After inspecting the Grand Jury minutes, the Court finds that the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally sufficient in all respects to establish each count and that the instructions to the Grand Jury were proper. Defendant's motion to release the Grand Jury minutes is denied since release of the Grand Jury minutes is not necessary to assist the Court in determining defendant's motion, and, in any event, any benefit to such release at this juncture in the proceedings is outweighed by the need to preserve grand jury secrecy. See CPL 210.30(3); 190.25(4)(a).

On consent of the People, defendant's motion seeking a Huntley hearing is granted. However, defendant's motion for a Dunaway hearing is denied because defendant has been served with a sworn felony complaint that details the charges against him and he has failed to raise an issue of fact as to probable cause for his arrest. By merely including in his motion papers conclusory boilerplate language that he was arrested in the absence of probable cause, defendant has not controverted the specific information provided by the People concerning the basis for his arrest. Thus, defendant has not satisfied his burden of alleging sufficient facts to warrant a Dunaway hearing.

Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the approximately sixteen year delay in commencing the instant prosecution is a violation of his due process right to prompt prosecution is denied. Based upon the record, the People have satisfied their burden of establishing that the delay in prosecuting defendant was not unreasonable. See People v. Staley, 41 NY2d 789, 791 (1977). In reaching this conclusion the Court has considered the following factors: 1) the extent of the delay; 2) the reasons for the delay; 3) the nature of the underlying charge; 4) whether there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and 5) whether there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay. See People v. [*2]Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442 (1975).^[FN1]

On April 4, 1998, the dead body of Regina Haskins was found in her apartment. She had been shot multiple times in the head and leg. In the immediate aftermath of the crime, an exhaustive police investigation ensued, but failed to yield any suspects. (See Affirmation of ADA at p. 6.) Defendant did not become the prime suspect in the murder of Ms. Haskins until July 8, 2013, when the New York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) was notified by the national DNA database (CODIS) that the DNA profile generated from ballistics evidence recovered from the crime scene matched the DNA profile of defendant that was in CODIS based upon his prior conviction in Virginia. (See Affirmation of ADA at p. 6.) On February 14, 2014, based upon the DNA match and additional evidence procured linking defendant to the crime, defendant was arrested and charged in a felony complaint with murder in the second degree.

Although the delay in arresting defendant was indeed substantial, defendant's claim that the prosecution has not established good cause for the delay is unavailing. With respect to the DNA evidence, on September 6, 2000, OCME issued a report indicating that analysis and testing on two pieces of ballistics evidence recovered at the crime scene revealed the presence of the DNA profile of both Ms. Haskins and an unknown individual. On December 21, 2000, OCME uploaded the DNA profile of the unknown individual into CODIS.^[FN2] However, when this DNA profile was uploaded into CODIS, an error was made in the transcription of the alleles on one of the thirteen loci of the DNA that were examined. In October 2003, defendant was convicted in Virginia and his DNA profile was entered into CODIS. Due to the transcription error noted above, when defendant's convicted offender profile was entered into CODIS, the CODIS software was prevented from determining that there was a match between the DNA profile developed from the crime scene ballistics evidence and defendant's convicted offender DNA profile. On July 8, 2013, CODIS changed its notification parameters whereby local databank administrators would now be notified of a match between a convicted offender's DNA profile and the DNA profile developed from case evidence where candidate specimens matched on all but one loci. Based on this change in notification parameters, on July 8, 2013, utilizing the new parameters, CODIS notified OCME that the DNA profile developed from the ballistic evidence recovered from Ms. Haskin's apartment matched the convicted offender DNA profile of defendant that had been stored in CODIS. (See Affirmation of ADA at pp. 4-6.)

The transcription error detailed above, which accounts for a substantial part of the prearrest delay, does not mandate dismissal of the indictment. This is so because: 1) the underlying charge of murder is the most serious of offenses; 2) defendant remained at liberty until he was arrested on February 14, 2014; and 3) there is no indication of bad faith on the part [*3]of law enforcement with respect to the cause of the delay.^[FN3] See People v. Decker, supra,13 NY3d at 15 (good cause for 15 year delay found where defendant charged with murder and People demonstrated that decision not to proceed with prosecution earlier was based on a good-faith determination that the evidence was insufficient at that time); People v. Nazario, 85 AD3d 577 (1st Dept. 2011)(12 year investigative delay was satisfactorily explained where defendant charged with murder and People established that the delay was due to the People's attempts to acquire substantial corroborating evidence and not due to bad faith). In addition, other than an unspecific conjecture proffered by defendant that the delay will impede his ability to locate potential witnesses to the shooting, defendant has failed to advance convincingly any claim or contention that his defense will be significantly impaired by the delay. See People v. Decker, supra, 13 NY3d at 16 (court finds notwithstanding the fact that with a 15 year delay witnesses' memories will fade and witnesses will be harder to locate, defendant still failed to establish that the defense was significantly impaired); People v. Vernace, supra, 96 NY2d at 887 (extensive delay not a basis for a finding of a due process violation even though such delay may result in some prejudice to defendant; court notes that delay will also make the case against defendant more difficult to prove). Having failed to establish prejudice, or any other basis for dismissal on this ground, defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his due process right to prompt prosecution is denied. See People v. Guerrero, 126 AD3d 613 (1st Dept. 2015)(no constitutional speedy trial violation where 13-year delay and People's inability to proceed explained by inability to prosecute defendant until DNA match).

This is the decision and order of the Court.