Reed Smith LLP, New York (Steven Cooper of counsel), for appellants.

Kirkland & Ellis LLP, New York (Andrew M. Genser, and John F. Hartmann of the bar of the State of Illinois, admitted pro hac vice of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered August 22, 2016, deemed an appeal from judgment (CPLR 5520 [c]), same court and Justice, entered September 26, 2016, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, dismissing plaintiffs' malpractice claim, and so considered, said judgment unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The engagement letter, which stated that it covered a period of seven months, provided that any action brought relating to the engagement must be commenced within one year of the accrual of the cause of action. The accrual of plaintiffs' accounting malpractice claim was on January 21, 2009, the date decedent signed the last document that was part of the estate tax plan formulated by defendant (see Ackerman v Price Waterhouse, 84 NY2d 535, 541 [1994]; Williamson v PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 9 NY3d 1, 7-8 [2007]). This action was not commenced until September 2015, and is untimely.

Plaintiffs may not avail themselves of the continuous representation tolling doctrine because the limitations period was contractual, not statutory, and was reasonable. The engagement letter indicated that decedent, a sophisticated and experienced businessman, and defendant, did not necessarily expect the representation to continue after the plan was in place, since the engagement expressly ended approximately seven months after the agreement was signed (see Executive Plaza, LLC v Peerless Ins. Co., 22 NY3d 511, 518 [2014]).

Equitable estoppel is equally inapplicable because the engagement letter made clear that any estate tax plan defendant formulated was subject to challenge by taxing authorities. Moreover, the complaint alleged that in April 2009, within the limitations period, defendant advised plaintiffs that the estate plan would likely be closely scrutinized by the IRS (see Putter v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 7 NY3d 548, 553 [2006]). Concur—Acosta, J.P., Richter, Andrias, Kahn and Gesmer, JJ.

Motion to take judicial notice denied. [Prior Case History: 2016 NY Slip Op 31604(U).]

Alvarado v French Council LLC

149 AD3d ?

French Council LLC, Alvarado v

149 AD3d ?

2017 NY Slip Op 03052

Alvarado v French Council LLC149 AD3d ?

Alvarado v French Council LLC

[—– NYS3d —–]

[*2]

Angel Alvarado, Also Known as Angel Albarado, Appellant, v French Council LLC et al., Respondents. Sim & Record, LLP, Bayside (Sang J. Sim of counsel), for appellant. Mischel & Horn, PC, New York (Scott T. Horn of counsel), for French Council LLC, respondent. Kaufman Borgeest & Ryan LLP, Valhalla (Edward J. Guardaro, Jr. of counsel), for Lowell Hotel Properties, LLC, Lowell Hotel Associates, L.P., and Bruce Caporusso, respondents. Law Office of James J. Toomey, New York (Evy L. Kazansky of counsel), for Kensico Properties, N.V. Inc., respondent. HEADNOTES Labor Safe Place to Work Fall from Makeshift Scaffold Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Robert D. Kalish, J.), entered February 19, 2016, which granted defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and denied plaintiff's cross motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Plaintiff was injured when, while doing plastering work during the course of a renovation of a residence, he fell approximately six feet from a makeshift scaffold. The record shows that plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims, which were premised on the theory that plaintiff's injuries arose from the means and methods of his work, were properly dismissed. Plaintiff testified that his employer instructed him on the tasks that he was to perform, and there is no evidence that defendants exercised any supervision or control over plaintiff's work (see Howard v Turner Constr. Co., 134 AD3d 523, 524-525 [1st Dept 2015]). Furthermore, plaintiff's Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6) claims were not viable in light of the homeowner's exemptions set forth in the statutes (see Bartoo v Buell, 87 NY2d 362, 368-369 [1996]; Farias v Simon, 122 AD3d 466 [1st Dept 2014]. Concur—Acosta, J.P., Richter, Andrias, Kahn and Gesmer, JJ.