Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Eugene Schwartzwald, J.H.O.), rendered October 3, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of disorderly conduct.

ORDERED that, on the court's own motion, defendant's notice of appeal from a purported judgment convicting him of reckless driving is deemed a valid notice of appeal from the judgment convicting defendant of disorderly conduct (see CPL 460.10 [6]); and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, the accusatory instrument is dismissed, and the fine, if paid, is remitted.

Following a nonjury trial, the Criminal Court found defendant guilty of disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20). On appeal, defendant contends that the proof at trial was legally insufficient to establish his guilt. While defendant failed to preserve this issue, we reach it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).

Upon a review of the record, we find that the evidence adduced at trial, when considered in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), was legally insufficient to establish all of the elements of disorderly conduct (see Penal Law § 240.20) beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no proof that defendant obstructed vehicular or pedestrian traffic (Penal Law § 240.20 [5]), or committed any of the other acts proscribed by Penal Law § 240.20.

In light of the foregoing, we pass on no other issue.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the accusatory instrument is dismissed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Solomon, JJ., concur.