Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Noach Dear, J.), entered November 28, 2014. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the complaint.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action in August 2014 to recover the purchase price of an automobile he had allegedly purchased from defendants. At a nonjury trial, plaintiff testified that defendants had sold him an automobile on September 15, 2013 and that he had been told that there were no problems with it. Plaintiff testified further that the vehicle had been declared a total loss prior to his purchase. The vehicle caught on fire on August 23, 2014. He is seeking a refund of the purchase price in the sum of $10,000. Defendant Susann Landriscina testified that she had sold the vehicle to plaintiff for $9,900 "as is," that she had signed the title over to plaintiff and that the vehicle had been in good working order at the time of the sale. Following the trial, the Civil Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to prove a prima facie case.

Upon our review of the record, we find that plaintiff did not meet his burden of establishing liability on the part of defendants, whether under the Uniform Commercial Code, general contract principles, or any other theory. We note that there was no proof establishing that defendant Domenick's Collision had sold the vehicle to plaintiff. As Susann Landriscina, who sold the vehicle to plaintiff, is not a "merchant" (UCC 2—104 [1]) of motor vehicles, no implied warranty of merchantability arose with the sale (see UCC 2—314). Moreover, no liability can be imposed based upon a breach of an express warranty (see UCC 2—313), since plaintiff failed to establish that any express warranty had been created. The alleged representation that the vehicle had "no problems" amounted to no more than sales talk or "puffery" (see Scaringe v Holstein, 103 AD2d 880, 881 [1984]). Similarly, there was no breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose (see UCC 2—315), as there was no showing of any "particular purpose" for which the vehicle was purchased. Even assuming that plaintiff is alleging a breach of contract and is seeking damages for "non-conformity of tender" (see UCC 2—714), he did not show that the tender of the vehicle failed to conform to the agreement. Moreover, the record established that plaintiff possessed the vehicle for almost one year before the vehicle caught on fire or he complained of any defect. We further find that, under the circumstances presented, there was [*2]insufficient evidence in the record to support a claim to recover the purchase price based upon a "revocation of acceptance" (see UCC 2-608).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Solomon, JJ., concur.