had no access to her since Wife
locked him out. (Tr. 2/10/15, pp. 153-54, 199-200).
On April 10, 2013, Husband filed a Family Offense Petition in Family Court
against Wife on his behalf and on behalf of M.N. alleging, among other things, that Wife
was abusive to him in front of the child and that Wife was using the limited Order of
Protection against him to threaten him (See Family Court Petition O-00283/13). Husband
received a limited Temporary Order of Protection on his behalf only.
On April 14, 2013, Wife had Husband arrested. Husband testified as to the
circumstances surrounding his arrest. Husband had emailed Wife to tell her he wanted to
pick [*4]up M.N., and Wife agreed. When Husband
arrived, Wife instructed him to wait in the house while she got M.N. ready.
Unbeknownst to Husband, Wife was upstairs and had called the police claiming Husband
was in the home abusing her. As Husband waited, two police officers entered the home
and arrested him. Wife tried to mislead the police claiming a warrant was out for
Husband's arrest, but in fact, the paper she was waving was an old police report.
Husband was arrested and held in a cell at the precinct for approximately 26 hours.
Husband was released before arraignment without being charged. This unfortunate
encounter was Husband's first contact with the criminal justice system.
After his release from confinement, Husband went straight to his parent's
home. He did not return to the former marital residence until Wife moved out pursuant to
Court Order on November 1, 2013 (Tr. 1/28/15 p. 106). When he returned home, he
found that Wife had changed the locks, took his laptop, wiped out the hard drive on his
desktop computer, removed every file from the locked filing cabinet, removed every
piece of clothing belonging to him and the subject child and most of the personal
property in the home, including the light bulbs (Tr. 2/10/15, pp. 203-04).
From the time he was arrested on April 14 until April 24, Wife restricted
Husband's access to M.N.. On or about April 24, 2013, after much negotiation, Husband
was permitted to have his parents pick up M.N. so they could spend time with her at their
house. Upon obtaining the subject child, Husband refused to return her. Wife makes
much of the fact that she did not see M.N. again until May 24, 2013 when Wife secured a
Court Order of parental access (Tr. 1/28/15 pp. 103; Jud. No. 9). However, Wife failed to
testify that an intervening Family Court appearance took place on May 15th wherein
Wife's application for visitation was denied. Husband testified that at the time he
withheld the child there was no parenting order in place and he was afraid that if M.N.
went back to Mother, she would not be returned to him (Tr., 2/26/15, p. 149-50).
During the course of the Family Court proceedings, Husband alerted that
court to Wife's ongoing contact with Mr. Sanchez, and the danger Husband thought this
contact posed to the subject child. Family Court ordered an ACS investigation. The
parties stipulated to certain ACS reports being admitted into evidence at this trial (Def.
Exs. 2, 3). Wife admits lying to ACS when she was asked by the child protective
investigator whether she was in contact with Mr. Sanchez (Tr. 1/28/15 p. 44). She also
lied to this Court on the record when she was asked whether she was in subsequent
contact with Mr. Sanchez (Tr. 2/10/15, p. 53.) Mother admitted her involvement with
Sanchez only after Husband subpoenaed the phone records evidencing the same. Mother
claims she lied because her decision to be in contact with Sanchez "had nothing to do"
with M.N. notwithstanding the Court's and ACS' concerns regarding this relationship (Tr.
1/28/15 p. 44).
Husband testified that Wife is chronically late for the "drop off" aspect of the
visitation exchange currently being performed at the 1st precinct in lower Manhattan, but
that she is always on time to "pick up" the subject child. He further testified that Wife
and the maternal grandmother, Margaret K., have been abusive to him during the course
of this litigation. For example, on December 26, 2013, Wife did not show up for the
exchange of M.N. Eventually she notified Husband that M.N. was in the emergency
room. When Husband arrived at the hospital [*5]he found
that Wife had misled security personnel as to the parameters of her Order of Protection.
As a result, Husband was not permitted to see M.N., or speak to any of the professionals
treating her until after Wife had left. Rather, he was told to remain in the waiting
room.
Husband credibly testified that Wife engaged in a pattern of abusive, degrading and
harassing conduct toward him designed to intimidate him from seeking custody and to
otherwise portray him as an unfit parent. She was nasty and condescending when he
would email her regarding M.N. She would make degrading remarks about his ethnicity
including mockingly referring to him only by his Chinese birth name although she knew
he preferred to be called by his anglicized name.
In addition to the harassing conduct indicated above, Wife also made various
allegations against Husband, and his family, to a variety of regulatory and municipal
agencies for alleged offenses ranging from a claim that the curb outside the home was
not up to grade, to allegations of tax fraud. Indeed, in one such instance, Wife admits she
reported Husband and his family to the Department of Health claiming that they were
harboring illegal piranhas in their office when, in fact, the fish in question were kissing
fish (Tr. 2/10/15, p. 63). When asked why she would make such claims, Wife retorted "
If you don't do illegal things, you can't be reported". (Tr. 2/10/15, p. 63). In addition,
Husband testified that Wife and her parents are currently Plaintiffs in a civil lawsuit
against Husband in which damages are being sought as reimbursement for monies
allegedly invested in kitchen appliances, blinds and wainscoting in the former marital
residence (Tr. 2/10/15, p. 140).
Beginning when M.N. was around 16 months old, Husband noticed she was
exhibiting developmental delays. Husband admits that he had her evaluated without
informing Wife. M.N. was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. Husband
immediately took steps to engage services for this child. After the child was diagnosed,
he invited Wife to participate in the child's treatment and services. Wife objected to the
fact that he had her evaluated, without her consent, and stated she did not believe there
was anything wrong with her child (2/10/15, p. 14).
c. The Subject Child M.N.
The subject child M.N. was born June 15, 2012. By Order dated May 24, 2013, Wife
has visitation with the subject child from Mondays at 9:00 a.m. until Thursday at 12:00
p.m. with pickup and drop off at the 122 Precinct. Husband has the child from Thursday
at 12:00 p.m through Monday at 9:00 a.m. (Jud No. 9). Wife currently lives in the Bronx,
Husband lives in Staten Island. The child is currently exchanged at the 1st Police
Precinct located in lower Manhattan as the parties agreed this was a mid-point between
their residences. Under the current visitation schedule, Wife does not have time with
M.N. on the weekends. (Tr. 1/28/15, p. 118-19).
When the parties resided together, Wife took care of M.N. while Husband
was at work, but he took over these responsibilities when he returned home or was off
from work. The result [*6]was that the parental
responsibilities were shared between these parents (2/10/15, pp. 194-96).
The subject child is developmentally delayed and has sensory issues. M.N. is
currently non verbal though she is progressing with sounds. She receives special
instruction for one hour once a week and has speech therapy 30 minutes twice a week at
Wife's home in the Bronx. M.N. receives duplicate services at her father's home in Staten
Island. Wife did not inform the Bronx service providers that M.N. was receiving services
in another borough although the services arranged by Husband preceded the services
arranged by Wife. Accordingly, there has been no coordination of services or treatment
goals for the subject child. As M.N. is over three years old, she has aged out of Early
Intervention Services will soon receive services through the New York City Department
of Education. Sadly, the parties currently do not communicate on any issues regarding
M.N., her special needs, or the services she needs or receives. (Tr. 1/28/15, pp.
116-17).
d. The Forensic Evaluator
By Order dated October 3, 2013, Dr. Stephen P. Herman was appointed to
conduct a forensic evaluation in his matter. Dr. Herman's forensic report dated March 22,
2014 was admitted into evidence on consent of all parties. (AFC Ex. 1). Dr. Herman
testified as to his evaluation of the parties and the contents of his report on February 26,
2015. Dr. Herman concluded that Husband should have primary physical custody of
M.N. with Wife being granted significant visitation. (AFC Ex. 1, p. 15). However, Dr.
Herman clearly indicated that his recommendations regarding visitation could not be
reasonably effectuated with the parties residing as distant as they currently are from one
another. Dr. Herman indicated that the child needs a base for services, and that a long
journey from Staten Island to the Bronx would be very detrimental to a child with autism
and sensory issues. Issues of
Credibility
/i>
Before addressing the substantive issues relevant to this divorce
proceeding, the issue of both parties' credibility need be addressed. As stated by Wife's
counsel "we [have] made credibility a huge issue in this case." (Tr. 2/26/15 p.120). In
their summations, and extensively during trial, both parties have indicated that the other
has been less than credible to this Court.
Throughout the course of her testimony, Wife's credibility before this
Court was called into question. In many instances Wife's testimony was simply not
believable, while in other situations her testimony was clearly contradicted by the
testimony of her other witnesses, including her own mother. Moreover, Wife actually
admitted lying to the Administration for Children's Services, and to Family Court Referee
Jennifer Mitek, regarding her relationship with a convicted felon, Mr. J. Sanchez. Wife
admitted that she told both the ACS worker and Referee Mitek that she had no
relationship with Mr. Sanchez, when in fact, she did. (Tr. 2/10/15, p.52); (Tr. 1/28/15,
p.44). In addition, during cross examination before this Court, Wife admitted that she
had an encounter with Mr. Sanchez in front of a nail salon in Brooklyn. (Tr. 2/10/15
p.56). This testimony is in clear contradiction to prior testimony offered to this Court,
that Wife has not had any contact with Mr. Sanchez since his release from prison
in January of 2013. (Tr. 1/28/15, p.46).
As argued by Husband, it has been shown that Wife has been less than
truthful when testifying in more than one official forum. Accordingly, while this Court
has carefully considered the testimony offered by Wife, her demonstrated willingness to
lie to governmental officials, and to the Court, to further her own interests, has resulted
in this Court affording little weight to that testimony. See Matter of Weber v. Weber, 100
AD3d 1244 (3rd Dept. 2012); See also, Matter of Rodriquez v. Kelly, 102
AD3d 594 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Ronnie P., 85 AD3d 1246 (3rd dept. 2011).
As artfully articulated by the forensic evaluator in response to a hypothetical question
regarding Wife's truthfulness, her admitted dishonesty "suggests that she has a propensity
to lie, to be dishonest, even in Court." (Tr. 2/26/15, p.49).
In contrast, while Wife has attempted, at length, to show that Husband has
also been dishonest in relation to his Statement of Net Worth, Husband was able to
explain that the approximated amounts indicated therein were accurate when the
document was drafted, though they may have changed at the time of trial. Moreover,
while the alleged inaccuracies in Husband's Statement of Net Worth may be relevant to
the issue of child support, they do not compare to Wife's admission that she lied to ACS
and Family Court, and her inconsistent testimony to this Court, regarding her ongoing
interactions with a convicted murderer. Applicable
Law
/i>
1. Custody of M.N..
When determining custody cases the primary concern for the Court is the best
interests of the child. See Matter of Islam v. Lee, 2014 NY Slip Op 2045 (2d
Dept. 2014). There is "no prima facie right to custody of the child in either parent."
DRL §70[a]; DRL §240 [1][a]. When determining
custody, the Court must consider the "totality of the circumstances" including the relative
fitness of the parties and quality of their home environments. See Matter of Blanc v. Larcher, 11
AD3d 458 (2d Dept. 2004). Factors to be considered include "the quality of the
home environment and the parental guidance the custodial parent provides for the child,
the ability of each parent to provide for the child's emotional and intellectual
development, the financial status and ability of each parent to provide for the child, the
relative fitness of the respective parents, and the effect an award of custody to one parent
might have on the child's relationship with the other parent." See Salvatore v. Salvatore, 68
AD3d 966 (2d Dept. 2009); see also, McGovern v. Lynch, 62 AD3d 712 (2d Dept. 2009).
The weight to be afforded to each of the various factors is within the discretion of the
trial court and requires an evaluation of the testimony, character and sincerity of all of the
parties involved. See
Bourne v. Bristow, 66 AD3d 621 (2d Dept. 2009). While the child's
preference must be considered, it is not determinative, particularly where the child is of
young age or cannot articulate a position. See Granata v. Granata, 289 AD2d
527 (2d Dept. 2001). Here, due to the age and the special needs of the child,
the child's position has been put forth by the attorney for the subject child. See Matter of Tejada v. Tejada,
126 AD3d 985 (2d Dept. 2015).
While the parties currently share parenting time with M.N., a final award of
joint custody is not a viable option for this child because, as conceded by the parties, the
relationship between them is too volatile and acrimonious to support such an
arrangement. See Bliss on behalf of Ach v. Ach, 56 NY2d 995 (1982).
Joint custody is inappropriate where the parties are antagonistic towards each other and
have demonstrated an inability to cooperate on matters concerning the [*7]child. See Matter of Lawrence v. Davidson, 109 AD3d 826 (2d Dept.
2013.) Accordingly, the Court is faced with the difficult determination of which
parent would be the more suitable custodial resource for M.N.. In making this
determination, the Court has considered, amongst other factors indicated below, whether
each parent would foster the relationship between M.N. and the other parent. See Matter of Feliccia v. Spahn,
108 AD3d 702 (2d Dept. 2013). The Court has also considered which parent is
better equipped to provide for the child's educational, emotional and social development.
See Matter of Ganzenmuller
v. Rivera, 40 AD3d 756 (2d Dept. 2007).Factors Considered
/i>
Ability to Meet M.N.'s Special Needs.
After considering the evidence at this trial, this Court finds that Husband
presents as the parent better suited to meet the subject child's special needs. The forensic
evaluator found that despite clear signs of developmental delays, Wife "did not
appreciate any of M.N.'s problems" (Tr. 2/26/15, p.16). While Husband made a poor
choice in not including Wife in M.N.'s initial evaluation, he was the first parent to
recognize the subject child's developmental delays and he took immediate steps to secure
professional treatment. Moreover, after securing a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder,
Husband immediately invited Wife to participate in a substantive discussion as to how
best to meet her needs. Wife makes much of the fact that Husband did not advise her
before he took M.N. for her initial evaluation. While consultation may be ideal in a
typical case, and Husband arguably should have at least made an attempt to include Wife,
he credibly testified that he felt it was not practical in his situation given Wife's denial of
M.N.'s symptoms, her hostility towards Husband, and his honest belief that Wife would
do something to interfere with the evaluation. Husband's testimony at trial indicates that
he has since learned from this mistake and is willing to involve Wife in decisions, so
long as it can be done in a safe and appropriate way. (Tr. 2/26/15, p.89).
Husband credibly testified that when Wife became involved with M.N.'s
evaluation she indicated that she didn't believe anything was wrong with her child. (Tr.
2/10/15, p.14). Indeed, even as of the time she met with Dr. Herman, Wife was still of
the belief that M.N. "had done well with her developmental milestones." Dr. Herman
noted, however, that Wife's position was clearly contradicted by the child's behavioral
and developmental assessment. When Dr. Herman revisited this subject with Wife and
asked her why she thought M.N. was non verbal, Wife blamed it on Husband claiming
that he had somehow traumatized the child, a charge Dr. Herman viewed as "specious"
and "erroneous" (AFC Ex 1, Tr. 2/10/15, pp. 6;14).
By the time of trial, Wife finally seemed to accept that her child presents
with special needs, but when asked directly if her child presented with autism, Wife
responded "when you first meet her she does, yes", indicating a lingering reluctance to
fully accept the diagnosis. (Tr. 1/28/15, p.115). Wife also testified that she believes that
M.N. will likely "grow out" of her sensory issues. (Tr. 1/18/15, p.113).
While Wife now appears to accept that M.N. has some degree of special
needs, her response to those needs has been impulsive and to a degree reckless. Despite
the fact that M.N. [*8]was already actively engaged in
services in Staten Island, Wife secured duplicate services in the Bronx without advising
Husband or the various Staten Island service providers. In fact, Wife still does not
discuss the child's needs or treatment with Husband. (Tr. 1/28/15, p.116). When one of
the child's Bronx service providers, S. Florich, was called to testify she indicated that she
was unaware that M.N. was receiving duplicate services, and that it's something she
would want to know, to coordinate services. (Tr. 2/27/15, pp. 37-38). Moreover, Ms.
Florich indicated that her information sheet did not including any contact information for
Husband, and that she should be having discussions with him. Husband credibly testified
that the first time he found out about the duplicate service providers was the second day
of this trial and that he immediately contacted the Staten Island providers to let them
know. (Tr. 2/27/15, pp.64-66).
Wife's decision to duplicate the subject child's services after Husband
had already secured treatment, together with her failure to ensure coordination between
the two, is concerning to this Court. Aside from endangering M.N.'s entitlement to
services as a whole based on Wife's failure to disclose the existence of a duplicate case
file and provider, Wife's failure to coordinate also makes no therapeutic sense. Since the
service providers were unaware of each other, there has been no sharing of information
regarding M.N., her status, her treatment goals or strategies being used to reach them.
(Tr. 2/17/15, p.39). Regardless of what Wife's feelings are towards Husband or what she
believes he is or is not entitled to in terms of parental rights, it was reckless to subject
this child to such a scheme.
After considering the history of M.N.'s treatment, together with both
parent's response to her special needs, and after considering the testimony of the forensic
evaluator on the subject, the Court finds that Husband presents as the parent better suited
to provide for the medical needs and educational development of this special needs child.
See Matter of Smalls v.
Payne, 64 AD3d 783 (2d Dept. 2009); See also, Matter of Ganzenmuller v.
Rivera, 40 AD3d 756 (2d Dept. 2007).
Moral & Emotional Guidance.
When evaluating cross claims for custody, the Court is charged with determining
which parent presents as better suited to provide for the subject child's moral and
emotional development. See Matter of Felty v. Felty, 108 AD3d 705 (2d Dept. 2013);
See also, Matter of Moreno v.
Cruz, 24 AD3d 780 (2d Dept. 2005); Acevedo v. Acevedo, 200 AD2d
567 (2d Dept. 1994).
At trial, a considerable amount of time was spent addressing the issue of Wife's
relationship with an individual known as J. Sanchez, a convicted felon. Wife testified
that she first met Mr. Sanchez in the summer of 2008 through a friend in Pennsylvania.
At the time she was introduced to him, Mr. Sanchez was incarcerated for murder in
Woodbourne Correctional Facility. (Tr. 1/28/15, pp. 27-29). Mr. Sanchez was sentenced
to 17 years to life in or around 1996 for murdering an innocent bystander in furtherance
of a retaliatory hit on a fellow drug dealer. (Tr.1/28/15, p.34). Shortly after meeting, Mr.
Sanchez and Wife began a romantic relationship, despite the obvious difficulties created
by one party being incarcerated. (Tr. 1/28/15, p. 30).
Wife admits that after a short period of "dating", she married Mr. Sanchez in
May of 2009, while he was still in prison. Wife testified that after a brief marriage she
divorced Mr. Sanchez in December of 2011 after realizing that being married to a
convicted murderer was likely a mistake. However, after Wife married Defendant
Husband, and had a child with him, she devoted months of her life, and approximately 59
hours on the phone, secretly working to secure Mr. Sanchez's release. (Tr. 2/11/15,
pp.165-166). During the course of these proceedings Wife has been less than credible to
this Court, and the Family Court, as to the extent of her involvement with Mr. Sanchez.
Indeed, her story about how she just happened to run into Mr. Sanchez, during the
parties' marriage, in front of a nail salon in East New York Brooklyn when she lived in
Staten Island is patently not credible. Moreover, Wife's description of this encounter,
admitted for the first time on cross examination, was in direct contradiction of her prior
testimony that she has had no contact with Mr. Sanchez since his release from prison in
January of 2013. (Tr. 1/28/15, p.46).
Beyond her questionable relationship with Mr. Sanchez, Wife has
continuously exhibited behavior that is troubling to this Court. In more than one instance,
when angered, Wife would be quick to call various authorities to make complaints
against Husband and his family. In one notable instance, Wife reported Husband, and his
family, to the Department of Health claiming that they were harboring illegal piranhas in
their office when, in fact, the fish in question were kissing fish. (Tr. 2/10/15, p. 63). Wife
has also reported Husband's family to city authorities because of the condition of the curb
outside their house. Finally, Wife reported Husband and his parents to the Internal
Revenue Service. (Tr. 2/10/15, pp.63-64). Wife's choices throughout the parties' short
marriage, and this litigation, often made with a spirit of vindictiveness, exhibit poor
judgment and a lack of moral insight. These traits, as exhibited by Wife, are not suitable
for a custodial parent bearing the primary responsibility for raising a child and fostering
that child's relationship with her other parent. See Matter of Meyers v.
Sheehan, 62 AD2d 802 (2d Dept. 2009); See also, Linton A. V. Mena C.,
301 AD2d 416 (1st Dept. 2003).
c. Stability.
When determining the custody of a child, especially a young child with special
needs, the Court must consider which parent "will best promote stability". Matter of Psaros v.
Mitchell-Ortega, 128 AD3d 703 (2d Dept. 2015); See also, Matter of Ivory B. v. Shameccka
D.B., 121 AD3d 674 (2d Dept. 2014). Stability relates, among other things,
to an ability to provide financial support, and a stable household. See Matter of
Conforti v. Conforti, 46 AD3d 877 (2d Dept. 2007); See also, Matter of Mullins v. Riener,
100 AD3d 760 (2d Dept. 2012).
When considering the factor of stability, despite listening to extended testimony on
the subject of finances, this Court remains unsure as to how Wife supports herself and by
extension, how she would support the subject child if custody to be granted to her.
Despite having obtained a Bachelors Degree in Business Administration, Wife has not
worked since she became pregnant in 2011. While this Court does not credit Wife's claim
that she stopped working because Husband wanted her to, even if that testimony were
credible, it would not explain why Wife has not secured employment since the parties
separated. Wife testified that she has simply chosen to stay home, despite the fact that she
currently shares parenting time with Husband. (Tr. 2/10/15, p.30).
Despite not having a source of income, Wife inexplicitly claims monthly expenses of
approximately $4,700. (Tr., 2/10/15, p. 34). Wife attempted to justify these
expenses by testifying that she is financially supported by her parents on a monthly basis.
Wife testified that her parents pay her rent, her monthly credit card bill, and all of her
housing expenses. However, when she called her own mother as her witness, her mother
contradicted her testimony regarding support. Maternal Grandmother testified that she
and her husband do not give Wife any money, no less approximately $60,000
per year, but that they allow her to live in "their" apartment, as the lease is in paternal
grandfather's name. After listing to Wife testify it is unclear to this Court why she is
unemployed. What is clear is that both Wife and her mother were less than credible to
this Court in regard to Wife's financial situation.
In addition to not having a secure source of income with which to support M.N.,
Wife has also shown that she is financially irresponsible when she does have access to
funds. In one such example, when Wife received a personal injury settlement in the
amount of approximately $162,000, she testified that she spent the majority of
those funds on counsel fees, together with the rental of an expensive four bedroom
apartment, and on the cash purchase of a Mercedes for $28,000. (Tr. 2/10/15, p
118). It is further worth nothing that Wife has established a pattern of financial instability
as she previously filed for Bankruptcy protection in 2007 to extinguish over
$35,000 in credit card debt. (Tr. 1/28/15, pp 23-24).
In contrast, Father has been gainfully employed for his family business for
approximately 12 years making approximately $84,000 per year. Husband
co-owns a home with his mother and has no consumer debt worth noting.
In addition to being financially unstable, Wife has also exhibited a pattern of
frequent relocation. While Wife's choice of personal residence is not of paramount
concern to this Court, when it comes to the residence of M.N., the Court must consider
which parent presents with a more stable household, including access to extended family.
See Hennelly v. Viger, 198 AD2d 224 (2d Dept. 1993); See also, Severo
E. v. Lizzette C., 157 AD2d 726 (2d Dept. 1990); Matter of Blakeney v.
Blakeney, 99 AD3d 898 (2d Dept. 2012).
In regards to a stable household, Wife testified that she was born in New Jersey and
stayed there until she went to college in Pennsylvania. After graduating College in 2005
she relocated to Brooklyn to live with a boyfriend. Six months after arriving in Brooklyn
Wife relocated to Dutchess County, New York. After living in upstate New York for a
period of approximately two years Wife relocated once again, back to Pennsylvania to
live with her parents. In 2011 Wife relocated back to New York and took up residence in
the Bronx until September of 2011 at which time she moved to Staten Island to live with
Defendant Husband. When the parties' relationship soured, Husband voluntarily moved
out of the marital residence on March 20, 2013. Despite being given occupancy of the
marital home, Wife chose to relocate once again to the Bronx in November of 2013.
Wife's current residence is approximately two hours travel time from Husband's
residence in Staten Island. (Tr. 2/10/15, p.92). Because of Wife's long history of
relocation, Husband has expressed concerns that if granted custody, Wife might suddenly
relocate with the child once again. Indeed, Husband credibly testified that Wife and her
mother threatened to abscond with the child to Florida. (Tr. 2/10/15 p.17).
After considering the facts relating to stability the Court finds that Husband, who has
[*9]strong roots in Staten Island, including access to the
support of extended family, and has been steadily employed for at last 12 years, presents
as the parent who can provide more stability for M.N.. See Matter of Moran v. Cortez, 85
AD3d 795 (2d Dept. 2011); See also, White v. Mazzella-White, 84 AD3d 1068 (2d Dept.
2011).
d. Criminal History
In deciding the issue of custody the Court has considered the criminal history
of the parties as a factor. See Matter of Jones v. Pagan, 96 AD3d 1058 (2d Dept.
2012). During the course of these proceedings Husband was arrested in relation to
Wife's Order of Protection, but was not charged. In explaining this event, Husband
credibly testified that Wife used the temporary Order of Protection issued in her favor by
Family Court as a sword to intimidate and manipulate him. She routinely threatened him
that she would call the police and he would "spend the night in Rikers" for the smallest
of perceived infractions. Her manipulation of this Order to exert control over Husband
culminated in his arrest. Husband was ultimately released, before arraignment, without
even the issuance of a desk appearance ticket. Husband credibly testified that this first
encounter with the criminal justice system was traumatic. Husband does not have any
prior criminal history.
In contrast to Husband's single non-eventful interaction with the criminal
justice system, Wife was arrested, prosecuted and ultimately plead guilty to one count of
"simple assault" and one count of "making terroristic threats with the intent to terrorize"
both violations of the Pennsylvania Penal Code. At trial Wife described the incident
which resulted in this conviction, which occurred in November of 2009. As would be
expected, she did so in a light most favorable to her position. In sum and substance Wife
admits that she got into a verbal altercation over an alleged driving infraction which
turned physical, and that during that physical altercation she pulled out a knife and
threatened her victim. (Tr. 1/28/15, p.54). As a result of these charges Wife ultimately
was sentenced to a three month period of house arrest, which she served in her parent's
house, followed by nine months of probation. When asked during cross examination why
she was carrying a knife, she indicated that she carried it "for protection". (Tr. 2/10/15,
p.70). Wife's violent criminal history is troubling to this Court as it indicates both poor
judgment and a lack of impulse control. Wife's criminal history, while not extensive, is a
factor which militates against an award of custody. See Matter of Nunn v. Bagley, 63
AD3d 1068 (2d Dept. 2009).
e. Alleged Substance Abuse-
Following a motor vehicle accident which occurred in March of 2009, and a
resulting surgery, Wife was prescribed Percocet and Darvocet for pain. Wife claims that
that during the course of their short marriage Husband abused her prescription drug
medication, taking approximately one pill a day. Husband vehemently denies ever using
Wife's medication. After considering the testimony of both parties, the Court credits the
testimony of Husband on the issue of prescription drug abuse. In making this credibility
finding, the Court notes that Husband has taken a drug test during the course of these
proceedings, and Wife admits that the test results were negative for all substances. (Tr.
2/10/15, p.78).
In addition to her claims of prescription drug abuse, during the course of the
forensic [*10]evaluation Wife presented Dr. Herman with
a shipping label from a company that sells a substance known as Kratom. Despite her
concerns regarding this substance, Wife failed to call an expert witness, or submit any
evidence regarding Kratom use, or the substances' effects. During his expert testimony,
Dr. Herman indicated that he has concerns about this substance, which he identified as a
naturally occurring leaf that stimulates the same sections of the brain as an opiate. When
questioned as to his use of Kratom, Husband admitted that he purchased a sample and
tried it a few times to self treat what he described as "stress headaches". (Tr. 2/27/15 pp.
56-57). Husband further indicated that the use of herbal medicines is not culturally
unusual to him as his family sometimes practices "traditional Chinese medicine". (Tr.
2/27/15 p.74). Husband credibility testified that the leaf had no effect on his headaches,
so he threw the rest of the Kratom away. While the record is devoid of information
regarding this substance, the Court notes that it is not illegal. "Although Kratom is listed
by the Drug Enforcement Agency as a drug of concern, [it] presently is not scheduled
under the Controlled Substances Act." See People v. Moss, 2013 NY Slip
Op. 33028 (U) (Sup. Ct. Suff. Cty. 2013).
While the Court does not condone self medication through the use of
Kratom, or other unregulated mind altering substances, there has been no credible
evidence that Husband is a danger to his child due to substance abuse. Husband has
denied the use of any illicit or illegal substances and Wife offered no evidence at trial to
suggest otherwise. In any event, it is hereby Ordered that both parties are to refrain from
taking any non prescribed illegal or controlled substances when in the presence of the
subject child.
f.Ability to Foster a Relationship with Non Custodial
Parent.
The Court has also considered which parent is in a better position to
facilitate and foster a relationship between the subject child and the non custodial parent.
See Matter of Lawler v. Eder, 106 AD3d 739 (2d Dept. 2013). Husband
testified at trial that he is not opposed to Wife having a relationship with M.N. and that
he felt that a good relationship with Wife would be beneficial. Husband further testified
that he thinks Wife is a good mother, but that her poor choices make her the less fit
custodial parent. (Tr. 2/26/15, pp. 131-32). Husband testified at length as to how he
wishes the parties could get along and make decisions together, but that it has become
impossible under the constant threat of being sued or going to jail. (Tr. 2/26/15, p.89). In
contrast, Wife has tried to denigrate Husband and his parenting abilities throughout this
litigation.
The Court credit's Husband's testimony that maternal grandmother, Margaret
K., was present for many of the parties' most serious altercations and instigated a number
of them. She also interfered with the subject child's "second opinion" evaluation by Dr.
Clemente (2/27/15 Tr., p. 105-107). The clear manifestation of hostility and anger the
maternal grandmother has for Husband does not suggest that she would be supportive of
M.N. s relationship with her father. Maternal grandmother's displeasure with the father of
her grandchild was apparent in her demeanor while testifying. While this Court is aware
that Maternal Grandmother is not seeking custody of M.N., it became apparent at trial
that Maternal Grandmother and Wife are united in interest when it comes to claims
against Husband.
After considering the evidence before the Court, it is obvious that Wife
allows her deep seeded animosity towards Husband to color her decision making with
respect to M.N.'s [*11]relationship with her father. Wife
callously testified that if Husband was late to a child exchange, she would vindictively
withhold the child the equivalent amount of time on the next exchange (Tr. 2/10/17, p.
47). Husband further described Wife's conduct at exchanges when he indicated that she
would physically hold M.N. back until the exact moment the exchange was supposed to
happen. Husband described one incident wherein Wife, at maternal grandmother's
direction, held M.N. away from Husband as they both stood in a police precinct for five
minutes from 11:55 to the exact scheduled exchange time of 12:00. (Tr. 2/10/15, p.24).
This type of petty inflexibility exhibited by Wife is a clear indication that she is not
interested in fostering a relationship between M.N. and her father, but instead is only
willing to give him exactly what he is entitled to under this Court's Orders.
When determining which parent presents as more supportive of the other, the
Court has considered the incident of April 2013 wherein Husband obtained possession of
the subject child and refused to give the child back to Wife for a period of time. Husband
attempted to explain this choice by indicating that he was afraid that if he gave M.N.
back to Wife, he wouldn't see her again without a Court Ordered schedule. (Tr. 2/26/15,
p.149). Husband further explained that Wife had previously restricted his access to M.N.
and that he was afraid that she would do so again. While not condoning Husband's
choice to resort to "self help" the Court notes that there was no Order at the time granting
a superior right to parental access to either party. Moreover the Court notes that there was
a Family Court appearance on May 15, 2013, during the time period in question, wherein
Wife's application for visitation was denied by the Family Court. (Tr. 2/27/15, pp.77-81).
Accordingly, Husband cannot be held responsible for withholding the child once the
matter was sub judice before the Family Court.
After consideration of the record, the Court finds that while neither party has
made perfect choices in regard to interacting with the other, Husband is the parent more
capable of fostering a positive relationship between the subject child and the
non-custodial parent. See Matter of Cobourne v. James, 35 AD3d 734 (2d Dept.
2006); See also, Matter of
O'Loughlin v. Sweetland, 98 AD3d 983 (2d Dept. 2012).
g.Court Appointed Forensic Evaluator
The Court has given considered the thoughtful analysis provided by the
Court appointed forensic evaluator, Dr. Herman. "While the recommendation of a
court-appointed evaluator is not determinative, it is a factor to be considered and is
entitled to some weight." Matter of Doyle v. Debi, 120 AD3d 676 (2d Dept.
2014). After meeting with the parties and the children, Dr. Herman submitted a
written report to the Court and credibly testified in support of that report.
Dr. Herman credibly testified that during the forensic process he did not
detect any evidence of abuse or neglect. However, Dr. Herman did indicate he was
concerned by Wife's lack of insight as to the developmental delays of her daughter.
Despite Wife's claims that M.N. was meeting all of her developmental milestones, Dr.
Herman testified that the subject child interacted in a very detached way from both of her
parents, treating them as objects more than people. However, on comparison, Dr.
Herman indicated that Husband presented as more engaged with M.N. Dr Herman
further indicated that Husband was more in touch with the special needs of the subject
child, as Wife indicated that she did not believe the child was autistic, but instead was the
victim of trauma on the part of Husband. Dr. Herman found no [*12]evidence of trauma but instead indicated that the child was
clearly on the autistic spectrum and presented with Severe developmental and cognitive
problems". (Tr. 2/26/15, pp. 4-6).
In both his report, and his testimony at trial, Dr. Herman recommends that
custody remain with Husband in Staten Island, subject to Mother's parenting time. (Tr.
2/26/15, p.22;68 & AFC Ex 1). While Dr. Herman indicates that a close to equal
split of parenting time is preferential, he further indicated that due to the distance
between the parties, the child should have a "base" for services and schooling, as autistic
children have major issues with "change". (Tr. 2/26/16, pp. 42;67). Dr. Herman was
further concerned with the proposition of a midweek exchange which would require
M.N. to sit in a car for upwards of two hours.
h. Attorney For the Subject Child's Position
While only one factor to be considered, the position taken by the subject
child's attorney was also considered by the Court. See Matter of Guiracocha v.
Amaro, 122 AD3d 632 (2d Dept. 2014). After a thoughtful consideration of
the factors, as indicated in his post trial summation, the attorney for the subject child
advocates for an award of sole legal and physical custody to Defendant Husband.
i.Ability to Provide Care
Lastly, the Court has considered which parent has played the role of primary
caretaker for the subject child. While both parties claim to have filled that role, and
during their short marriage they may have, their testimony on the subject is illustrative.
Wife spent the majority of her direct testimony addressing her past mistakes, and her
complaints about Husband rather than addressing the positive interactions she has had
with the subject child. On the other hand, while Husband's testimony does include
negative information about Wife, it focused considerably more on the various exercises,
routines, and positive activities enjoyed between father and daughter. (Tr. 2/26/15, pp.
77-87). Based only upon the record available before the Court, it appears that Husband
has played the role of primary caretaker since he was awarded considerable parenting
time with M.N. Accordingly, an award of custody to Husband would preserve his role as
primary caretaker. See Matter of Ocampo v. Jimenez, 27 AD3d 753 (2d Dept.
2006).
In addition to Husband's role as primary caretaker the Court has considered
each parties access to extended family to assist in child care and support the subject
child. Father testified that he has a large extended family that live nearby and provide a
loving environment for M.N. In contrast, Mother is an only child whose parents split
their time between residences in Pennsylvania and Florida (Tr., 2/27/15, pp. 96-97). The
availability of child care and support from members of the parties' extended family
including the presence of aunts, uncles and cousins is a factor that was considered by this
Court, though not afforded a great amount of weight. See Blakeney v. Blakeney, 99
AD3d 898 (2d Dept. 2012); See also, Matter of Bush v. Lopez, 2015 NY
Slip Op 01502 (3rd Dept. 2015).,Custody
/i>
For the reasons set forth above, and after considering all the relevant factors
presented by both parties at trial, including the relative fitness of each parent as compared
to the other, the [*13]recommendations of the forensic
evaluator, and the position of the attorney for the child, Father is hereby granted an Order
of sole physical and legal custody of the subject child M.N., subject to Mother's
parenting time schedule as detailed herein. See Matter of Edwards v. Rothschild, 60 AD3d 675 (2d Dept.
2009); see also, Matter of
Lovitch v. Lovitch, 64 AD3d 710 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter Osbourne S. v. Regina
S., 55 AD3d 465 (1st Dept. 2008). The Court find that Wife presents as the
parent "less fit" to have custody of M.N. See Eschbach v. Eschback, 56
NY2d 167 (1982). Accordingly, Husband shall have sole decision making authority
with respect to all issues respecting the health, education and general welfare of M.N.
including but not limited to the identification and delivery of services necessary to meet
her special needs. Wife shall cease and desist from securing any services for M.N. unless
Husband expressly consents to the same in writing after full consultation with M.N.'s
Staten Island service providers and any other relevant professionals.
In furtherance of his responsibility as the custodial parent to foster the child's
relationship with the non-custodial parent, Husband is hereby directed to confer with
Wife on all issues relating to the child's services, education, religion and medical matters.
Husband shall, however, have final decision making authority with respect to these and
all other major issues. Each party shall retain authority to make day to day decisions
while they are with the child. Both parents shall have access to M.N.'s medical and
educational records. Each parent shall be responsible for securing said information on
their own. Both parties shall be entitled to attend all school, extracurricular and
significant events in M.N.'s life at their own expense. As Husband indicated that he does
not feel comfortable with Wife being in his house, the service provider team meetings
described by Husband shall be moved to a neutral location for Wife to be afforded the
opportunity to attend, if she so chooses. (Tr. 2/27/15, p.68).
Parenting Time
/i>
While Husband has been granted sole legal custody with final decision making,
this does not end the analysis. Wife shares a loving bond with M.N. which should not be
minimized. The forensic evaluator, the attorney for the subject child, and Husband all
agree that the current arrangement is not M.N.'s best interest as it involves too much
travel between Husband's home on Staten Island, the police precinct located in lower
Manhattan, and Wife's home in the Bronx.
In his report, Dr. Herman suggested that Wife have alternating weekends
beginning Fridays with drop off on Monday morning. He also suggested that Wife have
two consecutive overnight visits when it was not her weekend. At trial, Dr. Herman
admitted that when he proffered this schedule, he was not aware that Wife was living in
the Bronx. (Tr., 2/26/15, p. 42). When he was told that the parties no longer reside on
Staten Island, Dr. Herman regarded his proffered schedule as "the exact wrong thing to
do" given the difficulties this young autistic child with change of environment. (Tr.
2/16/15, p. 42-43). Dr. Herman also proffered that the travel time would be very
unsettling to an autistic child.
While the Court agrees with an alternate weekend visitation schedule
beginning on Fridays, Wife's move to the Bronx makes it very burdensome for the child
to be brought back to Staten Island by the start of the school, or services, on Monday.
Rather, it is in the child's best interest for Wife to drop the child back to Husband's home
Sundays by 9:00 pm. As for weekday visits, Husband testified at trial that in order for
M.N. to have a full range of services [*14]on Staten
Island he would need to have physical custody from Monday to Friday. (Tr. 2/27/15
p.67). Following this logic, to allow Wife to have two consecutive overnights during the
week on her non weekend weeks would cause a tremendous disruption in services being
given to M.N. on Staten Island. Accordingly, when it is not Wife's weekend, she shall
have visitation with M.N. on Tuesday and Thursday nights from after school, or upon the
completion of her services, until 8:00 p.m. While Wife shall not be restricted to
remaining on Staten Island during her visits, she must return the child by 8:00 p.m.
The parenting time schedule set forth herein shall commence on August
14, 2015. This visitation schedule can be revisited on proper application to any court of
competent jurisdiction in the event that Wife moves back to Staten Island. The visitation
schedule may also be modified or supplemented upon agreement of the parties in writing.
The parties are encouraged to work out any differences or unforeseen circumstances
before seeking court intervention.
a. Holiday Time.
The parties shall alternate all of the major holidays and school vacations (once
M.N. is enrolled in school) as set forth below. Parenting time shall commence at 10:00
a.m. on the first day of the holiday or vacation period and shall conclude 8:00 p.m. on the
final day of the visit unless otherwise specified below. If a conflict occurs between the
normal parenting schedule and the holiday visitation schedule, the holiday visitation
schedule will supersede normal parenting time.
Holidays that fall on school days, once M.N. starts school, such as Halloween,
and the child's birthday shall commence at school dismissal (or 3:00 p.m. if there is no
school) and end at 8:00 p.m.
Mother's Day shall always be with Mother and Father's Day shall always be with
Father. Each parent shall have a total of two non-consecutive weeks of vacation with the
child during the months of July and August. One week shall be in July; the other week
shall be in August. Each party shall designate by email their vacation weeks by May 1 of
each calendar year or be subject to the other parent's choice of designated weeks. Wife
shall be granted first choice in the event that both parties seek the same weeks provided
she has timely designated her weeks in accordance herein.
The following holidays shall be alternated:
Child's Birthday:even years: Motherodd years: Father
Thanksgiving:even years: Motherodd years: Father
Christmas Eve:even years: Fatherodd years: Mother
Christmas Eve visit shall begin at 4 p.m. and end at 11 a.m. on Christmas
Day.
Christmas Day:even years: Motherodd years: Father
New Years Eve:even years: Motherodd years: Father
New Years Eve visit shall begin at 4:00 p.m. and end at 12:00 p.m on New
Year's Day.
New Years Day:even years: Fatherodd years: Mother
Martin Luther King Day:even years: Motherodd years: Father
President's Day:even years: Fatherodd years: Mother
Good Friday:even years: Fatherodd years: Mother
Easter:even years: Motherodd years: Father
Memorial Day:even years: Fatherodd years: Mother
Fourth of July:even years: Fatherodd years: Mother
Labor Day:even years: Motherodd years: Father
Halloween:even years: Motherodd years: Father
Columbus Day:even years: Fatherodd years: Mother
Veteran's Day:even years: Motherodd years: Father
b. General Matters:
Each parent shall ensure that homework, if any, is completed and the child attends
any school or after school activities. While each parent is entitled to travel with M.N.,
each parent is responsible for notifying the other parent in writing when they intend to
take the child overnight outside of the New York. If the child is to be taken out of the
New York, then a detailed itinerary of the travel plans must be provided with contact
information.
While the Court has attempted to address all of the known issues regarding the
parties' schedule of shared parenting time it is impossible for this Court to anticipate all
issues that may arise in the future. Accordingly, the parties are hereby encouraged to
confer with one another in the event that an issue arises, before seeking court
intervention.
As a final matter, as stipulated to at trial, Wife is hereby directed to allow no [*15]contact between Mr. J. Sanchez and the subject child
during any period of visitation. (Tr. 2/26/15, pp.132-133).
Child Support
/i>
Each party seeks an award of child support from the other. As Husband
has been awarded physical and legal custody of M.N., child support shall be payable
from Wife to Husband. Husband's first request for child support was contained in his
Verified Answer with Counterclaims dated July 25, 2013. Both Husband and Wife's
Statements of Net Worth were received as evidence at trial.
The Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) presumptively results in the correct
amount of child support to be awarded to the custodial parent. Applying the statutory
percentage of 17% to the combined parental income will provide the appropriate level of
support to meet the basic needs of the subject child.
When determining child support under the guidelines the Court is directed to
utilize the income as it was, or should have been, reported on the parties most recent tax
return. See DRL '240(1-b)(b)(5)(i); See also, Matter of Lynn v. Kroenung, 97 AD3d 822 (2d Dept.
2012). Court is also not bound by the financial information supplied by the parties,
and may impute income where appropriate. See Matter of Maharaj-Ellis v. Laroche, 54 AD3d 677 (2d
Dept. 2008).
The most recent tax return provided by Husband is his 2013 tax return which
indicates a gross income of $83,201. Husband's 2014 tax return, if filed, was not
offered into evidence at trial nor was it annexed to the updated Statement of Net Worth
submitted at trial. (Def. Ex. D).
When determining child support, the Court must deduct payments of Social Security,
Medicare and New York City taxes that have been "actually paid". See Kaufman v. Kaufman, 102
AD3d 925 (2d Dept. 2013). Husband has not provided W2 documentation to
show the taxes he paid in relation to his 2013 tax return. While Husband has included a
copy of his 2013 state and federal tax returns, the only amount indicated on those returns
is a deduction of $2,439 for local NYC resident tax. Husband has provided
various pay-stubs to his Statement of Net Worth, however these paystubs relate to
income from 2014, as do the approximated deductions included in the "gross income"
section of his Net Worth Statement. Accordingly, Husband's adjusted income for the
purpose of CSSA calculations shall be his gross income, minus local tax actually paid for
an adjusted income of $80,762.
The calculation of Wife's current income for child support purposes is considerably
more difficult. Wife admitted that the last time she filed taxes was in 2011 because she
has not been employed since she found out she was pregnant with the subject child.
Despite her longstanding unemployment, Wife's Statement of Net Worth indicates
monthly expenses of $4,679, which calculates to an annual sum of
$56,148. Wife testified at length during trial that this amount is routinely and
consistently provided by her parents, who support her every need from the payment of
rent, and insurance to the purchase of groceries. It is well settled law that [*16]routine support provided by friends or family members
should be considered income. See Baumgardner v. Baumgardner, 98 AD3d 929 (2d Dept.
2012); See also, Matter of
Recco v. Turbak, 124 AD3d 900 (2d Dept. 2015). Here, Wife went so far
as to indicate that her father told her that "they could afford to pay for [Wife] and M.N.
for the rest of [their] lives and a few extra people". (Tr. 2/10/15, p.173). Wife further
testified that her parents have a limitless amount of money for her, and that she would
never have to work again. (Tr. 2/10/15, p.174). In addition to this testimony, which
supports the imputation of income, Wife further testified that she is in the process of
starting a business where she expects to earn at least $50,000 a year. (Tr.
2/10/15, p. 157). Accordingly, for the purposes of calculating child support Wife's
income shall be calculated at the imputed sum of $56,148 representing the
ongoing and consistent support received from her family. See Matter of Funaro v. Kudrick,
128 AD3d 695 (2d Dept. 2015); See also, Matter of Kiernan v. Martin, 108 AD3d 767 (2d Dept.
2013). The Court notes that this amount is only a slight deviation from what Wife
admits she is capable of earning using the skills that she currently possesses in her chosen
field. See Kessler v.
Kessler, 118 AD3d 946 (2d Dept. 2014).
When determining child support the Court must deduct payments of Social Security,
Medicare and New York City taxes that have been "actually paid". See Kaufman v. Kaufman, 102
AD3d 925 (2d Dept. 2013). Here there is no indication that Wife has paid taxes
since 2011, accordingly, the full amount of Wife's imputed income, or $56,148
will be utilized for purposes of determining child support.
After conducting the required calculations utilizing the income figures indicated
above, the Court finds that the combined parental income for purposes of calculating
child support is $136,910. Applying the statutory percentage of twenty five
percent (17%) to the combined parental income results in a combined annual child
support obligation of $23,275. Husband's pro rata share of this guidelines child
support obligation is 59%, Wife's pro rata share is 41%. Accordingly, Wife's child
support obligation equates to $9,543 a year, $795 a month or
$367 bi-weekly. For the reasons set forth above, Wife is hereby Ordered to pay
child support in the amount of $795 a month. This payment shall be made
directly to Husband on or before the 24th of every month starting August 24, 2014.
This child support award may be revisited by a Court of competent jurisdiction upon
a showing of "(i) a substantial change in circumstances; or (ii) that three years have
passed since the order was entered, last modified or adjusted; or (iii) there has been a
change in either party's gross income by fifteen percent or more since the order was
entered, last modified or adjusted." See Mejia v. Mejia, 106 AD3d 786 (2d Dept. 2013).
1. Retroactivity
The award of child support Ordered herein shall be retroactive to Husband's Verified
Answer which was filed on July 25, 2013 and served a few days later. See Diaz v. Gonzalez, 115 AD3d
904 (2d Dept. 2014); See also, Augustin v. Bullen, 112 AD3d 658 (2d Dept. 2013).
Wife has not claimed any credits at trial as she indicated that she has not voluntarily paid
child support during the pendency of this action, and Husband did not make a motion for
pendente lite support.
Accordingly, The retroactive award of child support under the amount awarded
herein is $19,080 (24 months x $795 a month). This amount shall be
paid in monthly installments of $300 to be paid in addition to Wife's child
support obligation each month until all arrears are paid. In the event that Wife wishes to
pay off the balance in a lump sum payment she may do so at any time.
2. Subject Child as a Tax Dependent
The record is silent as to applications regarding who can claim the subject child as a
tax dependant. As Husband is currently the only parent employed, he shall be entitled to
claim the subject child as a tax dependant until such time as Wife becomes gainfully
employed. Upon a showing of employment Wife shall be able to claim the subject child
on even years and Husband on odd years. See Kim v. Schiller, 112 AD3d 671 (2d Dept. 2013).
3. Additional Child Support Expenses
The record is equally silent in regard to the cost of additional child care expenses
including unreimbursed medical expenses. The parties are hereby directed to split all
reasonable and necessary unreimbursed medical and reasonable and necessary childcare
expenses on a pro rata basis. See Cassano v. Cassano, 85 NY2d 649 (1995);
See also, Leuker v. Leuker, 72 AD3d 655 (2d Dept. 2010). Husband's pro
rata share shall be 59% and Wife's pro rata share shall be 41%. See Harris v. Harris, 97 AD3d
534 (2d Dept. 2012). As the custodial parent Husband shall have the obligation
of sending Wife any bills to which he seeks financial contribution.
Counsel fees
/i>
Wife seeks an award of counsel fees for the litigation of this divorce action.
Pursuant to DRL §237(a), a lawyer who represents a non-monied spouse may seek
attorney's fees from the monied spouse in the divorce action. See O'Connor v. O'Connor, 89
AD3d 703, 704 (2d Dept 2011). Effective October 12, 2010, DRL
§237(a)(5) creates a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to
the less monied spouse.
An award of attorney's fees will generally be warranted where there is a significant
disparity in the financial circumstances of the parties. See Chesner v. Chesner, 95 AD3d
1252, 1253 (2d Dept 2012). The purpose of DRL §237(a) is to redress the
economic disparity between the monied spouse and the non-monied spouse. An award of
interim counsel fees under DRL '237 is intended to allow the non-monied spouse to
litigate the action on an equal footing with the monied spouse. See Prichep v. Prichep, 52 AD3d
61 (2d Dept. 2008). Here, Wife argues that Husband is the monied spouse and
should be required to pay her attorney's fees.
Husband testified he paid his attorney approximately $30,000 as of the date
he testified at trial February 26, 2015 (Tr. 2/26/15, p. 122). Wife's testimony in regard to
her application for counsel fees is confusing and unclear. Wife testified that she is
seeking $85,000 as an approximation of the total amount of fees incurred by her
attorney in this action. However, Wife indicated that she actually owes her attorney
considerably less than this amount, if anything [*17]at all,
as they came to an agreement that her attorney would not seek to enforce any more than
the $47,000 she has already paid (Tr. 2/10/15, pp. 44-45). While Wife indicated
in subsequent testimony that she understands that she owes her attorney more than
$47,000 the Court finds this subsequent testimony to be less than credible.
While Wife has indicated that she has access to "unlimited funds" through her
parents, and therefore would likely not be entitled to an award of counsel fees in any
event, the Court need not even address the issue of which party presents as "monied" in
this action. As correctly argued by Husband, the Court cannot even consider Wife's
counsel fee application as there has been a complete failure of proof in regard to that
claim at trial. See Weinschneider v. Weinschneider, 50
AD3d 1128 (2d Dept. 2008); See also Mojdeh M. v. Jamshid A., 36 Misc 3d 1209[A], (Sup. Ct.
Kings Cty. 2012). In support of her application Wife completely failed to offer her
attorney's retainer agreement or any billing documentation during the course of the trial
record. See Barson v.
Barson, 32 AD3d 872 (2d Dept. 2006); See also, Mimran v. Mimran, 83 AD3d
550 (1st Dept. 2011). While this failure of proof would be relevant to any
application for counsel fees under DRL '237, it becomes all the more relevant in relation
to a trial application for counsel fees, as the party opposing that application has a right to
contest the reasonableness of the billing in an adversarial proceeding. See Price v.
Price, 113 AD2d 299 (2d Dept. 1985); See also, Sadofsky v. Sadofsky, 78
AD2d 520 (2d Dept. 1980).
While Wife attempted to cure this error in her post trial summations by including
billing documentation, the Court may not consider issues, or evidence, raised for the first
time in post trial summation papers. See Matter of Roberts v. Borg, 83 AD3d 947 (2d Dept. 2011);
See also, Cole v. Mandell Food Stores, 93 NY2d 34 (1999). Moreover, even
were the Court able to consider post trial evidence, Wife has still failed to submit a
retainer agreement into evidence as required in support of a counsel fee application.
See DeMato v. DeMato, 101 AD2d 847 (2d Dept. 1984); See also, Bentz v. Bentz, 71 AD3d
931 (2d Dept. 2010).
Accordingly Wife's application for counsel fees is hereby denied as there has been a
complete failure of proof in relation to that claim. See Clarke v. Clarke, 8 AD3d
272 (2d Dept. 2004); See also, Fu Kuo Hsu v. Hsuan Huang, 149 AD2d 405
(2d Dept. 1989). In so deciding the Court notes that Wife's reliance on a turn of the
century Erie County Surrogates Court case, In re Sewell, 67 N.Y.S. 456 (Sur.
Ct. Erie Cty. 1900), to establish the standard for a counsel fee application is not
persuasive, nor is it in any way controlling in this matrimonial action.
Conclusion
/i>
For the detailed reasons set forth above, Husband is hereby granted a Final Order of
Sole Custody of the subject child M.N.. Wife is granted the parenting time set forth
herein. Husband's application for child support is granted in the amount of $795
a month together with retroactive sums due and owing in the amount of $19,080
which shall be payable at the sum of $300 a month until all arrears are paid.
Wife's application for counsel fees is hereby denied for the reasons set forth above. All
other ancillary relief is resolved as directed herein. To the extent that an issue has not
been specifically addressed by this Decision it is hereby denied.
During the course of this litigation Defendant's motion sequence number 002 was
[*18]referred to trial, upon review of said motion, it is
hereby denied to the extent that it has not been addressed by this Decision after trial.
The Court has specifically considered all claims for reallocation of fees throughout
the course of this litigation, upon consideration, all requests for reallocation are hereby
denied.
Defendant Husband is hereby directed to prepare, serve, and file a Judgment
of Divorce together with Findings of Fact and all required supporting documentation,
together with a copy of this Decision within 60 days of the issuance of this Decision after
trial.
This constitutes the Decision of the Court after trial.
Dated:July 30, 2015
E N T E R:
__________________________________
HON. CATHERINE M. DIDOMENICO
Acting Justice Supreme Court
Footnotes
Footnote 1:For the purposes of this
Decision, the Statement of Net Worth has been considered as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1,
entered into evidence on consent, rather than the subject of Judicial Notice as it was
initially identified.