Upon the following papers numbered 1 to 56 read on this (1) motion by Prodject, LLC (Prodject), for summary judgment in its favor pursuant to CPLR 3212; (2) motion by Skyline Group NYC, Inc., d/b/a Skylight Group, i/s/h/a Skylight Group, d/b/a Skylights Soho, and Bridge Land Hudson, LLC ("Skyline/Bridge Land"), for summary judgment in their favor pursuant to CPLR 3212; and (3) motion by Cartier, a division of Richemont North America, Inc., ("Cartier"), to dismiss all claims and cross claims against it and, alternatively, for a conditional order of summary judgment on its claim for common law indemnification from Kadan and Prodject:

Plaintiff in this negligence/labor law action seeks damages for personal injuries sustained on April 13, 2012, while engaged in construction work at 275 Hudson Street, in New York City ("the premises"). The premises are owned by Bridge Land and leased to nonparty Skylight, LLC. Defendant/third-party plaintiff Skyline Group managed the property for Skylight, LLC. Skylight, LLC is in the business of event venue development and on April 3, 2012, it entered into a lease agreement with Cartier, a division of Richemont North America, Inc. ("Cartier"), for the short term lease of the premises. Cartier leased the same for the purpose of hosting an event known as "Juste un Clou Discotheque," a posh after-party celebrating the launch of a new Cartier jewelry line featuring performances by celebrity musical guests. Cartier hired Prodject to design the event, manage the construction at the premises, and to hire and coordinate contractors. Cartier arranged to have erected/constructed staging, seating area, and a disc jockey booth. Prodject, in collaboration with Cartier, designed the look of the space, created drawings, and submitted the drawings to Kadan, a contractor. Kadan converted the drawings into build-out specifications. The event was held on April 12, 2012. On the date of plaintiff's accident, Kadan and its subcontractor, Fairfield Pro (plaintiff's employer), were in the process of breaking down the staging. Plaintiff was working on the breakdown of staging when a piece of plywood he was walking on collapsed, causing him to fall and sustain personal injury. Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated their duties under Labor Law §§200, 240(1) and 241(6). As provided above, Prodject, Skyline/Bridge Land and Cartier move for summary judgment in their favor. The motions are opposed by the respective parties.

Plaintiff testified at his deposition as follows: At the time of the subject accident, he was working for Fairfield Pro as a production carpenter. His duties included assembling and disassembling sets/stages as well as loading and unloading materials. Plaintiff has held this job [*2]for five years. The accident occurred on April 13, 2012 at the subject premises. The seating area consisted of 4x8 sections of steel deck bolted or screwed together over a grid of support scaffolding. To accommodate the oval shape of the dance floor in the center of the room, Kadan and Fairfield employees made custom pieces of decking consisting of 2x4 sheets of plywood. The first level of the multi-tiered seating was slightly over 5 ½ feet tall, according to the plans. Metal handrails enclosed the elevated seating area at the time of the event. The handrails had been removed at the time of the accident.

Plaintiff was dismantling walling with another worker at the back of the stage when he fell as he was stepping up from the stage to the elevated seating area. As he fell to the floor, the right side of his torso or chest struck the edge of the steel deck that the custom piece of plywood was fitted into. While plaintiff estimated in his deposition that the height differential from the stage to the seating area was around 6 to 12 inches, the plans indicate that the height differential was closer to 2 ½ feet. Plaintiff testified that based on his experience in the field, he believes that someone removed the bolts that held the decking together in the area in question. In fact, he is certain that the bolts were installed during the event because the failure to do so would have resulted in a collapse during the event. As such, plaintiff testified, he believes that the bolts were removed prior to his fall. Furthermore, prior to the incident, plaintiff observed at least three workers under the elevated seating area dismantling the elevated seating area, specifically, he observed the workers removing the bracing under the decking. These braces give the vertical legs support.

Christine Goppel, Assistant Vice President of Public Relations Events, testified on behalf of Cartier that Cartier hired Prodject to help Cartier with the design and implementation of the event; to manage the logistics on the event night, and to negotiate terms. Goppel's duties included overseeing strategic events and sponsorship initiatives for Cartier. Goppel is familiar with the event that took place on April 12, 2012, at the Skylight Studios. In order to hold the event at the premises, Cartier entered into a location agreement to use the Skylight Studios. However, Goppel does not recall the actual name of the entity that entered into the agreement with Cartier. Goppel believes that the location agreement was for approximately one week. Essentially, Goppel entered into the location agreement to hold an event at the premises. Prior to entering into the agreement, Goppel visited the location which, at the time, was essentially a large empty space. In order to hold the event, Goppel hired Prodject to assist with the design and implementation of the event. There was no written agreement between Cartier and Prodject. Cartier told Prodject that it wanted the event to have a 1970's retro look and feel. However, Cartier did not provide Prodject with any specific plans. Prodject then hired Kadan to preform the assembly or build out the project. Cartier, however, did not have any direct contact with Kadan during the assembly or disassembly of the event. She believes that Prodject also hired contractors for lighting and sound. Cartier employees were not involved in the assembly or disassembling of the stage for the event and, therefore, did not give any instructions to anyone regarding how the elevated area around the dance floor was to be supported. Goppel visited the location on one occasion while the stage was being assembled. The purpose of the visit was to conduct a walk-through for logistics purposes. Cartier did not have a representative onsite during the disassembling of the stage.

Branko Balic testified on behalf of Kadan, as follows: He was Kadan's project manager. [*3]Prodject hired Kadan to handle the build-out of a set at the premises for Cartier. Prodject managed the onsite coordination between vendors, Kadan, lighting, etc. Prodject submitted a production schedule to Kadan before the actual event. Dominic Weir from Prodject was physically on site during the build out and breakdown of the space. Weir oversaw all the vendors during the breakdown of the space and was on site on behalf of Prodject to oversee that the trades were doing the job they were hired to do. Balic went to Prodject when he had a question. Weir was present on the day plaintiff had his accident. Balic was under the supervision of Weir , and Weir had the authority to shut down the work site if it was unsafe at any time.

Jennifer Blumin testified on behalf of Skyline as follows: Skyline is the managing agent hired by Skylight LLC for the Cartier project/event. Prodject hired Kadan. Prodject was the producer of the event and in charge of the event.

Jihye Song is a partner of Prodject and Prodject is a event designer/producer. Song testified that Prodject was hired by Cartier to help them design and execute the Cartier project. Kris Keely was Prodject's project manager for this event, and Keely would oversee the schedule and layout. Prodject would have to approve blueprints in general terms and had to approve the materials being used. While Kadan was assembling the set, it was required that one or two employees from Prodject be on the premises the entire time. The Prodject employee(s) would largely be there to maintain the schedule, check in on all vendors and make sure they were not running late. Prodject could advise the trade if the stage was not being built according to the floor plan. Prodject hired the security company for the event. After the event, Prodject employees were to maintain the schedule to make sure the venue itself wasn't being damaged. It was between Prodject or Kadan to determine the height of the different elevations between the dance floor and the seating area, such as whether it should be four feet as opposed to ten or another. Prodject had the authority to stop the work during the assembly process or disassembly process if they saw an unsafe condition taking place.

Kristopher Keeley is employed by Prodject as a project director, and his duties included coordinating a number of project managers, some of which were staff. Keeley testified that Dominick Weir was the project manager for the event at Skylight. While Keeley "occasionally" visited the venue, Weir was at the location before and during the party. He did not know if Weir was at the location site after the event. It was Weir's job to ensure that everything was proceeding along the time line and would keep Keeley informed to ensure that the project was proceeding along the time line. It was Prodject's job to draw the plan and facilitate the work. Kadan worked off the plans, to generate blue prints. Weir was responsible for ensuring that the build out was done in accordance with the specifications of the layout plan, and expected to report any digression from layout plan to Keeley.

Bryan Cho, Vice-President of Bridge Land submitted an affidavit indicating the following. Briefly, Bridge Land owns the subject property. At no time did Bridge Land, its employees or anyone on its behalf, direct manage, supervise, hire, retain, control or oversee any portion of the Cartier event, including the construction and subsequent breakdown of the staging.

The branches of the motion by Prodject which are for summary judgment dismissing all claims and cross claims against it pursuant to Labor Law §§240(1) and 241(6), are denied.

Labor Law § 240 (1) imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners and general contractors and their agents to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in [*4]elevated work sites (see McCarthy v Turner Constr., Inc., 17 NY3d 369, 374 [2011]). Labor Law § 241 (6) requires that owners and contractors and their agents "provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety" for workers and comply with specific safety rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Labor (Labor Law § 241 [6]; see Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501-502 [1993]). A general contractor may be held liable under Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6) if it was "responsible for coordinating and supervising the entire construction project and was invested with a concomitant power to enforce safety standards and to hire responsible contractors" (Temperino v DRA, Inc., 75 AD3d 543, 544 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; Aversano v JWH Contr., LLC, 37 AD3d 745 [2007]; Kulaszewski v Clinton Disposal Servs., 272 AD2d 855 [2000]). Moreover, a contractor may be held liable as an agent of the owner, where it had the authority to supervise and control the work at issue (see Herrel v West, 82 AD3d 933 [2011]; Bakhtadze v Riddle, 56 AD3d 589 [2008]).

Here, Prodject failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6) causes of action insofar as asserted against it by demonstrating that it was neither a general contractor nor an agent of the owner with regard to the plaintiff's work (see Herrel v West, 82 AD3d 933 [2011]; Kilmetis v Creative Pool & Spa, Inc., 74 AD3d 1289 [2010]; Temperino v DRA, Inc., 75 AD3d 543 [2010]; Aversano v JWH Contr., LLC, 37 AD3d 745 [2007]). The testimony of various parties raise triable issues of fact as to whether Prodject was a general contractor on the job site because it had the authority to supervise and control the work of all the trades, it performed the same duties as a contractor, it coordinated and was the overall supervisor for the work being performed, it could enforce safety standards, it hired and negotiated the responsible contractors and oversaw the construction progress. Prodject's "broad responsibility was both that of coordinator and overall supervisor for all the work being performed on the job site" (Walls v Turner Constr. Co., supra at 864; see Kenny v Fuller Co., 87 AD2d 183, 190 [1982]). With respect to safety concerns in particular, Prodject assumed the owner's authority, and responsibility, to "demand compliance" with applicable safety requirements and to stop the work upon detecting any unsafe practice or condition. Furthermore, there is evidence in the record that Keeley from Prodject forwarded an email to Kadan requesting that Kadan install a crude railing to prevent engineers and designers "from toppling backwards to their doom;" and that Keeley sent an email to Kadan requesting that Kadan cut approximately 25' of trusses from the southernmost lengths, as well as a change in the layout of the stage and reconfiguration of the lighting. At a minimum, these emails, in conjunction with the testimony establish that Prodject was responsible for the overall safety of the workers and acted in the capacity of a general contractor. Accordingly, the branches of the motion by Prodject which are for summary judgment dismissing all claims and cross claims against it pursuant to Labor Law §§240(1) and 241(6), are denied.

The branch of the motion which is to dismiss plaintiff's claims under Labor Law §200, as against Prodject, is also denied. Labor Law § 200 is a codification of the common-law duty of landowners and general contractors to provide workers with a reasonably safe place to work (see Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877 [1993]; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501-502 [1993]). "To be held liable under Labor Law § 200 for injuries arising from the manner in which work is performed, a defendant must have authority to [*5]exercise supervision and control over the work' " (Rojas v Schwartz, 74 AD3d 1046, 1046 [2010], quoting Gallello v MARJ Distribs., Inc., 50 AD3d 734, 735 [2008]; see Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121, 127-128 [2008]). Where a plaintiff's injuries arise not from the manner in which the work was performed, but from a dangerous condition on the premises, a defendant may be liable under Labor Law § 200 if it " either created the dangerous condition that caused the accident or had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition' " (Rojas v Schwartz, 74 AD3d at 1047, quoting Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 61 [2008]). Here, Prodject failed to established, prima facie, both that it did not create or have actual or constructive notice of the alleged condition which caused the injured plaintiff's injury, and that it lacked the authority to supervise or control the means and methods of the injured plaintiff's work (see generally id.; Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121 [2008]).

The branch of the motion by Skyline and Bridge Land which is for summary judgment in their favor dismissing plaintiff's claims under Labor Law §§240(1) and 241 (6), as against Bridge Land is granted as unopposed. The branches of the motion by Skyline and Bridge Land which are to dismiss plaintiff's labor law 200, 240(1) and 241(6) claims against Skyline are denied.

On plaintiff's claims under Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241(6), Skyline can be held liable if it was a "statutory agent" of the owner (Voultepsis v Gumley-Haft-Klierer, Inc., 60 AD3d 524, 525, 875 N.Y.S.2d 74 [2009]). Statutory agency turns on the authority to supervise and control the employee (see Fox v Brozman-Archer Realty Servs., 266 AD2d 97, 98-99 [1999]), and "[o]nly upon obtaining the authority to supervise and control does the third party fall within the class of those having nondelegable liability as an agent' under sections 240 and 241" (Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311, 318 [1981]). Here, there was evidence that Skyline, pursuant to the Location Agreement signed on its behalf by Jennifer Blumin, had a contractual obligation to maintain the premises as an owner and ensure that the premises was in compliance with applicable safety laws. Skyline also had an employee at the premises, namely, Daniel Blumin, the facilities manager, who was present at the time of the accident. Jennifer Blumin also testified that other employees from Skyline were involved in the preparation of the premises for the event. Accordingly, there are questions of fact as to the "scope" of Skyline's "oversight and control of the work" for statutory agency purposes (see Aponte v City of New York, 55 AD3d 485 [2008]). The record also presents triable issues regarding plaintiffs' claim under Labor Law § 200, both as to whether Skyline had the authority to control the activity that brought about plaintiff's alleged injury, and as to whether Skyline had actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition (see e.g. Fresco v 157 E. 72nd St. Condominium, 2 AD3d 326, 328 [2003], lv dismissed 3 NY3d 630 [2004]).

The branches of the motion by Cartier which are to dismiss the claims against it pursuant to Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1) and 241(6), are granted.

Labor Law § 240 (1) imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners and general contractors and their agents to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites (see McCarthy v Turner Constr., Inc., 17 NY3d 369, 374 [2011]). Labor Law § 241 (6) requires that owners and contractors and their agents "provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety" for workers and comply with specific safety rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Labor (Labor Law § 241 [6]; see Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501-502 [1993]). With [*6]respect to both statutes, the term "owner" encompasses a "person who has an interest in the property and who fulfilled the role of owner by contracting to have work performed for his [or her] benefit" (Copertino v Ward, 100 AD2d 565, 566, 473 NYS2d 494; see Kwang Ho Kim v D & W Shin Realty Corp., 47 AD3d 616, 618, 852 NYS2d 138). A party is deemed to be an agent of an owner or contractor under the Labor Law when it has the " ability to control the activity which brought about the injury' " (Guclu v 900 Eighth Ave. Condominium, LLC, 81 AD3d at 593, quoting Walls v Turner Constr. Co., 4 NY3d 861, 863-864 [2005]; see Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311, 317-318 [1981]). A lessee of real property is considered to be an owner within the meaning of the law if it hires a contractor and has the right to control the work at the property (see Guclu v 900 Eighth Ave. Condominium, LLC, 81 AD3d at 593; see also Ferluckaj v Goldman Sachs & Co., 12 NY3d 316, 320). Moreover, the term owner "may also apply to a lessee, where the lessee has the right or authority to control the work site, even if the lessee did not hire the general contractor" (Zaher v Shopwell, Inc., 18 AD3d 339, 339-340 [2005]; see Bart v Universal Pictures, 277 AD2d 4 [2000]). The key question is whether the defendant had the right to insist that proper safety practices were followed (see Grilikhes v International Tile & Stone Show Expos, 90 AD3d 480 [2011]; Bart v Universal Pictures, 277 AD2d 4 [2000]; Copertino v Ward, 100 AD2d 565 [1984]).

Here, Cartier established, prima facie, that it was not an owner or agent within the meaning of the Labor Law (see Zaher v Shopwell, Inc., 18 AD3d 339 [2005]). The undisputed record indicates that Cartier did not hire Kadan or Fairfield Pro and did not control the work of the contractors at the subject location. In fact, it appears that Cartier did not have any contact with Kaden or Fairfield Pro, and Cartier's employees did not give any instructions to anyone regarding how the work was to be performed at the premises. Based upon the deposition transcripts, Prodject hired Kadan and Kadan then hired Fairfield Pro. Cartier did not have to approve the use of Kadan, and did not have to approve the structural blue prints that were prepared by Kadan as this was outside of the scope of Cartier's knowledge and expertise. Furthermore, Cartier did not have the ability to control the work that brought about the injury, and did not have the right to insist that proper safety practices be followed by Kadan and Fairfield Pro (see Alfonso v Pac. Classon Realty, LLC, 101 AD3d 768, 770 [2012]).

As to Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence, "Labor Law § 200(1) is a codification of the common-law duty of an owner or general contractor to provide workers with a safe place to work" (Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 60, 866 NYS2d 323; see Ross v Curtis—Palmer Hydro—Elec. Co., 81 NY2d at 505, 601 NYS2d 49, 618 N.E.2d 82). Where, as here, a plaintiff's claim arises out of alleged defects or dangers in the methods or materials of the work, to prevail on a Labor Law § 200 cause of action, the plaintiff must show that the defendant "had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work" (Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d at 61, 866 NYS2d 323; see Pilato v 866 U.N. Plaza Assoc., LLC, 77 AD3d 644, 646, 909 N.Y.S.2d 80). "A defendant has the authority to supervise or control the work for purposes of Labor Law § 200 when that defendant bears the responsibility for the manner in which the work is performed" (Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d at 62, 866 NYS2d 323). "[T]he right to generally supervise the work, stop the contractor's work if a safety violation is noted, or to ensure compliance with safety regulations and contract specifications is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 200 or for common-law negligence" (Austin v Consolidated Edison, Inc., 79 [*7]AD3d 682, 684, 913 N.Y.S.2d 684 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Cambizaca v New York City Tr. Auth., 57 AD3d 701, 871 NYS2d 220).

Here, Cartier established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence insofar as asserted against it through the aforementioned deposition testimony, which demonstrated that it did not have the authority to supervise or control the manner in which Kadan or Prodject performed their work (see Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877, 609 N.Y.S.2d 168, 631 N.E.2d 110; Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311, 317, 445 N.Y.S.2d 127, 429 N.E.2d 805; Allan v DHL Exp. (USA), Inc., 99 AD3d 828, 831�32, 952 NYS2d 275, 279 [2012]; Pilato v 866 U.N. Plaza Assoc., LLC, 77 AD3d at 646, 909 NYS2d 80; Jenkins v Walter Realty, Inc., 71 AD3d 954, 898 NYS2d 56; Enos v Werlatone, Inc., 68 AD3d 712, 888 NYS2d 902; Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d at 62—63, 866 N.Y.S.2d 323). Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the motion by defendant Prodject to dismiss all claims and cross claims against it is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the branches of the motion by defendant Bridge Land for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's Labor Law §§240(1) and 241 (6) claims against it is granted without opposition; and it is further

ORDERED that the branches of the motion by defendant Skyline

ORDERED that the motion by defendant Cartier to dismiss the claims and cross claims against it is granted.