The defendant is charged with driving while intoxicated (V & TL §1192(3)) and moves for omnibus relief. The Court notes that the defendant was originally charged with a violation of V & TL §1192(2), which charge was dismissed by order of this Court dated July 2, 2015, the People consenting thereto. The defendant interposed omnibus motions prior to and subsequent to the People's filing of the new accusatory instrument and the Court will address the pertinent demands made in each motion.

Dismissal -

By prior order of this Court, that portion of the defendant's motion seeking dismissal of the information charging a violation of V & TL §1192(3) based upon an allegedly defective verification was adjourned for the People to furnish an affidavit on personal knowledge demonstrating that the document entitled "Supplementary Report" [*2]was in compliance with the verification requirements of CPL 100.30(1). The remaining demands set forth in the defendant's omnibus motions were held in abeyance to abide the outcome of said issue. The People have now filed the subject affidavit and the within accusatory instrument is hereby supplemented in said regard. Upon review, this Court finds that the information is in compliance with the verification requirements of CPL 100.30(1). As such, dismissal on said ground is denied.

The defendant's motion to dismiss on facial sufficiency grounds is also denied. The defendant argues that the element of intoxication is not adequately demonstrated and that the information does not provide a non-hearsay allegation identifying the defendant. It is the opinion of this Court that the information, read in conjunction with the supporting documents accompanying it, is sufficient on its face within the meaning of CPL 100.40 and CPL 100.15. In this regard, it has been held that "[a]ccusatory instruments are to be accorded a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading' and will be upheld so long as they serve the fundamental purposes of providing the accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense' and in a form sufficiently detailed' to prevent a subsequent retrial for the same offense'." (People v. Prevete, 10 Misc 3d 78 [App Term 2nd Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005], citing People v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354 [2000]); see also People v. Miles, 64 NY2d 731 [1984]). The requirements for pretrial sufficiency of an information differ from the burden of proof required at trial. (See People v. Henderson, 92 NY2d 677 [1999]).

Suppression of statement(s) to Det. Murray -

The defendant's motion to suppress her statement(s) allegedly made in a phone call to Det. Murray on January 9, 2014 is denied. The moving papers argue that suppression or a pretrial hearing must be granted as to the statement(s) because the People have not provided any evidence that it was the defendant who uttered the statement(s). In response, the People have consented to a Huntley hearing. Initially, the Court notes that a Huntley hearing is held for the purpose of determining if a statement was involuntarily made. (People v. Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]; see CPL 60.45). It has been held that "the statutory procedures for pretrial hearings concerning the voluntariness of confessions made no change in the long-standing rule that any dispute as to whether the defendant made the statement is a factual matter for the jury'." (People v. Montgomery, 101 AD2d 893 [2nd Dept 1984], lv app dsmd 85 NY2d 977 [1995], citing People v. Washington, 51 NY2d 214 [1980]). The defendant relies upon People v. Campney (94 NY2d 307 [1999]) for the proposition that the Court is required to hold a pretrial hearing to determine whether a defendant made a statement. It is the opinion of this Court that such reliance is unavailing herein, as the holding of the Campney Court pertained to the admissibility of adoptive admissions, a circumstance not present in the matter sub judice.

Suppression of other statement(s) -

The defendant also moves to suppress several statement(s) she allegedly made on the date of the accident. First, the defendant moves to suppress statements allegedly made to ambulance and hospital personnel; namely, that she had five drinks/five alcoholic beverages that night. The defendant also moves to suppress statements allegedly made to Tyler Blase, an Advanced Emergency Medical Technician. The defendant is alleged to have stated to Mr. Blase that she "had a few cocktails" and that she admitted "to 5 alcoholic beverages." The defendant moves to suppress these statement(s) on the ground that they were "unlawfully obtained in violation of the physician-patient privilege." With regard to statement(s) allegedly made by the defendant to "hospital and ambulance personnel", the Court notes that the moving and answering papers provide neither the context nor the recipient of such statements. With regard to the statement(s) allegedly made to AEMT Tyler Blase, the parties argue whether or not the privilege set forth in CPLR 4504(a) is applicable to communications with such persons.

The Court need not resolve the applicability of the physician-patient privilege in this matter, however. Assuming, arguendo, that the privilege did apply to all of the statements in question and that such privilege was not waived, the defendant's motion to suppress would still be denied. The Court of Appeals held in People v. Greene (97 NY3d 277 [2007]) that, "even if there was a violation of the physician-patient privilege, the suppression of the evidence found as a result is not required" because the physician-patient privilege is statutory in nature and there is no constitutional right to privacy in physician-patient communications. As such, "a violation of a statute does not, without more, justify suppressing the evidence to which that violation leads." (People v. Greene, supra, at 280-81). Therefore, the defendant's motions to suppress statement(s) made to hospital and ambulance personnel and to AEMT Tyler Blase are denied.

Suppression of blood sample and test results -

The defendant moves to suppress the blood sample and the results of a chemical test of the sample drawn at Stony Brook Hospital. As disclosed in the People's discovery, the blood sample was drawn by a registered nurse at the hospital for "admissions and pre-op surgery" (see Affidavit of Allyson Kist dated November 9, 2013) and not at the direction of law enforcement. The blood sample was subsequently obtained by the Suffolk County Police Department pursuant to a search warrant. The Court notes that, although the V & TL §1192(2) charge was previously dismissed herein, because the results of any test of the alcoholic content of a defendant's blood would be a factor for the trier of fact to consider on a V & TL §1192(3) charge (see CJI2d[NY] Vehicle and Traffic Law 1192(3) [rev January 2008 and December 2014]), the defendant's motion to suppress same is not moot.

In support of the motion to suppress the blood sample and results, the defendant argues that they were obtained by means of a defective warrant, that they were not obtained pursuant to the provisions of V & TL §1194 and that they constitute fruit of the [*3]poisoned tree by reason of a violation of the physician-patient privilege. In response to the defendant's motion alleging a defective warrant, the People state that "the warrant does not properly allege a Penal Law violation" and that the blood test result "cannot support the [original] charge." (See People's Affirmation in Opposition dated January 22, 2015, ¶¶ 4 - 6). The People do not interpose any substantive opposition to the defendant's contention that the warrant was defective. Therefore, solely for purposes of this case and without making an independent determination as to the validity of the warrant, the defendant's motion to suppress the blood sample and test results is granted. By reason of the foregoing, the Court does not reach the defendant's remaining arguments on this motion.

The defendant's motion for discovery is granted to the extent that the People shall respond or deny the defendant's demands with specificity in corresponding lettered or numbered fashion on or before the next return date.

Brady and Rosario material -

The defendant's motions are denied, as the People have responded, aver that they are not currently in possession of any further discoverable material and acknowledge their continuing obligations pursuant to CPL 240.20(1)(h), 240.44, 240.45 and Brady v. Maryland (373 US 83). Thus, no further order of the Court is necessary or warranted at this time.

Sandoval/Ventimiglia/Molineux relief -

Motion granted to the extent that hearings shall be held immediately prior to trial. The People shall furnish the defendant with CPL 240.43 material immediately prior to said hearings.