Recitation in accordance with CPLR 2219 (a) of the papers considered on the motion of the plaintiff Luis Ramon Esteban Pena, filed on November 13, 2014, under motion sequence number two for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 granting summary judgment in his favor.

On March 26, 2014, plaintiff commenced the instant action for damages for personal injuries by filing a summons and complaint with the Kings County Clerk's office. By joint answer filed June 4, 2014, defendants Christina Spade and Luke Rettler joined issue. A note of issue has not been filed.

The instant action is to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff alleges in his complaint and bill of particulars that on November 15, 2013, he was sitting in his parked vehicle on 45th Street at or near the intersection of 4th Avenue, in Brooklyn, New York. At that date and time, Luke Rettler (hereinafter Rettler) was operating a motor vehicle owned by co-defendant Christina Spade (hereinafter Spade) and traveling on 45th Street. Rettler attempted to make a right turn onto 4th Avenue when he collided with Esteban.

It is well established that summary judgment may be granted only when it is clear that no triable issue of fact exists (Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). The burden is upon the moving party to make a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law by presenting evidence in admissible form demonstrating the absence of material facts (Guiffirda v Citibank, 100 NY2d 72 [2003]).

A failure to make that showing requires the denial of the summary judgment motion, regardless of the adequacy of the opposing papers (Ayotte v Gervasio, 81 NY2d 1062 [1993]). If a prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidentiary proof sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact (Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, supra, 68 NY2d at 324).

"Pursuant to CPLR 3212 (b) a court will grant a motion for summary judgment upon a determination that the movant's papers justify holding, as a matter of law, "that there is no defense to the cause of action or that the cause of action or defense has no merit." Further, all of the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent of the motion (Marine Midland Bank v Dino & Artie's Automatic Transmission Co., 168 AD2d 610 [1990])" (People ex rel. Spitzer v Grasso, 50 AD3d 535, 544 [1st Dept 2008]).

New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 provides:

(a) No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway as required in section eleven hundred sixty, or turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway, or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety...

The plaintiff established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence showing that Rettler violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 by attempting to make a right turn [*2]and collided with plaintiff's parked car (Marsicano v Dealer Storage Corp, 8 AD3d 451 [2nd Dept 2004]).

The plaintiff has demonstrated their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that the defendant's vehicle violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163. Furthermore, plaintiff has established that he is free from comparative fault.

As the plaintiffs have met their burden on liability the burden is shifted to the defendants to raise a triable issue of fact (Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320—324 [1986]). This they have not done. Defendant's testimony conflicts with plaintiff's deposition testimony in that defendant claims that plaintiff was parked in the crosswalk in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1202 (a) (1) (d).

Generally, it is for the trier of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause. However, the issue of proximate cause may be decided as a matter of law where only one conclusion may be drawn from the established facts. Additionally, there may be more than one proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries. To sustain the burden of proving a prima facie case, the plaintiff in a negligence action must generally show that the defendant's negligence was a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury. Although the issue of proximate cause is generally for the jury, liability may not be imposed upon a party who merely furnishes the condition or occasion for the occurrence of the event but is not one of its causes (Canals v Tilcon New York, Inc., — NYS3d —, 2016 WL 143737 [2nd Dept 2016][internal citations omitted]).

In the instant matter, taking the defendant's testimony as true and finding the plaintiff parked in the crosswalk in violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1202 (a) (1) (d), the defendant still does not raise a triable issue of fact. Defendant testified that he did not see plaintiff's vehicle prior to the collision and has not asserted any allegation of how plaintiff's violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1202 (a) contributed to the accident. Accordingly, the plaintiff's violation merely furnished the occasion for the accident but did not proximately cause the accident.

Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this Court.