[*1]
People v Bacchus (Latoya)
2016 NY Slip Op 51168(U) [52 Misc 3d 140(A)]
Decided on July 26, 2016
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on July 26, 2016
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., SOLOMON and ELLIOT, JJ.
2013-2256 K CR

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Latoya Bacchus, Appellant.


Appeal by defendant, as limited by her brief, from a sentence of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Matthew A. Sciarrino, Jr., J.), imposed September 16, 2013, upon her conviction of assault in the third degree, upon her plea of guilty.

ORDERED that the sentence is affirmed.

Defendant, while represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00 [1]), stemming from allegations that, after a verbal dispute with two other women, she punched them and, after pushing them to the ground, repeatedly kicked them. In accordance with the terms of a plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to three years' probation (see Penal Law § 65.00 [3] [b] [i]), and final orders of protection were issued directing defendant to stay away from the victims. The court also granted defendant a certificate of relief from disabilities. As limited by her brief, defendant contends on appeal that her sentence of probation is excessive and that, to avoid her serving the remaining period of probation, the sentence should be modified to one day incarceration, with time served, or to an unconditional discharge.

As a general rule, a defendant who has been sentenced according to the terms of a bargained-for plea and sentencing agreement will not be heard to complain that the sentence was unduly harsh or excessive (see People v Galvez, 72 AD3d 838 [2010]; People v Caguana, 69 AD3d 953 [2010]; People v Ubiles, 59 AD3d 572 [2009]; People v Grigg, 53 AD3d 629 [2008]). Under the circumstances presented, we find no basis to deviate from that rule. The sentence was not excessive as it did not constitute an abuse of sentencing discretion or a failure to observe sentencing principles, and defendant has not demonstrated the existence of mitigating or extraordinary circumstances (see People v Farrar, 52 NY2d 302 [1982]; People v Vega, 73 AD3d 1218 [2010]; People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).

Accordingly, the sentence is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Solomon and Elliot, JJ., concur.


Decision Date: July 26, 2016