The plaintiff commenced this breach of contract action, against his former client, to recover legal fees in the sum of $10,214.50 with interest thereon from June 2, 2015, together with costs and disbursements.

The plaintiff now moves for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212, granting summary judgment in his favor. The plaintiff also seeks to dismiss the defendant's two (2) counterclaims based upon res judicata and collateral estoppel, and moves for sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130.1.1.

Summary judgment is drastic relief - - it denies one party the opportunity to go to trial. Thus, summary judgment should only be granted where there are no triable issues of fact (see Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361 [1974]). The focus for the court is on issue finding, not issue determining (see Hantz v Fishman, 155 AD2d 415 [2d Dept 1989]).

The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering evidence in admissible form to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact. Failure to make such a prima facie showing requires [*2]denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Winegrad v NY Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Once the movant has demonstrated a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party, to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact, which require a trial of the action (see Zuckerman v New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

In support of the motion at bar, the plaintiff submits, inter alia, his detailed affidavit, which sets forth the nature of the legal services provided to the defendant; a copy of the Retainer Agreement, dated July 10, 2014, which bears the defendant's signature thereon; a copy of the plaintiff's bill, detailing the hours expended in connection with his representation of the defendant in the Nassau County Supreme Court Action (Docket No.604695/14); a copy of the Decision and Order of the Supreme Court (Bruno, J.) dated July 9, 2015, which relieved the plaintiff herein as attorney for the defendant pursuant to CPLR 321(b) and granted him a charging lien in the sum of $10,214.50 ; and a copy of the indictment from the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, dated July 15, 2015 in an action entitled United States of America v Brandon Lisi and Katerina Arvanitakis.

The above-noted sworn statements and documentation submitted therewith sufficiently demonstrate that the plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant to represent him in an action in the Supreme Court of Nassau County. It further shows that from July 10, 2014 through June 2, 2015, legal services in connection with that representation were rendered, to wit: the filing of a summons and complaint; various document review; Demand and Notice of an EBT; the filing a motion to compel; the taking of a deposition, the service of a subpoena etc., and that the balance of $10,214.50 remains outstanding. Accordingly, as the plaintiff has met its burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish a triable issue of fact.

In opposition, the defendant submits, inter alia, the affirmation of Genevieve Lane Lopresti, Esq, and the affidavits of Alexandro and Sandy Kopoulos. Both the defendant and his wife argue, among other things, that the retainer agreement and the fees set forth therein are improper. Specifically, they claim that the "total fee... was not to exceed $5,000.00." (Alexandro Kopoulos Affidavit ¶5). However, the language of the retainer agreement belies this conclusion. In pertinent part the agreement provides:

"This will confirm that you have retained me to seek recovery from Ms. Arvanitakis the exorbitant legal fees she charged you in connection with the matters surrounding the controversy concerning monies you were to receive .... . In consideration of the services to be rendered by me, you will have paid me my minimum fee of $5,000.00. My minimum fee for handling this matter to a conclusion and is based upon committing myself, the value of the services, the reservation of time, the nature of the case, the issues involved and other factors affecting an overall fee. The retainer shall be credited toward an hourly rate of $350.00 per hour for the time I expend. You will be billed after the retainer has [*3]been depleted. The retainer and fee does not include: (a) any other actions or proceedings; (b) work in appellate courts; or (c) out-of-pocket expenses or disbursements...."

"[W]hen the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties must be found within the four corners of the contract, giving practical interpretation to the language employed and the parties' reasonable expectations. Thus, a written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms" (Dysal, Inc. v. Hub Props. Trust, 92 AD3d 826, 827 [2d Dept 2012]). Furthermore, "[i]nterpretation of an unambiguous contract provision is a function for the court, and matters extrinsic to the agreement may not be considered when the intent of the parties can be gleaned from the face of the instrument. A court should not imply a term which the parties themselves failed to include" (2632 Realty Dev. Corp. v. 299 Main St., LLC, 94 AD3d 743, 745 [2d Dept 2012]; see also Westchester County Correction Officers Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v County of Westchester, 99 AD3d 998, 999 [2d Dept 2012]).

Here, the retainer agreement, which was signed by the defendant on July 10, 2014, is clear on its face. The interpretation the defendant suggests, to wit: that the fees were capped at $5,000.00 is in direct contradiction of the plain language of the agreement. Nor, does the court find persuasive the defendant's claim that the plaintiff's representation of him in the Supreme Court action was somehow deficient, which would forgive his obligation to pay legal fees. In fact, in connection with that representation, the Supreme Court awarded the plaintiff a charging lien for those outstanding fees, when plaintiff moved by Order to Show Cause to be relieved as counsel on the ground of defendant's "refusal to acknowledge his obligations" of payment (see Plaintiff's Exhibits C and E). Accordingly, and having raised no other grounds in opposition, the defendant has failed to raise an issue of fact for trial.

In view of the foregoing, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted. Let judgment be entered in the sum of $10,214.50 with interest thereon from June 2, 2015, together with costs and disbursements.

The portion of the plaintiff's motion which seeks to dismiss the defendant's counterclaims, which assert causes of action for legal malpractice is granted. Said counterclaims are hereby dismissed.

The plaintiff's request for sanctions in accordance with 22 NYCRR§ 130.1.1. is denied, as without merit.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

So Ordered: