Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, Fifth District (Vincent J. Martorana, J.), entered March 3, 2014. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, upon finding in favor of plaintiff in the principal sum of $3,959 on its cause of action and in favor of defendant in the principal sum of $200 on his counterclaim, awarded plaintiff the net principal sum of $3,759.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this small claims action seeking to recover the principal sum of $3,959, representing the amount allegedly due for installing an aluminum awning pursuant to a written contract entered into with defendant. Defendant subsequently commenced a separate small claims action against plaintiff for the return of his $3,000 deposit, alleging that plaintiff had breached the contract. At trial, the actions were consolidated under plaintiff's index number, and defendant's action was deemed a counterclaim. Following the trial, the District Court, upon finding in favor of plaintiff in the principal sum of $3,959 on its cause of action and in favor of defendant in the principal sum of $200 on the counterclaim, awarded plaintiff the net principal sum of $3,759. On appeal, defendant argues, among other things, that plaintiff should not have been permitted to recover under the contract since the contract violated General Business Law § 771 by not "containing essential statutory provisions" and that, in any event, the judgment did not provide substantial justice.

General Business Law § 771 (1) provides that "[e]very home improvement contract subject to the provisions of this article, and all amendments thereto, shall be evidenced by a writing and shall be signed by all the parties to the contract." The writing shall contain, among other things, the name, address, telephone number and license number of the contractor, a notice to the owner regarding liens by contractors and subcontractors, and a notice to the owner regarding the deposit of payments into escrow accounts. General Business Law § 770 (6) defines a "home improvement contract" as "an agreement for the performance of home improvement, between a home improvement contractor and an owner, and where the aggregate contract price specified in one or more home improvement contracts, including all labor, services and materials to be furnished by the home improvement contractor, exceeds five hundred dollars." Thus, as it is undisputed that plaintiff is a home improvement contractor (see General Business Law § 770 [5]), the installation of the awning involved herein is a home improvement subject to General Business Law article 36-A. In addition, there is no dispute that plaintiff's contract failed to fully [*2]comply with the provisions of General Business Law § 771 (1).

While there are cases barring recovery by a home improvement contractor where the contractor fails to fully comply with consumer protection legislation (see Frank v Feiss, 266 AD2d 825 [1999]; Harter v Krause, 250 AD2d 984 [1998]), this case falls within the cases that have carved out an exception to the rule requiring full compliance with General Business Law § 771 (see Porter v Bryant, 256 AD2d 395 [1998]; Wowaka & Sons, Inc. v Pardell, 242 AD2d 1 [1998]; Island Wide Heating & Air Conditioning v Sachs, 189 Misc 2d 355 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2001]; see also Lloyd Capital Corp. v Pat Henchar, Inc., 80 NY2d 124 [1992]). Insofar as the loss of judicial recourse in this case is out of proportion to the requirements of public policy (see Wowaka & Sons, Inc., 242 AD2d at 6), plaintiff's failure to fully comply with the statute should not bar its recovery.

In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UDCA 1807; see UDCA 1804; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). This deference applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126). Upon a review of the record, we find that there is ample support for the District Court's determination and, thus, that substantial justice was done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see UDCA 1804, 1807; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d at 126).

Defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Marano, P.J., Iannacci and Garguilo, JJ., concur.