| Mazurek v Gabryszak |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 52039(U) [57 Misc 3d 1206(A)] |
| Decided on October 28, 2015 |
| Supreme Court, Erie County |
| Troutman, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Kristy L. Mazurek,
Plaintiff,
against Dennis Gabryszak, ADAM LOCHER, SHELDON SILVER, NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY, and STATE OF NEW YORK, Defendants. |
Defendants, Dennis Gabryszak, by his attorney, CONNORS & VILARDO, LLP, Terrence M. Connors, Esq. and Nicholas A. Romano, Esq., of counsel, Sheldon Silver, by his attorney, HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP, Kenneth Kirschner, Esq. and Vi T. Vu, Esq., of counsel, and New York State Assembly and State of New York, by their attorney, ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, New York State [*2]Attorney General, Kathleen M. Kaczor, Esq., of counsel move for an order dismissing the Complaint on the ground that all claims are untimely or, in the alternative, on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action against them. Defendants, New York State Assembly and State of New York, also allege that this court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against them with the exception of claims pursuant to Executive Law §296 because the New York State Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction for said claims. However, these Defendants allege that Plaintiff has previously brought a duplicate action for the same relief in the Court of Claims such that this filing violates CPLR §3211(a)(4) and ask that her Executive Law claims be dismissed on this basis, as well.
Plaintiff, Kristy L. Mazurek, by her attorney, JOHN P. BARTOLOMEI & ASSOCIATES, John P. Bartolomei, Esq., of counsel, opposes, asserting that her causes of action arise out of the Defendants' violations of the terms of her employment contract and that her claims are, therefore, not time-barred, citing Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx, Co., 276 NY259 (1937). In the alternative she asks for leave to amend her complaint in compliance with CPLR §3014. She also opposes the defense claim that she has failed to state a cause of action for sexual discrimination, alleging that she has shown sufficient facts to state this cause of action.
Defendants reply that the underlying nature of Plaintiff's causes of action dictates the statute of limitations that applies to each and that Plaintiff cannot be permitted to extend the statute of limitations of her various claims by characterizing them as a breach of contract. They cite Brick, supra and Tighe v. Ginsberg, 146 AD2d 268 (4th Dept., 1989). They also assert that, in addition, she has failed to state a claim for breach of contract. There was never a written contract and her reliance on the employee handbook is misplaced because such handbooks do not constitute contracts in New York, citing Rich v. Coopervision, Inc., 198 AD2d 860 (4th Dept., 1993). Finally, they allege that she has abandoned most of her remaining claims or conceded the Defendants' positions on them by not opposing them, and as to the one she did oppose, she has failed to state a cause of action because her alleged facts are insufficient to give rise to a cause of action for sexual discrimination.
The legal arguments submitted by the parties were read and considered by the court but are not included in the official record of this case. The court finds that the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over the claims brought by Plaintiff against the State and the Assembly with the exception of those pursuant to the Executive Law, and as to those, Plaintiff has filed a duplicate action in that court. [*3]Therefore, all of Plaintiff's claims against the New York State Assembly and the State of New York are dismissed for either lack of jurisdiction or duplication of filing, as the case may be.
Defendants, Silver and Gabryszak's, motions are addressed next.
The court finds that Plaintiff left her employment in May of 2009 and commenced this action in November of 2014, more than 3 years after all of the causes of action set forth in her Complaint would have accrued, except for breach of contract. The court finds that the Plaintiff was an at-will employee and was not employed pursuant to a contract, express or implied. Therefore, she has failed to state a cause of action with respect to her Twelfth cause of action for breach of contract. This court has determined that Plaintiff is not able to extend the time in which to bring this action by alleging that her claims sound in contract, in any event. Consequently, all of Plaintiff's claims against Dennis Gabryszak and Sheldon Silver are dismissed as time-barred. This court does not need to reach Defendants' other arguments.
Although Defendant, Adam Locher, has not brought a motion to dismiss, the court exercises its discretion in light of the facts and the law to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims against him, as well.
ACCORDINGLY, Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted, the complaint against Defendant, Adam Locher, is dismissed, and Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend her complaint is denied.