Supreme Court, Suffolk County, December 7, 2017

Gail S. Lauzon, Hicksville, for petitioner.

Cerussi & Gunn, P.C., Garden City, for respondent.

The motion is decided as follows: it is ordered that, inasmuch{**58 Misc 3d at 602} as this matter was not resolved at a conference held with the court and counsel for the parties, the application (No. 001) by petitioner, Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), for a stay of arbitration is hereby granted and the respondent, Caitlin Minton, is permanently stayed from proceeding to arbitration with GEICO for the accident of November 26, 2014; and it is further ordered that counsel for GEICO shall promptly serve a copy of this order via first-class mail upon counsel for the respondent, and shall promptly thereafter file the affidavit of such service with the Suffolk County Clerk.

This action arose from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on November 26, 2014. When the accident occurred, the respondent, Caitlin Minton, was operating a 2007 Toyota when it was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by Christopher Savage. At the time of the accident, Minton's vehicle was insured by GEICO under a policy with bodily injury (BI) and supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorist (SUM) coverage limits of $25,000/$50,000, while Savage's vehicle was insured by National Liability & Fire Insurance Co. with a BI limit of $25,000. Given the minimum limits and offset provisions of Minton's SUM endorsement, SUM coverage was not available to Minton under her own policy with GEICO. Instead, Minton served GEICO with a demand for arbitration under a policy of insurance issued by GEICO to Minton's same-sex partner, Vanessa Guarino, which carried BI and SUM limits of $100,000/$300,000.

Minton's demand for SUM arbitration under the Guarino policy is premised upon Minton's allegation that she resided with Guarino on the date of the subject accident. GEICO contends, however, that Minton was not a "resident relative" of Guarino's household on the date of the accident and that, therefore, Minton is not entitled to SUM benefits under Guarino's policy. Consequently, GEICO seeks an order permanently staying Minton from proceeding to SUM arbitration.

In support of its petition GEICO annexes the relevant declarations page from the Guarino policy, which shows that while Guarino's address was "29 Hulse Ave., Wading River" on the date of the accident, the relevant police accident report lists Minton's address as "119 Hampton Vista Dr., Manorville." Therefore, GEICO denied Minton's claim for SUM coverage under Guarino's policy on the grounds that Minton was neither a "resident relative" of Guarino, nor a "named insured" under Guarino's policy. Accordingly, GEICO argues that Minton is not{**58 Misc 3d at 603} entitled to proceed to SUM arbitration against GEICO under Guarino's policy.

Pursuant to paragraph 1 of the definitions section of Guarino's GEICO SUM endorsement, "insured" is defined as: "(a) you [Guarino], as the named insured and, while residents of the same household, your spouse and the relatives of either you or your spouse."

In opposition to GEICO's petition to stay arbitration, Minton contends that the 119 Hampton Vista Drive, Manorville address listed on the police report was a temporary address, and that since July of 2014 she has continuously resided with Guarino at 29 Hulse Avenue, Wading River. In support of this contention, Minton submits a copy of her November 26, 2014 accident-related hospital registration record, as well as a bank statement, each listing her address [*2]as 29 Hulse Avenue, Wading River. Minton further contends that since July 2014 she and Guarino have "lived together at [that] address . . . in a committed relationship as if [they] were in a traditional 'spouse' relationship."

Here, it is undisputed that Minton was not a named insured under Guarino's GEICO policy. It is also beyond dispute that, despite their committed, "as if" spouses, relationship, Minton and Guarino were not legally married on the date of the accident. Therefore, irrespective of the residency issue, Minton did not meet the definition of "insured" under Guarino's GEICO SUM endorsement by virtue of a spousal relationship.

It is the courts' responsibility to determine the rights and obligations of parties under insurance contracts based on the specific language of the policies whose unambiguous provisions must be given their plain and ordinary meaning (see Matter of Encompass Indem. Co. v USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 61 AD3d 974 [2d Dept 2009]; Labate v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 45 AD3d 811 [2d Dept 2007]). While it is true that policies of insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer, where the provisions of the policy are clear and unambiguous they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning, and courts should refrain from rewriting the agreement (see Maurice Goldman & Sons v Hanover Ins. Co., 80 NY2d 986 [1992]; Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Kligler, 42 NY2d 863 [1977]; Marshall v Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y., 44 AD3d 1014 [2d Dept 2007]).

It is evident from the face of the GEICO policy that there is only one named insured, Guarino, and that the language of the{**58 Misc 3d at 604} policy does not give rise to any ambiguity (see Matter of Government Gen. Empls. Ins. Co. v Constantino, 49 AD3d 736 [2d Dept 2008]). The plain meaning of a policy's language may not be disregarded in order to find an ambiguity where none exists (see Empire Fire & Mar. Ins. Co. v Eveready Ins. Co., 48 AD3d 406 [2d Dept 2008]; Bassuk Bros. v Utica First Ins. Co., 1 AD3d 470 [2d Dept 2003]). A court will not strain to create unclarity (see Caporino v Travelers Ins. Co., 62 NY2d 234 [1984]). Likewise, equitable considerations will not allow an extension of coverage beyond its fair intent and meaning (see Eisner v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 141 Misc 2d 744 [Sup Ct, NY County 1988]).

In addition to seeking coverage as Guarino's presumed spouse, Minton uses the expansive definition of "family" set forth in Braschi v Stahl Assoc. Co. (74 NY2d 201 [1989]) to argue that as Guarino's same-sex partner, she is entitled to coverage as Guarino's "relative." Such argument, however, is unavailing. The expansive definition of "family" set forth in Braschi was applied to rent-stabilized tenants, in the context of rent stabilization laws being substantially the same as rent control laws, and has no bearing on interpreting different statutes with different statutory purposes (see Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v Pine, 44 AD3d 636 [2d Dept 2007]). In fact, unlike Braschi, this case "does not involve the interpretation of a statute at all, but rather a contractual provision, [and] there is no basis for applying the expansive definition of family set forth in Braschi" (Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v Pine, 44 AD3d at 640). Likewise, under the facts of this case, there is no basis to broaden the definition of "spouse" or "relative" to include Minton as an insured under the SUM provisions of Guarino's GEICO policy (see Matter of Cooper, 187 AD2d 128 [2d Dept 1993]).

Since Minton was neither a married spouse nor a relative of Guarino at the time of her accident, she is not entitled to coverage under the SUM endorsement issued by GEICO to Guarino (see Matter of Government Gen. Empls. Ins. Co. v Constantino, 49 AD3d 736 [2d Dept 2008]). Therefore, GEICO's petition is granted and Minton is permanently stayed from proceeding to arbitration with GEICO for the accident of November 26, 2014.